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ABSTRACT
My dissertation explores how and why firms facing the same exogenous threats react differently,
leading to different business model innovation (BMI) processes. I examine BMI in a context that
has been hard-hit by COVID-19 pandemic restrictions—the restaurant industry. Employing a
mixed-method research design, I conducted a longitudinal, inductive comparative case study of
17 restaurateurs in the same geographic region to explore how they have responded to the
pandemic and how their BMI unfolded over time. To generalize my understanding of these
processes, I then analyzed large-scale media data about the restaurant industry using topic
modeling. In this quantitative analysis, I explored relationships identified in the inductive study.
From these analyses, I identified a new theoretical lens to explain how entrepreneurs engage in
BMI during a crisis: sensemaking. Using different sensemaking frames (opportunity and threat),
restauranteurs in this study undertook different patterns of BMI actions. Specifically, those who
adopted an opportunity sensemaking frame are linked to two BMI patterns, (1) replacing or
adding new business concepts and (2) expanding the business’s physical structure. Those who
had a threat frame are related to two BMI patterns, (3) improving operational efficiency and (4)
implementing temporary changes. In addition, unlike these restauranteurs, some restauranteurs
who engaged in low-level sensemaking are associated with a BMI pattern, (5) using the same old
business model. My topic modeling findings identify similar BMI patterns from restauranteurs
across the U.S. My dissertation contributes to our understanding of BMI actions and processes
by identifying the factors affecting BMI and explicating the dynamic processes BMI can take,
rather than forcing a single framework on what is inherently a multi-modal process.
Keywords
Business Model Innovation, COVID-19, Crisis, Sensemaking, Process Research.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In the valley of Elah, Goliath—the giant champion of the Philistines—held a sharp
javelin in one hand and shouted at the Israelites, “Send out your warrior.” In response, Saul—the
king of the Israelites—with his head in his hands, had to make a decision. The king decided to
send the shepherd boy David, rather than a soldier, to battle Goliath. While the giant and the
Philistines laughed at and mocked the boy, David slung his slingshot. When David’s rock struck
and killed the giant, the laughter stopped, and King Saul breathed a sigh of relief.
In 2020, COVID-19 challenged the world like Goliath challenged the Israelites, and
businesses have struggled to find solutions to the COVID-19 disruption. Just as Saul considered
several options in fighting the Philistines, in the face of the pandemic, businesses have responded
in various ways—from one extreme of accepting defeat or slightly changing to the other extreme
of making bold and novel moves that deviate significantly from their existing ways of
operating—just as King Saul did with his unconventional choice of sending David into battle.
Business owners and entrepreneurs are also dealing with stress from COVID-19, similar to King
Saul’s stress in his situation with Goliath. There is much more we need to understand about
business owners’ decisions and actions during this crisis. These decisions and actions affect how
they position themselves and operate in their industry by changing their system of business
activities (i.e., business model) (Martins, Rindova, & Greenbaum, 2015; Zott, Amit, & Massa,
2011).
In my dissertation, I studied the COVID-19 crisis to understand how and why firms
facing the same exogenous threat react differently, making different business model innovations
and undertaking different business model innovation processes. Specifically, my research
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questions are: (1) What are decision-makers’ business model innovations in response to the
COVID-19 crisis and (2) how and why has their BMI unfolded differently over time given the
same exogenous change? With the first question, I explored how small business owners have
operated and offered value via their business model changes during the pandemic. With the
second question, I investigated decision-makers’ different actions and factors affecting the BMI
process during the pandemic (Foss & Saebi, 2017; Martins et al., 2015). By building on different
theoretical lenses (i.e., rational, evolutionary, and cognitive) employed in BMI research, I studied
business model changes in a context that has experienced significant and sustained pressures
resulting from the COVID-19 crisis—the restaurant and food-service industry. I used a mixedmethod research design. First, I conducted an inductive study using in-depth, open-ended
interviews with restaurant owners and entrepreneurs. To further explore relationships uncovered
in my field research, and to extend understanding by accounting for regional influences, I then
analyzed large-scale media data using topic modeling to systematically explore and verify
relationships identified in the inductive study.
Business models are defined as “the designed system of activities through which a firm
creates and captures value” (Martins et al., 2015: 99). Over time, business models change
through a process referred to as business model innovation (BMI) (Martins et al., 2015; Mitchell
& Coles, 2003; Zott et al., 2011). Many researchers agree that business models and the process
of changing a business model need to be further researched, noting the lack of theoretical
understanding about business model creation and the mixed results of BMI empirical studies,
which have failed to generate cumulative, consistent insights (Demil, Lecocq, Ricart, & Zott,
2015; Foss & Saebi, 2017; Massa, Tucci, & Afuah, 2017; Martins et al., 2015; Sorescu, 2017).
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Some researchers note that the business model is “a slippery construct to study”
(Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013: 480), representing the controversy about whether business
models represent a stand-alone construct, or is just another name for strategy (Foss & Saebi,
2017; Massa et al., 2017). Some studies emphasize the latter perspective, stating: “the role of
business models in explaining value captured relative to competition—[is] a staple of strategy
research” (Massa et al., 2017: 90). This view is more externally oriented and compares a focal
firm to other firms in their industry. However, many researchers argue that business model
studies are distinct from strategy because business models emphasize creating value (even in
temporary ways) over establishing sustainable competitive advantages (Amit & Zott, 2001;
Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2011; Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002; Massa et al., 2017;
McDonald & Eisenhardt, 2020). In their view, the focus is on internal changes and adjustments
involving many stakeholders. I adopt this perspective and treat business models as distinct from
strategy because of their focus on the organization and organizational changes instead of on
external positioning, and BMI as the process of changing a business model over time.
In my dissertation, I build on the growing body of research about business model
innovation. Factors that scholars have found affect BMI include, but are not limited to, the
impact of external changes (e.g., technological shocks, regulatory changes, and crises) that are
beyond a firm’s competitive environment (Amit & Zott, 2001; Osiyevskyy & Dewald, 2018;
Saebi, Lien, & Foss, 2017); access to organizational capabilities (e.g., resources and networks)
(Doz & Kosonen, 2010; Guo, Su, & Ahlstrom, 2016; Miller, McAdam, & McAdam, 2014); and
decision-makers’ cognitive processes (Aspara, Lamberg, Laukia, & Tikkanen, 2013; Martins et
al., 2015). Many empirical studies have focused primarily on the results of BMI emerging from
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an undescribed “black box” process. Thus, the process of business model development and
change has not been fully explored.
Cases have been used to research BMI, and these studies provide descriptive explanations
of new business models’ emergence. Yet, these studies have not fully explained the factors
underlying the BMI process (Amit & Zott, 2015; Bohnsack, Pinkse, & Kolk, 2014; Doz &
Kosonen, 2010; Osiyevskyy & Dewald, 2015). In assessing the way forward in BMI research,
Foss and Saebi (2017: 209) argued that “the process approach to BMI may inherently require
more of a qualitative approach than the content approach.” My dissertation takes the next needed
step in BMI research. I (a) closely examined the BMIs of several firms facing the same
exogenous shocks, (b) was open to many factors that can explain these changes, and (c) followed
my qualitative comparative case study with a large-scale examination using media accounts to
further explore these relationships. In the following sections, I provide more background on the
BMI construct and factors affecting business model changes.
Business Model Innovation. The fact that “business models matter” (Chesbrough, 2007:
12) is a key assumption among management researchers, as reflected in the increasing number of
studies about BMI over the past 20 years (Foss & Saebi, 2017; Massa et al., 2017). As noted
above, a firm’s business model is defined as a designed system of interdependent activities to
create and capture value (Martins et al., 2015; Zott & Amit, 2010). As Martins and colleagues
(2015) noted, business models evolve to continually create and capture value. Yet, the distinctly
different definitions, measurements, and methods in the BMI literature have led to mixed
findings across studies, limiting cumulative insights.
First, studies vary in whether they define BMI as an outcome or an organizational
process. Studies that define BMI as an outcome primarily examine a new business model’s
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emergence in a particular firm or an industry (Abdelkafi, Makhotin, & Posselt, 2013; Anderson
& Kupp, 2008; Schneider & Spieth, 2013; Sorescu, 2017). Focusing on one point in time, these
studies compare firms’ old and new business models; however, the process that occurs in
between that generates the new outcome is an uninvestigated “black box.” Studies using a
process definition of BMI focus on the patterns of firms’ decisions and actions over time, and on
how business models are modified across this process (Demil & Lecocq, 2010; Doz & Kosonen,
2010; McDonald & Eisenhardt, 2020; Sosna, Trevinyo-Rodriguez, & Velamuri, 2010).
Therefore, Foss and Saebi (2017: 207) note that BMI “definitions abound, differ markedly, and
are often ambiguous.” I am interested in the process of business model change over time, not the
more static approach of describing a business model at one point in time (i.e., the outcome
approach).
Second, because of these different definitions, measurement approaches used to capture
BMI have varied. Studies treating BMI as an outcome have primarily used surveys with
retrospective questions and archival data, such as annual reports and firms’ websites, to assess
these BMI outcomes. For example, Saebi and colleagues (2017) surveyed respondents about
their firm’s previous BMI. In studies using archival data, researchers capture BMI by coding new
business models at one point in time. For example, Kim and Min (2015) captured BMI as an
outcome by counting retailers’ online stores in annual reports and websites. Similarly, Visnjic
and colleagues (Visnjic, Wiengarten, & Neely, 2016) used manufacturing firms’ annual reports
and coded BMI as different offerings described and seen in these documents. BMI process
studies have also used survey and archival methods. In BMI process research, survey items
measure the intentions of decision makers regarding business model changes and how they are
planning to make those changes (Aspara, Hietanen, & Tikkanen, 2010; Bock, Opsahl, George, &
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Gann, 2012; Osiyevskyy & Dewald, 2018). Process studies using archival data measure BMI by
coding firms’ activities and changes over time. For example, Bohnsack and colleagues (2014)
measured BMI process by capturing detailed patterns of firms’ actions over time using public
press articles.
Third, both BMI outcome and BMI process research have used single and multiple case
studies employing archival data and/or field investigations (Foss & Saebi, 2017). For instance,
BMI outcome researchers have studied single and multiple companies across industries such as
telecommunications (Anderson & Kupp, 2008), banking (Yunus, Moingeon, & Lehmann-Ortega,
2010), and restaurants (Franceschelli, Santoro, & Candelo, 2018). Similarly, BMI process
researchers have studied high technology firms (Cavalcante, 2014), digital platform startups
(Ghezzi & Cavallo, 2020), a professional football club (Demil & Lecocq, 2010), and a nutritionmanagement firm (Sosna et al., 2010). Despite all these case studies in varied contexts, most
have been descriptive, idiosyncratic accounts of what occurred in a particular context. Most of
these studies also take a retrospective approach rather than a real-time investigation by asking
about current challenges and actions. Therefore, these BMI studies have not led to cumulative,
novel insights, and we still lack a comprehensive understanding of BMI’s dynamic processes.
Given the different definitions, methodologies, measures, and contexts in empirical BMI
research, it is unsurprising that findings have been mixed and/or non-cumulative (Foss & Saebi,
2017). For instance, some researchers who have explored BMI as an outcome have found BMI’s
positive effects on profitability and other aspects of externally-facing performance metrics
(Denicolai, Ramirez, & Tidd, 2014; Kim & Min, 2015; Zott & Amit, 2007). In contrast, other
empirical studies have found no support for these relationships (Knudsen & Mortensen, 2011;
Visnjic & Looy, 2013). Also, some researchers have discussed BMI as a key predictor of
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strategic flexibility (Bashir & Verma, 2019) and strategic agility (Arbussa, Bikfalvi, & Marquès,
2017; Clauss, Abebe, Tangpong, & Hock, 2019). However, other empirical research did not find
a direct relationship between BMI and either strategic flexibility (Bock et al., 2012; Schneider &
Spieth, 2014) or strategic agility (Djaja & Arief, 2015; Hock, Clauss, & Schulz, 2016). Some
studies have even identified BMI as moderating or mediating the effects of other constructs (e.g.,
firm performance, resources, organizational culture).
Because of these mixed findings and limited generalizable theory development, Foss and
Saebi (2017) called for more empirical studies that can provide “conceptual clarification,
theoretical models, and cumulative empirical work” (p. 222). My dissertation responds to this
call by answering my first research question—What are decision-makers’ decisions and actions
regarding BMI in response to the COVID-19 crisis? Using different data sources (i.e., interviews
and archival data), I examined the unfolding BMI process over time, and in real time, I also
conducted a large-scale investigation of BMI. As a result, I clarify the BMI construct, identify
individual and contextual factors that influence BMI, and elaborate on how the process unfolds.
In the next section, I review factors in previous research addressing BMI change processes,
which provide further theoretical insights in this area.
Factors Affecting BMI Processes. My second research question is how and why do
decision-makers’ BMI unfolded differently over time given the same exogenous change? I
considered factors and mechanisms from previous BMI studies. Yet, given the inductive nature
of my field study, I was open to insights beyond existing explanations. Martins and colleagues
(2015) identified three lenses—rational, evolutionary, and cognitive—used in previous BMI
research to explain how and why business models change. These three lenses highlight different
factors affecting BMI.
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The rational lens emphasizes exogenous factors, such as significant industry or
technological disruptions, as the main drivers for BMI (Amit & Zott, 2001; Bask, MerisaloRantanen, Tinnilä, & Lauraeus, 2012; Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013). Studies with this view
highlight that BMI occurs because an environmental change disrupts a firm’s business model
(e.g., Amit & Zott, 2001). Firms engage in the BMI process because a new environment
introduces new challenges, such as key resources becoming unobtainable (e.g., Pearson & Clair,
1998; Kim & Min, 2015) and stable stakeholders’ actions becoming unpredictable (e.g., Pajunen,
2006; Teece, 2010). Teece (2010) (also quoted by Martins and colleagues) discussed the logic of
this view: “…when the underlying technology changes, and an established logic for satisfying
consumer needs…is overturned, the business model must change too” (Martins et al., 2015:
101). Thus, the rational perspective suggests that BMI fits with external conditions to optimize
value creation, occurring through a rational optimization process (e.g., Amit & Zott, 2001;
Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010; Teece, 2010). However, the rational lens treats BMI as an
outcome in which managers make concrete decisions to rationally optimize the BMI process in
the face of exogenous shocks (Martins et al., 2015). This lens is limited to explaining firms’
different decision-making processes and idiosyncratic actions in the face of similar conditions.
The evolutionary lens highlights decision-makers’ perceptions of problems or
opportunities as the main drivers for BMI (Martins et al., 2015; Osiyevskyy & Dewald, 2018).
This view also focuses on external factors; but unlike the rational view, it emphasizes the role of
adaptation (i.e., incremental changes to BMI) and trial-and-error experimentation (e.g.,
Chesbrough, 2010; McDonald & Eisenhardt, 2020; Sosna et al., 2010). For instance, decision
makers may react to new problems emerging from environmental change by searching for a
solution—first through familiar problem-solving routines and then more distally if they cannot
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identify a satisfactory solution (Audia & Greve, 2006; Cyert & March, 1963; Sosna et al., 2010).
Learning and incrementally adapting are key factors of the BMI process according to this
perspective; however, while it is well suited to explain incremental BMI changes, but it does not
explain radical BMI decisions and actions (Sorescu, 2017).
The cognitive view does not rely on external changes and stimuli to affect the BMI
process. Instead, this perspective contends that BMI changes in relation to decision-makers’
understandings of different business models; thus, decision makers can make changes
independent of exogenous challenges (Doz & Kosonen, 2010; Martins et al., 2015). Martins and
colleagues (2015) suggested that decision-makers’ schemas provide new possibilities for
changing business models through a process of designing, combining, and generating innovative
ideas (Aspara et al., 2013; Massa et al., 2017). In this view, decision-makers’ knowledge and
understanding of various business models are important factors for innovating business models.
For instance, Martins and colleagues (2015) introduced the two cognitive mechanisms—
analogical reasoning (i.e., comparing similarities between a firm’s and other firms’ business
models) and conceptual combination (i.e., comparing differences among various business
concepts)—that decision makers can use to generate new business models. Thus, with the
cognitive lens, decision-makers’ characteristics and experiences play an important role in the
BMI process, but it can also accommodate exogenous influences that trigger decision-makers’
cognitions. Thus, the cognitive view can explain decision-makers’ BMI intentions by addressing
various issues (different BMI processes, idiosyncratic decisions and actions, and radical changes)
that different views may not answer. Nevertheless, Massa et al. (2017) stated that researchers
with the cognitive lens face challenges in identifying the BMI’s origin and its changes over time
because often decision-makers’ cognition changes do not lead to firms’ attribute changes.
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These three views highlight different factors and distinct ways to innovate business
models (e.g., value optimization, incremental changes, and potentially radical changes). BMI
researchers have often tended to adopt one of these lenses to explain BMI processes. A notable
exception is Amit and Zott (2015), who approached the BMI process using multiple factors
(managerial goals, others’ business models, stakeholder activities, and environmental
constraints) to understand BMI outcomes. They used four different BMI outcomes, such as
novelty (i.e., adoption of new activities), lock-in (i.e., ability to attract and keep stakeholders),
complementarities (i.e., reinforce activities), and efficiency (i.e., cost-reducing activities). To
conduct this exploratory study, Amit and Zott (2015) interviewed executives of nine ventures
multiple times during 2007 and 2008. They provided rich insights into a variety of factors
leading to a BMI change and they linked different antecedents and results to develop a more
predictive theory. For instance, environmental constraints and existing business models can
stimulate entrepreneurs’ creativity to create novel business models, and entrepreneurs’ goals and
stakeholders’ activities enhance firms’ business models to attract more stakeholders (Amit &
Zott, 2015). Yet, while they addressed antecedents affecting BMI and outcomes, this study does
not clearly address BMI as a process, which is my focus.
In addition, what has not been clearly studied is how and why firms facing the same
exogenous threat react differently by making different BMI changes and undertaking different
BMI processes. While many researchers have stated that decisions and actions are essential for
BMI (Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2011; Chesbrough, 2010; Doz & Kosonen, 2010; Martins et
al., 2015), the field has not fully uncovered the BMI processes and factors that lead decision
makers to different BMI choices. Furthermore, studying firms over time reveals how different
factors come into play. The longitudinal focus provides an opportunity to see whether BMI
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occurs in response to an environmental shock, factors that influence when and how BMI occurs,
and how BMI changes over time in response to experience and additional environmental shifts. I
examined the speed and magnitude of response from different decision makers and observed
BMI changes based on their schemas, firms’ conditions, and their perceptions of problems and
opportunities. Thus, my research clarifies what BMI is as well as how and why it differently
changes over time in the face of the same external change by observing restauranteurs’ decisions
and actions, and the patterns of their BMI process.
Research Context
My dissertation focused on the restaurant and food-service industry. On March 11, 2020,
the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the spread of coronavirus a pandemic. As a
result, many state and local governments in the United States enacted restrictions on restaurants.
Many restaurants posted signs saying, “CLOSED until further notice.” Even when regulations
eased weeks later, restauranteurs struggled to deal with environmental changes. Understanding
these restauranteurs’ stories during the COVID-19 crisis is important because restaurants (a) are
many cities’ essential economic pillars; (b) are closely linked to other industries; (c) are largely
owner-operated; (d) employ millions; (e) are ubiquitous; (f) vary dramatically in size, resource
availability, and market segments served; (g) have been hit extremely hard by the COVID-19
crisis; and (h) have visible business models (i.e., menus, physical spaces: see Björklund,
Mikkonen, Mattila, & van der Marel, 2020). Thus, from a research perspective, the restaurant
and food service industry’s characteristics are useful for understanding different types of BMIs.
A sudden and unprecedented event offers new opportunities and insights while putting
most firms at risk by violating their organization-environment fit, raising decision uncertainty,
and hindering strategic actions. Thus, decision-makers’ leadership and responsibility are more
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important than ever, and their decisions are probably more carefully considered because of the
higher risks from their environments. I believe that a crisis setting is an opportunity to delve
deeply into business owners’ decision-making mechanisms and problem-solving processes.
Exploring a crisis setting creates a common threat, and provides the opportunity to explore realtime sensemaking, enhancing our understanding of business model changes in a temporally
compressed fashion. Management research has not fully uncovered the reasons for different
business owners’ reactions and adaptations to external challenges (Foss & Saebi, 2017). My
study contributes to understanding what their BMI decisions and actions are in response to the
COVID-19, why decision makers use BMI differently, and how they innovate new business
models over time during the pandemic crisis.
Qualitative Study Methods
I used a multiple case design involving 17 restaurants or restaurant groups from one city
in the Southeastern United States. These restaurants were selected to include organizations of
different sizes, with different histories, cuisines, locations, and resources. I interviewed the
owners of these firms—and in some cases key managers who participate in decision making as
well—as they control the decisions made and can explain their decisions and actions. I
conducted three panels of open-ended, semi-structured interviews (Eisenhardt, 1989). After
interviewing these restaurants’ owners, I analyzed their responses to address (a) their decisions
and actions during the COVID-19 pandemic and (b) how and why their BMI unfolded differently
when confronted with the same external challenge.
The interviews took place (1) after the initial implementation of, and then the gradual
lifting of wide-spread government restrictions (May to July 2020), (2) before the November 2020
U.S. presidential election (mid-October to early November 2020), and (3) a year after the initial
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responses to the pandemic and vaccines began to mitigate the COVID-19 threat (May to June
2021). I supplemented each case with photographs taken throughout the yearlong data collection
process; I also captured restaurant data from social media and local news media (Mathison,
1988; Sjödin, Parida, Jovanovic, & Visnjic, 2020). Based on these data, I conducted an in-depth
analysis of each case across the three interviews using open coding employing Computer Aided
Qualitative Data Analysis software QDA Miner (CAQDAS). I created a narrative for each case
followed by a visual map of how the process unfolded and key factors affecting the process
(Langley, 1999). From this within case analysis, I identified different BMI patterns and key
factors that influenced why the restaurateurs pursued them.
After I have gained an in-depth understanding of each case—the BMI actions taken and
explanations for decisions—I then compared across the cases in a synthetic process data analysis
approach (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Langley, 1999). Through an iterative process I
compared and contrasted each case until I identified common groups of firms employing similar
BMI patterns. Several patterns emerged from this analysis representing different BMI actions. I
then compared factors evident within a group of firms with similar BMI actions as well as
compared factors found in other patterns with different BMI actions. The key feature of the
multiple case analysis was capturing similar or different BMI actions and the factors that affect
the actions. This analysis generated a rich and detailed picture of BMI in terms of what has been
undertaken and why.
I found that the restauranteurs employed two different sensemaking frames to understand
their environmental and organizational cues, and that each sensemaking frame was associated
with different patterns. Those who interpreted organizational and environmental cues using an
opportunity sensemaking frame employed two BMI patterns, (1) replacing or adding new
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business concepts or (2) expanding the business’s physical structure. Those who interpreted
environmental and organizational cues using a threat sensemaking frame pursued two other BMI
patterns, (3) improving operational efficiency or (4) implementing temporary changes.
Furthermore, restauranteurs who engaged in low-level sensemaking undertook minimal or no
BMI, (5) using the same old business model.
Topic Modeling Study Methods
In addition, in my second study, I compiled a large textual dataset to identify broad
patterns, including those arising from my inductive, interpretive interviews (Sonpar & GoldenBiddle, 2008). This database consisted of public press articles from national media sources
related to the U.S. restaurant and food-service industry. Using topic modeling, I analyzed this
corpus of documents. The reason for using the articles from various regions is because my first
qualitative study focuses on an area in the Southeastern United States where COVID-19
restrictions have not been as strong compared to other regions in the US. The severity of the
restrictions and attitudes towards fighting the coronavirus via mask mandates, business shutdown
orders, and stay-at-home orders have been more relaxed than other regions (Lee et al., 2020). In
addition, relatively mild winter weather conditions allow restaurants to offer more outdoor
dining compared to the Northern states where average temperatures often fall below zero degrees
(Fahrenheit) during the winter. As a consequence, the environmental contingencies that a
restaurant faces vary across geographic and political regions (i.e., Democrats, Republicans).
Topic modeling allowed me to assess differences in restaurant owners’ actions based on the
severity of the pandemic crisis as well as other factors such as local restrictions and weather.
Many management studies have used topic modeling within large amounts of textual data
to identify key themes (i.e., categorized words and/or phrases) (Croidieu & Kim, 2018; Hannigan
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et al., 2019; Kaplan & Vakili, 2015; Kobayashi et al., 2018; Schmiedel, Müller, & vom Brocke,
2019). I used topic modeling to identify how topics changed over time by geographic locale, the
severity of the COVID-19 cases, and other factors. Thus, researchers can extract latent topics
representing ideas from textual data and compare them with other attributes through topic
modeling analysis (Blei, Ng, & Jordan, 2003; Schmiedel et al., 2019).
My topic modeling analysis used the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) approach, which
is widely used and well accepted in management studies. Topic identification allows the
researcher to isolate regional differences as well as companies’ decisions and actions over time
(e.g., Antons, Kleer, & Salge, 2016; Croidieu, & Kim, 2018; Giorgi, Maoret, & Zajac, 2019;
Kaplan & Vakili, 2015). Using national-level restaurant data, I combined topic modeling themes
with factors such as different regions (e.g., East North Central, South Atlantic, and Mountain)
and political party strength (i.e., Democrats, Republicans) to identify different environmental
conditions and business owners’ decisions and actions in modifying business models. Using an
LDA model I captured 53 topics, interpreted each topic’s meaning, and then further classified the
documents by month and state to provide a more detailed analysis (Croidieu & Kim, 2018). This
technique allowed me to understand how different business models emerged and evolved over
time in different areas in the United States.
Based on my topic modeling analysis, I confirmed the four BMI patterns related to
different sensemaking frames (opportunity and threat) that I identified in my qualitative analysis.
I also found that different BMI patterns may be connected to environmental changes. Differences
in environmental conditions can either strengthen or weaken restauranteurs’ involvement in
certain BMI patterns, yet the differences were small. Therefore, I found that entrepreneurs’ BMI
actions cannot be explained by environmental differences alone, and relying on certain
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exogenous changes, organizational challenges, and business-model knowledge may be
insufficient to understand the big picture of the BMI actions and process. In the following
chapter, I discuss a comprehensive overview of BMI literature, research gaps in the field, and my
dissertation research questions.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The concept of business models has been around for a long time (e.g., Bellman, Clark,
Malcolm, Craft, & Ricciardi, 1957), but it started becoming widely discussed in the mid-1990s
with the advent of internet-based businesses (Amit & Zott, 2020; Foss & Saebi, 2017). Firms
were interested in doing business in new ways in response to the new markets, and researchers
recognized firms’ innovative actions in their business models (Amit & Zott, 2001; Magretta,
2002). Interest in business model innovation (BMI) grew in the early 2000s, paralleling the
growth in online businesses (Amit & Zott, 2001; Foss & Saebi, 2017). Amazon, eBay, Netflix,
and other online companies grew dramatically, becoming giants and threatening traditional firms
and their ways of doing business. For instance, Airbnb changed the traditional hospitality
industry's landscape by connecting travelers with individual “hosts” willing to rent rooms, or
their entire homes, through an online platform. Its business model broke through the hotel
industry’s barriers to entry and enlarged the industry’s economic pie (Bashir & Verma, 2016).
While these new firms had well-honed business models that created value, traditional firms
continued innovating existing strategic frameworks and value-chain models (producing and
delivering products/services) to achieve a competitive advantage (Amit & Zott, 2020). For
example, in response to the market changes Airbnb created, many hotels were involved in
changing traditional business models by restructuring and improving operations to enhance
customers’ satisfaction (Zach, Nicolau, & Sharma, 2020).
Changes in business models are pervasive phenomena that happen across industries such
as manufacturing (e.g., Sjödin, Parida, Jovanovic, & Visnjic, 2020; Witell & Löfgren, 2013),
retail (e.g., Kim & Min, 2015; Sohl, Vroom, & McCann, 2020), financial service (e.g.,
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McDonald & Eisenhardt, 2020; Yunus, Moingeon, & Lehmann-Ortega, 2010), and many others
(e.g., Saebi, Lien, & Foss, 2017; Osiyevskyy & Dewald, 2015). The many stories about new
business models and business model changes have attracted managers to engage in BMI (Kim &
Min, 2015; Martins, Rindova, & Greenbaum, 2015; McDonald & Eisenhardt, 2020). For
instance, the Boston Consulting Group’s 2014 reports revealed that 94 percent of 1,500 senior
executives said their firms engaged in business model innovation to some degree (Lindgardt &
Ayers, 2014).
Although BMI is happening everywhere for different reasons, “BMI research is relatively
recent and non-cumulative” (Foss & Saebi, 2017: 203). As Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu (2013)
noted, the business model is “a slippery construct to study” (p. 480); therefore, researchers have
not systemically understood what BMI is, or how and why firms engage it. Based on my review
of the BMI literature, I consider how the distinctly different definitions, measurements, and
methods in BMI research that have limited our ability to develop cumulative insights.
The term business model innovation (BMI) has not been clearly defined; as a result,
scholars have used it in a variety of confusing ways. Some researchers treat outcomes (i.e., new
business models), such as Airbnb’s online platform, as BMI (Teece, 2010; Zach et al., 2020).
Because these researchers see new systems (Kim & Min, 2015; Sohl et al., 2020) or new services
(Visnjic, Van Looy, & Neely, 2013; Visnjic, Wiengarten, & Neely, 2016) as BMI, BMI’s scope
is limited, and ignores other business model changes. Other researchers consider BMI a process
involved in creating successful business models (Demil & Lecocq, 2010; McDonald &
Eisenhardt, 2020), and focus on the mechanisms underlying how new business models emerge
(e.g., BMI’s causes and the processes employed by Airbnb).
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In my literature review, I provide a comprehensive overview of BMI research by
separating the two main BMI research streams into outcome research and process research, and
then comparing them (Foss & Saebi, 2017; Demil & Lecocq, 2010). I then focus on BMI process
research and discuss the three theoretical lenses (rational, evolutionary, and cognitive) proposed
by Martins and colleagues (2015). Finally, I identify why the following research questions on
BMI are needed: (1) What are the processes decision makers use to engage in BMI when
responding to crises? and (2) How and why have these BMIs unfolded differently over time and
firms, given the same exogenous change?
BMI: An Outcome or a Process
Although a business model is clearly defined as “the designed system of activities
through which a firm creates and captures value” (Martins et al., 2015: 99), opinions vary on
whether BMI is (a) an outcome (new or changed business model) or (b) a process (the way
business models are created or changed). After reviewing prior BMI studies and identifying
different BMI definitions, Foss and Saebi (2017) stated that “definitions abound, differ
markedly, and are often ambiguous” (Foss & Saebi, 2017: 207). The different conceptualizations
of BMI as outcomes and processes hinder BMI research’s cumulative development. Thus, I
review the BMI literature to gain insight into the landscape of BMI research in terms of
conceptualizations and methods. I then propose why the process approach is more suitable for
understanding BMI.
1. Defining BMI
Edward Sapir, an American linguist and anthropologist, said that “one of the glories of
English simplicity is the possibility of using the same word as noun and verb” (Sapir, 2021: 114).
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I found that the word BMI has been used as a noun (i.e., an outcome) and a verb (i.e., a series of
actions, or process). BMI is interpreted differently in each research stream.
BMI outcome research
BMI outcome research focuses on newly designed systems in industries or firms
(Abdelkafi, Makhotin, & Posselt, 2013; Santos, Spector, & Van der Heyden, 2009; Sorescu,
2017), and these studies compare firms’ old and new business models. BMI outcome researchers
consider a new business model to be a form of innovation (Amit & Zott, 2001) and a set of
strategic actions (Chesbrough, 2007). Therefore, introducing new business models is recognized
as an innovative action. Within BMI outcome research, various levels of business model changes
result in different definitions. Table 2.1 summarizes the different levels of changes that are
considered BMIs. Some BMI outcome researchers argue that BMI includes incremental and
broad changes in business models (Abdelkafi et al., 2013; Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013;
Khanagha, Volberda, & Oshri, 2014), while others consider only radical changes as BMI (Foss
& Saebi, 2017; Sorescu, 2017). For instance, Sorescu (2017: 692) defined BMI “as a change in
the value creation, value appropriation, or value delivery function of a firm that results in a
significant change to the firm’s value proposition.” Foss and Saebi (2017: 201) defined BMI “as
designed, novel, and nontrivial changes to the key elements of a firm’s BM and/or the
architecture linking these elements.” However, Abdelkafi and colleagues (2013: 13) argued, “A
business model innovation happens when the company modifies or improves at least one of the
value dimensions.” Other BMI researchers have even defined any changes (incremental or
radical) in a firm’s business model as BMIs (Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013; Khanagha et al.,
2014; Skarzynski & Gibson, 2008).
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Table 2.1. BMI Definitions in Outcome Research
Definition Types

Author(s)
Foss & Saebi (2017:
216)

“We define a BMI as designed, novel, and nontrivial changes to
the key elements of a firm’s BM and/or the architecture linking
these elements.”

Gambardella &
McGahan (2010: 263)

“Business-model innovation occurs when a firm adopts a novel
approach to commercializing its underlying assets.”

Markides (2006: 20)

“Business model innovation is the discovery of a fundamentally
different business model in an existing business.”

Sorescu (2017: 692)

“A business model innovation is defined as a change in the value
creation, value appropriation, or value delivery function of a firm
that results in a significant change to the firm’s value proposition.”

Abdelkafi et al. (2013:
13)

“A business model innovation happens when the company
modifies or improves at least one of the value dimensions.”

Santos et al. (2009: 14)

“Business model innovation (BMI) is a reconfiguration of
activities in the existing business model of a firm that is new to the
product service market in which the firm competes.”

Casadesus-Masanell &
Zhu (2013: 464)

“At root, business model innovation refers to the search for new
logics of the firm and new ways to create and capture value for its
stakeholders; it focuses primarily on finding new ways to generate
revenues and define value propositions for customers, suppliers,
and partners.”

Khanagha et al. (2014:
324)

“Business model innovation activities can range from incremental
changes in individual components of business models, extension of
the existing business model, introduction of parallel business
models, right through to disruption of the business model, which
may potentially entail replacing the existing model with a
fundamentally different one.”

Skarzynski & Gibson
(2008: 111)

“Business model innovation is about creating fundamentally new
kinds of businesses, or about bringing more strategic variety into
the business you are already in — the kind of variety that is highly
valued by customers.”

Radical changes

Incremental
changes

Broad changes
(incremental and
radical changes)

Definitions
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BMI outcome researchers express their perspective with practical examples when
explaining BMI. Amit and Zott (2020) discussed Zopa, the first peer-to-peer online lending firm,
as an example of BMI. Although describing Zopa’s services and loans as similar to a standard
loan, they emphasized that the firm’s business model is distinct from traditional banks because
“everything happens online; it is a BMI” (Amit & Zott, 2020: 87). Girotra and Netessine (2011)
described MyFab, an internet-based furniture firm, as another example of BMI. MyFab uses
customer input in designing furniture—floating potential furniture designs to customers, then
using a voting system to identify the most popular designs. Because the business model is
different from that of the traditional furniture industry, Girotra and Netessine (2011) considered
it a BMI. Therefore, BMI outcome studies considered BMI to be a “noun” that describes a new
or developed system introduced into a firm or a market.
BMI process research
Other BMI researchers consider BMI the process of creating and developing business
models. They focus on business model changes as processes because a new business model “is
rarely found immediately, but requires progressive refinements to create internal consistency
and/or to adapt to its environment” (Demil & Lecocq, 2010: 228). These researchers focus on
explaining firms’ BMI based on different stages and patterns of changes across firms (Bohnsack,
Pinkse, & Kolk, 2014; Cavalcante, 2014; Ghezzi & Cavallo, 2020). BMI process studies
investigate BMI as a dynamic process rather than as static changes to an existing model
(Bucherer, Eisert, & Gassmann, 2012; Demil & Lecocq, 2010; Foss & Saebi, 2017).
As Table 2.2 shows, BMI process researchers define BMI as a continuous process of business
model change. Sosna and colleagues (Sosna, Trevinyo-Rodriguez, & Velamuri, 2010: 384)
stated that “firms begin with a business model and then—in response to certain triggers
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Table 2.2. BMI Definitions in Process Research
Definition Types

Fine tuning
process

Author(s)

Definitions

Demil & Lecocq
(2010: 227)

Business model evolution “as a fine tuning process involving
voluntary and emergent changes in and between permanently
linked core components”

Bucherer et al. (2012:
184)

“business model innovation as a process that deliberately changes
the core elements of a firm and its business logic.”

Sosna et al. (2010:
384)

“business model development as an initial experiment followed
by constant revision, adaptation and fine tuning based on trialand-error learning.”

McGrath (2010: 260)

“With new business models, experimentation is key, and it can
take place both within firms and across industries… some firms
develop superior capabilities at experimentation and consequently
can build better models more quickly than their slower
counterparts.”
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(typically external)—plan, design, test and re-test alternative business model variants until they
find the one that best suits their objectives.” McDonald and Eisenhardt (2020: 483) also
investigated nascent entrepreneurs’ behaviors in designing effective business models, and found
that they “(1) borrow (business models) from peers and focus on established substitutes for their
services or products, (2) test assumptions, then commit to a broad business-model template, and
(3) pause before elaborating the activity system.”
BMI process researchers use practical examples to support their conceptualizations of
BMI as fine-tuning processes and continuous experimentation (Demil & Lecocq, 2010;
McGrath, 2010). For instance, Aversa and colleagues (Aversa, Haefliger, Hueller, & Reza, 2020)
studied Amazon.com from 1995 to 2018, and the authors presented Amazon’s business model
changes and expansions over time. Amazon launched an online bookstore in 1995, and they
expanded their scope of products offered, becoming a diversified online retailer in 2000. From
2000 to 2010, they changed their distribution system and launched different online businesses
such as Amazon Prime, Mechanical Turk, and Web Services. From 2010 to 2018, Amazon
jumped into TV and Fire Phone services (discontinuing the phone service in 2015) and opened
physical stores. Their growth and expansion cannot be simply explained as adding new services,
because such additions require refinements in organizational structure (Demil & Lecocq, 2010)
and networks (Aversa et al., 2020). Therefore, BMI process studies consider BMI a “verb”
reflecting a series of actions and adjustments to find suitable business models.
BMI researchers treating BMI as an outcome or a process have both expanded our
understanding of BMI. However, their different BMI interpretations hamper building cumulative
knowledge because they lead researchers to take different empirical approaches to studying BMI.
In the next section, I discuss how the empirical differences in these two research streams.
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2. Methods Used to Empirically Study BMI
Different interpretations of BMI have led to differences in the methodology used. While
BMI researchers in both research streams used quantitative (i.e., analyzing survey and archival
data) and qualitative (i.e., analyzing interviews) methods, their applications differed depending
on their BMI interpretations. Using both methodological approaches, outcome researchers
focused on firms’ past BMI actions and new business models, while process researchers gave
attention to firms’ willingness to engage in BMI and BMI actions over time. In this section, I
discuss further how quantitative and qualitative methods were differently used in each research
stream.
BMI findings in quantitative studies
Outcome research. BMI outcome researchers believe that firms with a new business
model achieve better performance and survival in response to an environmental change (Kim &
Min, 2015; Pedersen, Gwozdz, & Hvass, 2018; Velu, 2015; Visnjic et al., 2016). That belief is
aligned with Chesbrough’s (2007: 12) argument that “A better business model often will beat a
better idea or technology.” Therefore, BMI outcome researchers typically measured BMI using
survey or secondary data, testing BMI’s relationships with environmental changes,
organizational factors (e.g., partnerships, strategic orientation), and firm performance (e.g.,
Karimi & Walter, 2016; Kim & Min, 2015; Saebi et al., 2017; Velu, 2015).
Studies using surveys capture BMI by asking managers about the degrees of change in
business models. For instance, Saebi and colleagues (2017) measured Norwegian firms’ changes
in response to the 2008 financial crisis using a survey, and found that firms were more likely to
adopt a new business model when decision makers perceived more threats than opportunities in
the face of the crisis. Velu (2015) also used a survey to measure BMI by asking questions of
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experts who understand the bond market. This approach involved sharing firms’ new business
models with experts and asking them about their perceptions of BMI. The author found a Ushaped relationship between BMI levels and firms’ survival rates—low (i.e., similar to the
traditional business model) and high (i.e., different and better than the traditional model) levels
of a BMI were positively associated with survival.
BMI outcome researchers have also measured BMI using secondary data by capturing
newly introduced business models. Kim and Min (2015) studied the relationship between retail
firms’ new business models and financial performance. Using retail firms’ annual reports, they
coded having online stores as BMI and found the new business models had a positive effect on
performance. Visnjic and colleagues (2016) studied manufacturing firms’ “servitization” (i.e.,
adding service-oriented business models) and its effects on performance. Also using annual
reports, these researchers found that firms with both product and service-oriented innovations
had better performance in the long term, while sacrificing short-term performance (Visnjic et al.,
2016).
Many BMI outcome researchers consider a new business model as BMI (Kim & Min,
2015; Saebi et al., 2017; Visnjic et al., 2016). Using survey and secondary sources, BMI
outcome researchers have suggested that (a) an environmental change often stimulates new
business models, (b) different organizational and managerial factors are positively associated
with BMI adoption, and (c) the new models are often positively related to firm performance. In
summary, BMI outcome studies with quantitative methods have mainly explained what drives
new business models and what happens after adopting them. The first section of Table 2.3
summarizes the relationship between BMI and other factors, BMI measurements, and previous
studies’ findings in BMI outcome research. Although this research stream has offered broad
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Table 2.3. Quantitative Methods in BMI Outcome and Process Studies
Research
Type

Relationship

BMI
Measurement

Environmental changes ➔
BMI adaptation

Survey

Organizational/Managerial
capability ➔
BMI adaptation

Survey
Secondary
data

BMI
Outcome
Research
BMI adaptation ➔
Firm Performance

BMI
Process
Research

Survey
Secondary
data

Findings
Perceived opportunities and
threats from environmental
changes increase BMI
adaptation.
Organizational and
managerial capabilities have a
positive relationship with
BMI adaptation.

BMI has a positive
relationship with firm
performance and
sustainability.

Example Studies
Saebi et al. (2017),
Velu & Jacob (2016)
Von Delft et al.
(2019), Guo et al.
(2016), Narayan et
al., (2020)
Cucculelli &
Bettinelli (2015), Kim
& Min (2015),
Pedersen et al.
(2018),
Sohl et al. (2020),
Visnjic et al. (2016),
Zott & Amit (2007)

BMI has a curvilinear
relationship (U or inverted U
shapes) with firm
performance or survival.

Karimi & Walter
(2016),
Velu (2015)

Osiyevskyy &
Dewald (2015, 2018)

Environmental changes ➔
BMI intention

Survey

Perceived opportunities and
threats from environmental
changes increase BMI
intention.

Organizational
differences ➔
Different BMI approaches

Survey
Secondary
data

Different conditions (e.g.,
organizational structures,
capabilities, and prior
business models) lead to
different BMI approaches.

Bohnsack et al.
(2014)
Eppler et al. (2011)

BMI intention and
experimentation have a
positive relationship with firm
performance.

Aspara et al. (2010),
Bouwman et al.
(2019),
Huang et al. (2013)

BMI intention and
experimentation ➔
Firm performance

Survey
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ideas about business model components and relationships with other organizational factors, it is
limited in providing insight into how to develop or change business models (Demil & Lecocq,
2010; Foss & Saebi, 2017). Thus, it does not provide insights into the detailed actions and
processes firms can use as they attempt to engage in BMI.
Process research. BMI process researchers have focused on the different stages of BMI,
BMI experimentation, and organizational learning from BMI efforts (Bouwman, Nikou, &
Reuver, 2019; Ghezzi & Cavallo, 2020; McDonald & Eisenhardt, 2020; Sosna et al., 2010).
While many BMI process studies have used case study designs (e.g., Foss & Saebi, 2017), some
researchers have used survey and secondary data sources to investigate the relationships between
a firm’s efforts at BMI and important factors such as environmental changes, organizational
conditions, and managerial perceptions (Bock, Opsahl, George, & Gann, 2012; Bohnsack et al.,
2014; Eppler, Hoffmann, & Bresciani, 2011; Huang, Lai, Lin, & Chen, 2013; Osiyevskyy &
Dewald, 2015).
BMI process researchers have asked survey questions about decision makers’ willingness
to engage in BMI and their innovative actions in specific areas of their business models. For
example, Osiyevskyy and Dewald (2015) surveyed 241 Canadian real estate broker managers
who experienced major regulatory changes in their industry. Asking questions about managers’
BMI intentions and actions, these researchers found that managers’ cognitive factors, such as
perceived opportunities and threats, influenced firms’ BMI behaviors. They suggested that the
willingness to undertake BMI was reduced when decision makers detected a high level of threat
from environmental changes, but perceived a performance-reducing threat as an opportunity for
a novel business model to enhance managers’ explorative intentions of engaging in BMI.
Bouwman and colleagues (2019) studied small firms and found that they lacked the resources
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and time for BMI experimentation. They asked questions about the past 12 months of firms’
resource allocation efforts to BMI practices. Their study revealed that managerial BMI resource
allocation efforts enhanced BMI experimentation, which was also linked to increased firm
performance.
Using archival data, BMI process researchers have also examined new business model
patterns of firms’ actions over time. Bonhsack and colleagues (2014) studied the automobile
industry and tracked new business model patterns from incumbent firms (e.g., BMW, GM, and
Hyundai) and entrepreneurial firms (e.g., BYD, Chery, and Tesla). Using press releases (in
industry trade magazines and a car magazine), they captured each firm’s electric vehicle projects
from 2006 to 2010, and found little difference in BMI patterns between incumbent and
entrepreneurial firms. The researchers emphasized that more firms in the industry were
transforming their business models over time because of technological advancement.
Many BMI process researchers using quantitative methods consider BMI a series of
actions or efforts to achieve an objective in particular contexts (Bock et al., 2012; Bonhsack et
al., 2014; Bouwman et al., 2019). Although relatively few studies use survey and secondary
sources, BMI process researchers have suggested that firms’ (a) perceived problems and
opportunities enhance BMI efforts; (b) capabilities lead various BMI processes; and (c)
experimentation and learning in business models enhances firm performance. In summary, BMI
process studies employing quantitative methods have explored the causes and processes of firms’
BMI engagements. The second section of Table 2.3 summarizes the relationship between BMI
and other factors, BMI measurements, and findings in BMI process research. Although BMI
process researchers have studied BMI patterns and managerial intentions in BMI over time, the
ability to capture the full spectrum of BMI processes via quantitative study may be limited (e.g.,
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Amit & Zott, 2015, 2016; Demil & Lecocq, 2010). Foss and Saebi (2017: 209) emphasized that
“the process approach to BMI may inherently require more of a qualitative approach than the
content approach” to understand detailed BMI actions and processes. In the next section, I
discuss how these two research streams studied BMI with qualitative methods.
BMI findings in qualitative studies
Outcome research. By using case studies, BMI outcome researchers have focused on
explaining the causes (i.e., opportunities and problems) for a new business model and the
outcome of adopting it. A group of BMI outcome researchers has focused on how firms solve
problems through BMI in a particular context (e.g., Yunus et al., 2010; Witell & Löfgren, 2013).
For instance, Yunus and colleagues (2010) discussed Grameen Group, which works to alleviate
poverty by providing various services such as clean water, affordable healthy food, and
microfinancing that offers small loans without requiring the borrower put up collateral. These
researchers discussed various problems (e.g., the lack of expertise, financial resources, and
financial profit) that Grameen faced, and its business model changes that solved the problems.
They argued that social businesses should develop a social business model that is different from
for-profit business models to solve problems in social business contexts and achieve a social
goal. Similarly, Witell and Löfgren (2013: 520) discussed six manufacturers’ transition “from
service for free to service for fee” in various industries such as the automotive, beverage, pulp,
and other industries. They argued that manufacturing firms are deeply engaged in a productbased business model, and often do not charge for services. Observing that free services are cost
drivers, they found that firms changed their business models to reduce the cost problem. Firms
innovated business models either incrementally (minor changes in structure and content of
services) or radically (changes in governance by including partners).
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Other researchers have focused on the results of adopting new business models. They
argued that firms achieve a better outcome from adopting new business models (Anderson &
Kupp, 2008; Franceschelli, Santoro, & Candelo, 2018; Matzler, Bailom, den Eichen, & Kohler,
2013). For instance, Anderson and Kupp (2008) studied successful telecommunication firms’
business models for low-income customers. These researchers discussed firms’ unconventional
actions in creating new value-chains, building partnerships with non-traditional organizations
(e.g., non-profit, local entrepreneurs), and capturing opportunities from developing markets.
Similarly, Franceschelli and colleagues (2018) explained an Italian pizzeria’s new business
model by describing its different parts (e.g., customers, revenue, costs, and partnership), their
functions, and reasons why each part was designed. They emphasized the importance of BMI
efforts to achieve a sustainable business.
These studies provided detailed explanations of what new business models looked like,
and the causes and results of BMI. Using a retrospective approach, researchers have focused on
the relationship between a cause and a result, discussing firms’ BMI in a linear fashion (i.e., A
leads to B). Thus, these studies fail to consider certain aspects of decision-making processes,
such as the initial considerations that led to different business models, the unexpected
consequences of the business models employed, and how they were subsequently modified.
Although BMI outcome studies’ purpose is not to understand BMI processes, failing to
understand what these processes look like hinders understanding of why and how firms engage
in BMI.
Process research. BMI process researchers have often used case studies to better
understand the reasons for, the processes involved in, and the outcomes of business model
changes. Their focus is on firms’ actions over time around their business model. Thus, they
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consider BMI as a process of finding well-suited business models, and emphasize continuous
fine-tuning processes.
These studies have highlighted continuous experimentation and fine-tuning processes to
find and retain an appropriate business model (Sjödin et al., 2020; Sosna et al., 2010; Visnjic et
al., 2013). For instance, Visnjic and colleagues (2013) conducted a case study using Atlas
Copco, an industrial equipment firm, and provided a comprehensive understanding of market
performance through the manufacturing firm’s service BMI efforts. After the firm adopted the
service business model, it found that its product and service sales had been inseparably
connected to each other as complements or substitutes. Service businesses could either help
product sales by building a strong relationship with customers, or cannibalize product business
by reducing product sales with a prolonged replacement cycle. Also, product and service sales
employees had different motivations and incentives. Thus, the firm needed to track and manage
both service and product business models by continuously adding and revising them in the
organization to achieve better outcomes. Finding a series of business model changes, the authors
stated, “The Atlas Copco experience suggests that a focus on customer relationships should be
the starting point—and a core motivation behind the development of the service business—but it
is not in itself sufficient” (Visnjic et al., 2013: 119).
Sjödin and colleagues (2020) interviewed six B2B firms that shifted from traditional
product sales to outcome-based services (i.e., a firm guarantees product or service performance)
to understand their BMI process. They found the three key process phases for effective changes
in business models. According to the authors, (1) firms and customers work together to capture
value-creation opportunities and distribute value in the first phase; (2) firms engage in alignment
between the value offering and profit formula in the second phase; (3) firms work on refining
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value-creation processes and revising other organizational structures in the last phase. In each
phase, the authors argued that firms were engaged in both value creation process (i.e., a set of
activities to realize higher value) and value capture process (i.e., a process of securing and
distributing value) to achieve and retain new business models. Thus, they emphasized that BMI
is a process of aligning and re-aligning these value creation and value capture processes.
Other researchers have specifically focused on how firms engage in the early stage of
creating a new business model (Cavalcante, 2014; Ghezzi & Cavallo, 2020; Frankenberger,
Weiblen, Csik, & Gassmann, 2013; McDonald & Eisenhardt, 2020). For instance, Cavalcante
(2014) and Ghezzi and Cavallo (2020) emphasized the importance of the early stage in the BMI
process. Both studies found that experimentation and learning in this stage are important in
developing effective business models. Frankenberger and colleagues (2013) and McDonald and
Eisenhardt (2020) found sub-phases of the stage and discussed those phases as an iterative
process. Specifically, Frankenberger and colleagues (2013) studied six established firms’ initial
actions in changing business models and found four phases such as initiation (i.e., consideration
of the needs in business model changes), ideation (i.e., generation of the possible options),
integration (i.e., creation of a new business model), and implementation (i.e., realization of the
business model). McDonald and Eisenhardt (2020) identified three actions nascent entrepreneurs
employed in designing business models (i.e., borrowing concepts from others, testing
assumptions, and pausing for elaboration).
Although many researchers have emphasized BMI as a process rather than a one-time
decision (Demil & Lecocq, 2010; Sosna et al., 2010), BMI studies have not fully uncovered
systematic explanations of how the process creates different business models. Also, BMI process
studies have not fully considered how the BMI process evolves over time (Berends, Smit,
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Reymen, & Podoynitsyna, 2016). Thus, more studies are required to understand the BMI process
and its outcomes (Amit & Zott, 2015, 2016; Demil & Lecocq, 2010; Mezger, 2014; Sjödin et al.,
2020).
In summary, using case studies, many BMI outcome researchers have focused on
different reasons to engage in BMI and on BMI’s outcome. On the other hand, BMI process
researchers have focused on experimentation and the overall fine-tuning of processes in the early
stages of organizational founding, or of organizational change. Table 2.4 summarizes these
studies’ areas of focus, research settings, and findings.
3. Challenges of having Different BMI Research Streams
BMI outcome research provides insight into different types of business models, their
relationships with important business factors (e.g., performance and sustainability), and effective
business model arrangements (Amit & Zott, 2015; Kim & Min, 2015; Saebi et al., 2017; Zott &
Amit, 2007). In contrast, BMI process research helps to recognize how businesses engage in
changing their business models over time (McDonald & Eisenhardt, 2020; Sjödin et al., 2020;
Visnjic et al., 2013). However, their differences in focus may hinder building cumulative insights
about BMI; attending to different aspects of BMI without considering the other stream’s focus
dilutes attention and has yielded mixed findings, thus challenging further theoretical
development (Demil, Lecocq, Ricart, & Zott, 2015; Foss & Saebi, 2017; Massa, Tucci, & Afuah,
2017; Sorescu, 2017).
On the one hand, BMI outcome research identifies potential causes (i.e., opportunities
and problems) and outcomes based on the contexts studied. However, BMI outcome researchers
have found inconsistent and idiosyncratic results based on their study contexts. For instance,

34

Table 2.4. Qualitative Methods in BMI Outcome and Process Studies
Research
Type

Themes

Author(s)

Setting

Findings/Contributions

The
telecommunication
industry

Firms created new ways to serve the poor via
changing value-chain, collaborating with
non-traditional partners, and building
networks.

A food start-up

The restaurant changed in each business
model segment (e.g., client segments, client
relationship, distribution channels, and cost)
for sustainability.

Nespresso

Nespresso built successful business model
innovation in product and service, value
creation, profit formula, marketing, and sales.
They have achieved better performance by
offering a unique positioning in the market.

Grameen Bank

Grameen Bank solved problems by
formulating social business models by
changing conventional thinking, searching for
new partners, taking constant
experimentation, finding social-profitoriented shareholders, and identifying social
profit goals.

Six manufacturers

The manufacturing firms solved problems by
using different degrees of business model
changes (minor, incremental, and radical
BMI).

Visnjic et al.
(2013)

Atlas Copco

Atlas Copco made a transition to productservice-based business models, and the firm
tracked to keep aligning the relationship with
products.

Sjödin et al.
(2020)

Firms in various
industries

Firms’ alignment processes of value creation
(i.e., increasing value) and value capture (i.e.,
securing and distributing value) should be
considered over time in the BMI.

Sosna et al.
(2010)

The Naturhouse

The firm achieved BMI based on trial-anderror learning and knowledge transfer process
from individuals to the organization and viceversa.

Cavalcante
(2014)

Four satellite
navigation
organizations

Managers actively adopted experiments and
learning in the early stage of the BMI to build
effective business models.

Ghezzi &
Cavallo
(2020)

Digital platform
start-ups

Lean startup approaches (i.e., agile
developments) helped develop BMI in the
early stage by experimenting with business
models, managing resources, and applying
products/services.

Frankenberger
et al. (2013)

Six multinational
firms of different
industries

Firms took initiation, ideation, integration,
and implementation phases to develop new
business models.

Anderson &
Kupp
(2008)
Using BMI
for
performance
enhancement

Franceschelli
et al. (2018)

Matzler et al.
(2013)

BMI
Outcome
Research

Using BMI
for problem
solving

Yunus et al.
(2010)

Witell &
Löfgren,
(2013)

Engaging
BMI over
time for
value
creation

BMI
Process
Research

Experiments
and learning
in the early
stage of BMI
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many researchers have found a positive relationship between new business models and firm
performance (Denicolai, Ramirez, & Tidd, 2014; Kim & Min, 2015; Zott & Amit, 2007), while
others have revealed different or even inverse relationships (Knudsen & Mortensen, 2011;
Visnjic et al., 2016; Visnjic & Looy, 2013). On the other hand, BMI process research provides
more in-depth understanding regarding BMI by tracing firms’ actions and reactions over time
(McDonald & Eisenhardt, 2020; Sjödin et al., 2020). Although BMI process researchers have
revealed firms’ actions, many studies have been purely descriptive, discussing unique scenarios
in particular contexts. Thus, these two research streams have discussed the same concept, but
their approaches are difficult to combine.
Moreover, BMI outcome research has varied in the magnitude of change required to
constitute BMI, treating both incremental changes and radical changes as “innovation” (e.g.,
Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013; Foss & Saebi, 2017). BMI outcome studies are also limited in
explaining how firms can change their business models, because the actual BMI processes are
often missing (Demil & Lecocq, 2010; Foss & Saebi, 2017). BMI process research can provide
such explanations because they often compare patterns of firms’ BMI processes and have
developed a theoretical framework that treats the BMI process as a formula (e.g., McDonald &
Eisenhardt, 2020; Sjödin et al., 2020). However, the process they have identified does not clearly
match with the incremental and radical business models that discussed in BMI outcome studies.
Recent research has attempted to explore how process differences can lead to outcome
differences. Berends and colleagues (2016) identified to process components—experiential
learning and cognitive search—that could lead to different BMI outcomes depending on how
they were ordered. They argued, “‘drifting’ starts with an emphasis on experiential learning and
shifts later to cognitive search; ‘leaping,’ in contrast, starts with an emphasis on cognitive search
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and shifts later to experiential learning” (Berends et al., 2016: 181). The authors attempted to
understand how differences in the ways firms’ BMI processes unfold over time led to different
outcomes. Nevertheless, they stated that “both drifting and leaping can result in radical business
model innovations” (p. 181), and their efforts did not present explicit connections between the
patterns and different outcomes.
Since each BMI research stream has discussed different BMI phenomena, and researchers
have failed to connect these two research streams, current BMI research has provided limited
insights regarding how firms engage in BMI and the results of their BMI efforts (Amit & Zott,
2015; Demil & Lecocq, 2010; Foss & Saebi, 2017; Martins et al., 2015). Given a lack of
comprehensive understanding of dynamic BMI processes, and different business models, my
dissertation use the BMI process approach, develop in-depth knowledge about decision makers’
BMI actions over time, and link the extent and nature of different BMI processes to different
firm outcomes. As Sjödin and colleagues (2020: 179) stated, “Achieving business model
alignment is a continuous practice and not a one-time activity.” BMI evolves over time because
external and organizational environments (Amit & Zott, 2001; Sosna et al., 2010) and decisionmakers’ perceptions and knowledge (Doz & Kosonen, 2010; Martins et al., 2015) constantly
change. Therefore, I consider BMI as a process that can vary in its extensiveness and duration,
and can both change existing business models to various degrees or create new business models.
I expect to gain a comprehensive understanding of firms’ business model changes by
investigating firms’ external and internal conditions as well as decision makers’ decisions and
actions.
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Three Theoretical BMI Processes
Theoretical explanations of the BMI process have failed to generate cumulative insights.
Many BMI researchers have observed that a business model changes when the firm’s
environment changes (Amit & Zott, 2001; Teece, 2010). Although these BMI researchers have
emphasized external shock as BMI’s main drivers, other researchers have acknowledged
managerial cognition and organizational problems are additional important elements leading to
business model innovation (e.g., Bock et al., 2012; Martins et al., 2015; Sosna et al., 2010). In
discussing different causes of BMI, Martins and colleagues (2015) identified three theoretical
lenses characterizing different BMI process explanations: (a) rational, (b) evolutionary, and (c)
cognitive. Their study expanded decision makers’ BMI decisions and actions based on different
theoretical explanations by comparing the different causes, processes, and outcomes associated
with each view. In this section I use Martins and colleagues’ (2015) framework to evaluate the
different BMI process perspectives and identify my dissertation’s focus.
1. Rational Lens
According to the rational lens, business models are consciously designed systems that
present decision-makers’ rational choices (Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010; Martins et al.,
2015; Zott & Amit, 2010). BMI begins with an environmental shock, or change (Amit & Zott,
2001). The new environment introduces new challenges, such as key resources becoming
unobtainable (e.g., Kim & Min, 2015; Pearson & Clair, 1998) and stable stakeholders’ actions
becoming unpredictable (e.g., Pajunen, 2006; Teece, 2010). These challenges highlight
weaknesses in existing business models, so decision makers innovate their business models in
response (Teece, 2010). Researchers have argued that regulatory changes (e.g., Bask, MerisaloRantanen, Tinnilä, & Lauraeus, 2012), technology developments (e.g., Chesbrough, 2010), and
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virtual market opportunities (e.g., Amit & Zott, 2001) have pushed decision makers to innovate
their business models. For instance, Teece (2010) (also quoted by Martins and colleagues) stated
“…when the underlying technology changes, and an established logic for satisfying consumer
needs…is overturned, the business model must change too” (Martins et al., 2015: 101). Thus, the
rational lens explains the BMI process as a causal mechanism where the decision maker’s role is
to align the firm’s business model with the new environment.
According to this lens, decision makers manage BMI and create value by optimizing the
BMI process via an economic mindset (Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010; Teece, 2010; Zott &
Amit, 2015). For instance, Johnson and colleagues (Johnson, Christensen, & Kagermann, 2008)
argued that firms evaluate their current business model and customers’ needs to find areas
requiring change and determine whether BMI efforts are worthwhile. More specifically, Amit
and Zott (2016) proposed five steps in the BMI process: (1) observing problems, (2) synthesizing
them with firms’ objectives, (3) generating feasible solutions, (4) refining solutions, and (5)
implementing the final choice. In this process, decision makers consider the firm’s capabilities
(e.g., opportunity recognition and resource availabilities) when adopting new business models
(Amit & Zott, 2016; Teece, 2010).
The outcome of the BMI process is a new business model—which they conceive of as a
designed system (Amit & Zott, 2001; Martins et al., 2015). Amit and Zott (2001, 2015)
highlighted four ways that firms create value by changing business models: (a) novelty (i.e.,
adopting and governing new activities); (b) lock-in (i.e., retaining partners and customers by
using positive networks and increasing stakeholders’ switching costs), (c) complementarities
(i.e., reinforcement of activities by promoting synergies through bundling products/services,
activities, and technologies); and (d) efficiency (i.e., reducing costs by linking activities) (Amit &
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Zott, 2001, 2015). BMI researchers have suggested that by using these value drivers, a new
business model offers a firm the opportunity to achieve competitive advantage, ecological
fitness, and sustainable performance (Amit & Zott, 2016; Bask et al., 2012; Brea‐Solís,
Casadesus‐Masanell, & Grifell‐Tatjé, 2015). Therefore, by making optimal choices, decision
makers create new business models at various levels to achieve better outcomes. Table 2.5
summarizes previous rational studies that have discussed BMI’s causes, processes, and
outcomes.
However, this lens does not explain outliers that make extreme decisions, such as making
no changes in the face of an environmental threat or creating a completely different business
model that perhaps cannibalizes existing businesses (e.g., Johnson et al., 2008). Because it
assumes there is an “optimal” outcome for a given set of conditions, the rational lens is also of
limited utility in explaining why firms adopt different business models when they face similar
conditions (e.g., Norris, Taylor Jr, & Taylor, 2021; Thorgren & Williams, 2020). Thus, these
researchers have often confronted claims that decision makers are too cognitively limited to
understand every aspect of their firms (Martins et al., 2015; Massa et al., 2017; McGrath 2010).
Also, the rational lens assumes that managers make concrete decisions to rationally optimize the
BMI process; thus, it does not consider why firms might engage in BMI when there are no
significant environmental changes or problems (Martins et al., 2015).
2. Evolutionary Lens
The evolutionary lens describes the BMI process as being closely aligned with the
behavioral theory of the firm (e.g., Andries, Debackere, & Van Looy, 2013; Frankenberger &
Sauer, 2019; Martins et al., 2015). Unlike the rational lens, which views a business model as a
designed system based on decision makers’ optimal choices (Amit & Zott, 2016; Zott & Amit,
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Table 2.5. Rationale Lens—BMI Causes, Process, and Outcomes
Author(s)
Amit & Zott
(2016)

BMI Causes
The rapidly changing
economic landscape and
Dynamic capability
(sensing, seizing
opportunity, transforming
assets)

Bask et al. (2012)

BMI Process

BMI Outcomes

Five stages:
observe, synthesize, generate,
refine, and implement

Ecological fitness in a
shifting environment

An economic downturn,
deregulation, and
intensive competition

Engaging in mergers,
acquisition, and partnerships,
and developing business
models to different service
sectors

Transform from single or a
few traditional banking
services to multiple services
(e.g., Banking, insurance,
and asset management)

Brea‐Solís et al.
(2015)

Pricing problem,
Efficiency problem,
Performance downturn,
and increased labor costs

Engaging in acquisition,
investing in technology, and
improving efficiency

Achieving a new business
model, a large-scale
development, and
competitive advantage

Zott & Amit
(2015)

Organizational goals,
business model
templates, environmental
constraints, and
stakeholders’ activities

Five stages:
observe, synthesize, generate,
refine, and implement

Sustainable performance
Competitive advantage
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2015), the evolutionary lens suggests a business model is the result of a fine-tuning process and
trial-and-error experimentation (Chesbrough, 2010; Dunford, Palmer, & Benveniste, 2010;
McGrath, 2010; Sosna et al., 2010). Using the evolutionary lens, BMI researchers have argued
that decision makers engage in BMI when they recognize problems or opportunities in an
uncertain environment by searching for a solution (Cyert & March, 1963)—first through
problem-solving routines and then by expanding their search if they initially fail to find a
satisfactory solution (Berends et al., 2016; Martins et al., 2015; McGrath, 2010; Osiyevskyy &
Dewald, 2018). Considering both optimization and accurate predictions challenging because of
limited information, the evolutionary lens argues that continuous experimentation and trial-anderror learning are key elements of BMI processes (Cavalcante, 2014; McGrath 2010). Thus,
rather than treating it as a linear process, like the rational lens, the evolutionary lens describes the
BMI process as possessing non-recursive, or circular causality, with decision makers
continuously searching for solutions to problems amid environmental uncertainty and refining
their business models as new solutions are identified.
Because the evolutionary lens emphasizes experimentation and learning, they expect
BMI to occur incrementally (Martins et al., 2015). For instance, McDonald and Eisenhardt
(2020: 492) studied “how entrepreneurs effectively design business models in nascent markets,”
and emphasized BMI as an adaptive learning process. They found that entrepreneurs searched for
solutions in other business models, developed their own prototype business models based on the
search, then continued testing and developing the models until they created an effective business
model (McDonald & Eisenhardt, 2020). Investigating Naturhouse’s BMI process, Sosna and
colleagues (2010) identified incremental developments via fine-tuning processes in various
business dimensions (e.g., pricing, distribution, network, and knowledge transfer).
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Using the evolutionary lens, BMI researchers have thus argued that business model
changes are incremental because they result from BMI processes that change a particular part of
the business model first, and then modify other areas until a satisfactory overall model is found
(Sosna et al., 2010). Similar to the rational lens, the evolutionary lens also assumes that BMI’s
outcomes offer a firm the opportunity to achieve more effective business models and better
performance (Berends et al., 2016; McDonald & Eisenhardt, 2020; McGrath, 2010; Sosna et al.,
2010). Table 2.6 summarizes the evolutionary studies exploring BMI’s causes, processes, and
outcomes.
However, the evolutionary lens is limited because it does not explain why firms take
radical actions from the get-go, as opposed to first engaging in prior incremental changes (Demil
& Lecocq, 2010; Sorescu, 2017). Learning and incrementally adapting are key factors of the
BMI process according to this perspective; however, while it is well suited to explain
incremental BMI changes that lead to satisfactory outcomes, it does not address firms’ optimal
decisions or radical actions. When firms perceive problems, their capabilities are important
factors that influence whether they make radical changes (Eggers & Kaul, 2018). Further,
although the evolutionary lens focuses on learning and incremental adaptation, it has not fully
articulated the different ways firms attempt to change their business models based on
organizational capabilities (e.g., Snihur & Zott, 2020). Finally, BMI studies using the
evolutionary lens often describe certain firms’ BMIs in idiosyncratic ways; consequently, their
explanations have limited generalizability (e.g., Berends et al., 2016; Sosna et al., 2010). Using
the evolutionary lens, BMI researchers understand the causes, continuous processes, and
outcomes in BMIs; nevertheless, the explanation is still limited.
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Table 2.6. Evolutionary Lens—BMI Causes, Process, and Outcomes
Author(s)

Berends et al.
(2016)

BMI Causes
Unexpected problems
(e.g., partnership,
customer relationship,
performance synergy)
from new business
model adaptation

BMI Process

Drifting patterns (start with a
reconceptualization of business model)
– a shift from taking experiential
learning to taking cognitive search

BMI Outcomes

Developing radical
business model
change

Leaping patterns (start with new
conceptualization of business model)–
a shift from taking cognitive search to
taking experiential learning

Dunford et al.
(2010)

New market
opportunity

Four processes:
clarifying the core business model
elements, responding to contextual
conditions, experimenting with
something new, and taking others’
experience

Enhancing
performance via
internationalization

McDonald &
Eisenhardt (2020)

No clear
conceptualization of a
business model

Parallel play steps:
Borrow from others’ business models,
experimentation to test assumptions
(learning), and pause (reflection) before
applying the business model

Developing an
effective business
model that supports
value creation

Sosna et al. (2010)

Decreasing revenue

Exploration – business model design,
testing, development

Enhancing
performance
Create value

Exploitation – scale up with sustainable
models, sustained growth via
organizational learning
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3. Cognitive Lens
Unlike the rational and evolutionary lenses, the cognitive lens highlights that decision
makers engage in BMI using their cognition and knowledge regardless of environmental changes
(Doz & Kosonen, 2010; Martins et al., 2015). Based on cognitive perspective studies (e.g.,
Gavetti, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2007; Gentner, 1983; Ocasio, 2011; Wisniewski, 1997), Martins
and colleagues (2015) theorized how decision makers could proactively reconstruct, redesign,
and reorganize their business models without exogenous environment pressures or a clear
initiating problem or opportunity. They suggested that decision-makers’ schemas provide new
possibilities for changing business models. Specifically, Martins and colleagues (2015) discussed
two cognitive mechanisms—analogical reasoning (Gentner, 1983) and conceptual combination
(Wisniewski, 1997)—that decision makers can use to generate new business models. Analogical
reasoning is the use of knowledge about one domain to understand information in a different
domain; that is, by treating one domain as an analogy for another (Gentner, 1983; Martins et al.,
2015). Using the method, firms can innovate business models by comparing similarities between
the focal firm’s and other firms’ business models. Conceptual combination refers to a cognitive
process in which different concepts are integrated into a new concept (Martins et al., 2015;
Wisniewski, 1997). It is another way to engage in BMI by comparing differences among various
business concepts and creating a new concept.
Both mechanisms share similar processes, as decision makers’ using these cognitive
processes follow the same four steps: (1) select a concept or a business model, (2) recognize its
activities, (3) consider how it will apply to their firms, and (4) revise and adapt it as a new
business model (Martins et al., 2015). More specifically, Martins and colleagues (2015)
explained how both analogical reasoning and conceptual combination work within the four steps.
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Using analogical reasoning, decision makers (1) select a concept that can apply to their target
business model; (2) understand the concept’s elements that could be used to create value; (3)
compare the elements between the concept and their target business model and decide what
elements to adopt; then (4) revise the borrowed elements to suit the target business model.
Similarly, using conceptual combination, decision makers (1) select a concept that could be
combined with their target business model; (2) identify differences between the two concepts; (3)
determine which elements from the selected concept are useful and integrate them into the target
business model; and (4) adapt elements to suit the target business model. Thus, decision makers
use these mechanisms by applying their knowledge and ability to design innovative business
models.
Other BMI researchers also have discussed how decision makers use their cognition to
innovate firms’ business models. Doz and Kosonen (2010) emphasized managerial metacapabilities—strategic sensitivity (perception, awareness, and attention), leadership unity (ability
to make decisions), and resource fluidity (capability to allocate resources)—to engage in BMI.
Snihur and Zott (2020) found that decision makers (1) search for ideas for business models, (2)
engage in system thinking and information processing, and (3) leverage power and expertise to
implement business models. Based on these explanations, decision makers can proactively use
their knowledge to engage in BMI without a particular exogenous cause (Martins et al., 2015).
Thus, the cognitive lens’s explanations can go beyond the other lenses’ causal mechanisms
(Chesbrough, 2010).
Moreover, managerial knowledge is an important resource for radical innovation (e.g.,
Miller, Fern, & Cardinal, 2007; Zhou & Li, 2012). Having a broad knowledge of different
domains allows firms to generate novel ideas and new combinations (Taylor & Greve, 2006).
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However, when the knowledge is shallow, it may promote incremental innovation, because
radical changes require in-depth understanding of a specific domain (e.g., Laursen & Salter,
2006; Zahra & George, 2002). Thus, based on the cognitive lens’s explanations, decision makers
can possibly generate both incremental and radical business models using their cognitive
capabilities (Aspara, Lamberg, Laukia, & Tikkanen, 2013; Doz & Kosonen, 2010; Martins et al.,
2015), indicating that BMI’s outcomes offer novel business models in various ways (Chesbrough
& Rosenbloom, 2002; Doz & Kosonen, 2010; Martins et al., 2015; Snihur & Zott, 2020). Table
2.7 summarizes previous BMI cognitive studies explaining BMI’s causes, processes, and
outcomes.
However, approaching BMI using the cognitive lens also involves challenges. Massa and
colleagues (2017: 83) stated that “business models in this interpretation are not fixed attributes of
the firm, but instead reside in managers’ heads…. Reducing business models to mental models
only held by an individual can be misleading.” Also, even when decision makers use schemas
that “represent accumulated knowledge and provide frames for interpreting new information”
(Martins et al., 2015: 103) to innovate business models, their decisions and actions can still
change based on a firm’s other conditions (e.g., stakeholders’ beliefs, firms’ reputations, and
performance conditions) (Aspara et al., 2013; Doz & Kosonen, 2010). These other factors can
shift decision-makers’ attention, leading them to allocate and use their schema differently
(Ocasio, 2011). Furthermore, BMI researchers using the cognitive lens have noted that firms
primarily take ideas from existing business models (Martins et al., 2015; Snihur & Zott, 2020).
That approach may limit explaining radical business model changes that did not previously exist.
Thus, BMI studies using the cognitive lens have not fully addressed BMI processes and how
decision makers’ decisions and actions are affected by other factors.
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Table 2.7. Cognitive Lens—BMI Causes, Process, and Outcomes
Autor(s)

Doz & Kosonen
(2010)

BMI Causes
TMT members’ metacapabilities (Strategic
sensitivity, leadership
unity, and resource
fluidity)

BMI Process

Three broad steps:
Strategic sensitivity
(anticipating, experimenting,
distancing, abstracting, and
reframing)

BMI Outcomes

Achieving successful
business model renewal and
transformation

Leadership Unity
(dialoguing, revealing,
integrating, aligning, and caring)
Resource Fluidity
(Decoupling, Modularizing,
Dissociating, Switching, and
grafting)
Aspara et al.
(2013)

Profitability problems
and top managers’
consensus to change a
business model

Martins et al.
(2015)

Knowledge and
information

Snihur & Zott
(2020)

Decision-makers’
novelty orientation
based on search
behavior, thinking,
decision making
patterns

Having inter-organizational
negotiations, choosing a business
to change based on reputation,
and retaining and removing
businesses to change business
models
Four steps:
select a concept or a business
model, recognize the activities of
it, consider how it will apply to
target firms, and revise and adapt
it

Achieving effective
business models that
enhance performance

Take structural imprinting and
cognitive imprinting processes

Achieving novel business
models

Reconfigured business
models that support value
creation

Structural imprinting influence
and reinforce cognitive
imprinting process and vice
versa
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Comprehensive Understanding in BMI
Using three different lenses, BMI researchers have provided different explanations for
BMI’s causes, processes, and outcomes. Although those explanations offer insight into how
firms develop new business models, these varied discussions using different lenses hinder
developing a cumulative and systematic explanation of BMI. BMI studies have often presented
practical examples of BMI (e.g., Amazon, Netflix, and Xerox); but each study has presented a
distinctive explanation aligning with a specific theoretical lens. For example, rational lens
studies have highlighted Netflix’s capabilities and optimization process (e.g., Christensen,
Bartman, & Van Bever, 2016; Teece, 2010); evolutionary lens studies have discussed Netflix’s
experimentation and learning processes (e.g., Bouwman et al., 2019; McDonald & Eisenhardt,
2020); and cognitive lens studies have emphasized Netflix’s imprint on other firms’ business
models (e.g., Snihur & Zott, 2020).
Amit and Zott (2015) attempted to encompass these three lenses by connecting multiple
factors (managerial goals, other firms’ business models, stakeholder activities, and
environmental constraints) to different BMI value-driving outcomes discussed earlier: novelty,
lock-in, complementarities, and efficiency. By investigating nine ventures during 2007 and 2008,
these researchers provided rich insights into how the multiple factors foster BMI and results in
different outcomes. Nevertheless, their study focused on capturing static changes by connecting
different antecedents and results to develop a more predictive theory rather than understanding
dynamic BMI processes.
Similarly, BMI outcome researchers discussed various types of new business models as
outcomes (e.g., Casadesus-Masanell & Zhu, 2013; Foss & Saebi, 2017; Santos et al., 2009), and
they made connections between these outcomes and firms’ prior conditions such as external,
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organizational, and managerial factors (e.g., Von Delft, Kortmann, Gelhard, & Pisani, 2019;
Narayan, Sidhu, & Volberda, 2020; Saebi et al., 2017; Velu & Jacob, 2016). However, BMI
processes within the relationships are often missing, or describe a particular context. BMI
process researchers captured a process that explains how decision makers engage in BMI, their
findings are not well connected with decision-makers’ different BMI decisions and actions.
Thus, the field still has not yet connected all the dots (i.e., causes, processes, outcomes) of
knowledge in BMI. I believe that studying dynamic BMI processes can help connect these dots
to make patterns.
Therefore, studying BMI with a single lens can limit scholars’ abilities to capture the full
scope of decision makers’ choices and actions as they evolve over time in response to each
BMI’s outcomes and feedback, and the cognitive processes through which they are interpreted.
In my dissertation, I address these limitations and attempt to provide a more comprehensive
understanding of the BMI process in the face of changing environmental circumstances,
exploring the ways and extent to which decision makers search for alternatives, the various
physical, social and financial resources and constraints they face, and the different ways they
interpreted and combined these exogeneous and endogenous factors to engage in BMI.
Specifically, I conducted a real-time study of BMI during the COVID-19 crisis because
the mechanisms underlying firms’ different BMI reactions in the face of the same exogenous
threat have not been clearly studied. The pandemic crisis has disrupted firms’ economic
activities, created functional problems and new business opportunities, and increased concerns
about existing business models (Giones et al., 2020; Kuckertz et al., 2020; Norris et al., 2021).
Further, by studying ongoing BMI as the process unfolds, I gained insights into the non-recursive
aspects of BMI, whether and how decision makers’ perceptions and interpretations evolve in
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response, and how this affects the extent and direction of their BMI. Thus, my dissertation
explores the following questions: (a) What are decision makers’ BMIs in response to the
COVID-19 crisis? and (b) How and why have the decision makers’ BMIs unfolded differently
over time given the same exogenous change?
To answer the questions, I considered various factors (e.g., external changes,
organizational conditions, and managerial cognitions) that lead restauranteurs to different
decisions and actions. Many BMI researchers have noted that decisions and actions are essential
for BMI (Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2011; Chesbrough, 2010; Doz & Kosonen, 2010;
Martins et al., 2015). Therefore, I studied restaurants’ decisions and actions over time to identify
the patterns of their BMI processes. By taking a longitudinal approach, I examined the speed and
magnitude of response from various decision makers and tracked their BMI processes. As a
result, the study provides a comprehensive understanding of a dynamic BMI process.
In the next chapter (Chapter 3), I discuss my multiple case design and my research
context. In Chapter 4, I provide the findings from the analysis. Then in the following chapters
(Chapter 5 and Chapter 6), I discuss my topic modeling methods as well as the findings of the
analysis.
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CHAPTER 3
QUALITATIVE STUDY METHODS
The COVID-19 crisis provides an exceptional opportunity to understand BMI processes
in real time. First, all firms are faced with the effect on regular business activities around the
same point in time in March 2020. Second, there was a tremendous lack of clarity and no
successful templates for navigating the uncertainty around this crisis. Third, crises enhance the
likelihood of undertaking BMI (Björklund, Mikkonen, Mattila, & van der Marel, 2020; Norris,
Taylor Jr, & Taylor, 2021). Thus, I investigated decision-makers’ BMIs in response to the
COVID-19 crisis within one industry to understand how and why their decisions and actions
differ in the face of the same environmental threat.
In the previous chapter, I concluded from my literature review that there is a need for
more exploratory research related to understanding different BMI decisions and actions when
faced with the same environmental change. Because of the state of the BMI literature, I
undertook a multiple case study of 17 companies in one locality, primarily using three stages of
interviews. The multiple case study method allows me to develop a deep understanding of how
several companies in the same industry adapted during the COVID-19 pandemic, and how their
business model innovations evolved over time as conditions changed.
Research Context
My dissertation focused on the restaurant and food-service industry. In any society,
restaurants have a bigger meaning than just making and selling food and drink. Non-food
elements, such as their emotional and social aspects, also attract people to eating establishments.
They are essential places for social gatherings and interactions that provide human needs. Also,
restaurants are an important source of jobs, and the industry is a vital economic pillar. According
to the National Restaurant Association (NRA, 2019), the U.S. restaurant industry was projected
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to hire more than 15.3 million people and achieve total sales of $ 863 billion by the end of 2019.
Therefore, restaurants are a vital part of everyday lives and the economy that were disrupted by
the pandemic.
On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the spread of the
coronavirus a pandemic. Many state and local governments in the United States enacted
restrictions on restaurants because they were “non-essential” businesses. Restaurants were asked
to follow social distancing guidelines and use alternative business models—no dine-in, only
take-out, drive-thru, and/or delivery. Many restaurants laid off all their staff and posted signs
saying, “CLOSED until further notice.” Even when regulations eased weeks later, restauranteurs
struggled to deal with environmental changes. To date, over 110,000 restaurants have
permanently or temporarily (long-term) closed, over 3.1 million employees lost their jobs, and
the industry’s economy was in a free fall (Gonzalez, 2020; NRA, 2020).
The pandemic crisis caused massive disruptions in most businesses, but restrictions and
consumer fear of social gatherings added another layer of interruption to restaurants, because you
cannot eat while wearing a mask. Understanding these restauranteurs’ stories during the COVID19 crisis is important because they: (a) are many cities’ essential economic pillars; (b) are closely
linked to other industries; (c) are largely owner-operated; (d) employ millions; (e) are ubiquitous;
(f) vary dramatically in size, resource availability, and market segments served; and (g) have
visible business models (i.e., menus and physical spaces: see Björklund et al., 2020). Thus, from
a research perspective, the restaurant industry’s characteristics are useful for understanding
different types and practices in BMIs.
In addition, given the sudden and unprecedented nature of the pandemic, decisionmakers’ leadership is more important than ever because the event offers new opportunities and
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insights while putting most firms at risk by changing their organization-environment fit, raising
decision uncertainty, and hindering strategic actions (e.g., Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000; Bundy,
Pfarrer, Short, & Coombs, 2017; Meyer, 1982; Milliken, 1987; Sine & David, 2003). Thus, a
crisis setting is a good opportunity to delve into business owners’ decisions and actions related to
their BMI, because the setting provides the chance to explore real-time actions in a compressed
fashion. I took the opportunity to study BMI and to understand business owners’ different
reactions and adaptations in response to external changes, an area that has not been fully
explored in BMI research (Foss & Saebi, 2017).
Multiple Case Study Design
I used a multiple case study design (Eisenhardt, 1989, 2021), but there are different types
of multiple case designs from which to choose: (a) common antecedents (i.e., studying cases
with a common antecedent that influences outcomes); (b) common processes (i.e., revealing
cases’ processes and/or outcomes in response to the same phenomenon, but in different settings);
(c) matched pairs (i.e., comparing two similar cases’ processes and outcomes); (d) polar types
(i.e., studying cases that extremely different in certain dimensions, but similar on others); and (e)
racing (i.e., studying similar cases that start actions at the same time and comparing their
outcomes at a certain point) (Eisenhardt, 2021). Among these different multiple case study
approaches, the best fit for my study is the common antecedents design. Researchers study
seemingly similar cases to reveal distinct processes and/or outcomes that result from a common
event or experience. For example, Smith and Zeithaml (1996) used this multiple case study
approach to research how firms in one industry (local telecommunications providers) changed;
specifically, whether they undertook international expansion processes after the 1984 break-up of
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AT&T. Using the cases that are experiencing COVID-19 as a main phenomenon, I developed a
deep understanding of the BMI process within each case, and then compared across all cases.
The multiple case design, or the Eisenhardt Method (Eisenhardt, 2021; Langley &
Abdallah, 2011) is not without its critics. Welch and colleagues (Welch, Piekkari, Plakoyiannaki,
& Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2011) argued that the method is weak on causal explanation and
contextualization. They posited that the method embraces a positivist view that only allows
researchers to capture construct relationships that emerged in most cases, while downplaying
each case’s differences. However, Eisenhardt (2020: 223) refuted that critique by saying, “the
use of theory building from cases, and broadly case methods is diverse and increasingly rich.” In
further defending the method, Eisenhardt explained that each case is viewed as a natural
experiment, which allows researchers to develop a theoretical logic with causal explanations
(e.g., Eisenhardt, 2021; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012).
However, Eisenhardt does not fully discuss how to study organizational changes over
time (Eisenhardt, 1989, 2021). She (Eisenhardt, 2021) points to Langley’s (1999) work as
offering key insights into studying how changes evolve over time. My multiple case study
approach followed the Eisenhardt method (Eisenhardt, 1989, 2021), but also leveraged Langley’s
insights on process changes over time (Langley, 1999; Langley et al., 2013). My question—how
and why firms facing the same exogenous threat react differently, creating different BMIs and
undertaking different BMI processes—fits with “process studies [which] address questions about
how and why things emerge, develop, grow, or terminate over time, as distinct from variance
questions dealing with covariation among dependent and independent variables” (Langley et al.,
2013: 1).
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Data sources
For the multiple case study, my principal data source is semi-structured interviews of 17
restaurants or restaurant groups from one city in the Southeastern United States1. These
restaurants were selected to include organizations of different sizes, with different histories,
cuisines, locations, and resources. I used a combination of direct contacts and snowball sampling
because “the method yields a study sample through referrals made among people who share or
know of others who possess some characteristics that are of research interest” (Biernacki &
Waldorf, 1981: 141).
Our informants are restaurant owners—and, in some cases, restaurant managers—who
controlled decisions relating to restaurant operations that affected their business model. Thus,
these interviewees were able to explain decisions and actions related to business model changes.
I conducted three panels of open-ended, semi-structured interviews (Eisenhardt, 1989). The
interviews’ stages were: (1) following the initial implementation of restrictions of wide-spread
government restrictions (May to June 2020) to identify their actions in sudden external changes;
(2) before the results of the November 2020 U.S. presidential election (mid-October to early
November 2020) to avoid the dramatic impacts from the new COVID-19 policies; and (3) a year
after the initial responses to the pandemic to evaluate their overall BMI process and vaccines
began to mitigate the COVID-19 threat (May to June 2021) to capture whether the restaurants
maintain or eliminate changes in their business models. Table 3.8 summarizes key characteristics
of the firms in our study.

1

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved (UTK IRB-20-05844-XM).
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Table 3.1. Overview of Interviews
Interviewees

Number
of stores

Years in
business

Cuisine types

Restaurant types

Locations

Big Shoulder

Owner

1

1

Vegetarian,
Mediterranean

Casual dining

Downtown

Traveler

Owner

1

4

Italian

Casual dining

Downtown

Owner and
Manager

1

4

American

Fine dining

Downtown

Unconventional

Owner

1

8

Snack

Pop-Up food stands

Neighborhood

Rebel

Owner

1

9

American

Casual dining

Neighborhood

Happy

Owner and
Manager

1

+ 10

Thai

Casual dining

Neighborhood

Steady

Owner

1

+ 30

Chinese

Casual dining

Shopping
District

Family

Owner

1

+ 30

American

Casual dining

Neighborhood

Two Owners

2

5

Japanese,
Mexican

Casual dining

Downtown

Special

Owner

2

+ 40

American

Fast food

Shopping
District

Musician

Owner

2

+ 10

American

Casual dining

Polymath

Owner

3

3

Coffee,
Bread

Coffee shop

Golfer

Owner

3

7

American,
Italian,
Bread

Fine dining,
Casual dining

Coffee shop

Restaurant (*)

Hospitality

Meditation

Beaver Dam

Owner

3

+ 10

Coffee,
Bread

Food Network

Owner

15

+ 10

American

Fine dining,
Casual dining

Mathematician

Owner

20

+ 20

American

Fine dining,
Casual dining

Owner and a
20
+ 20
American
Partner
Note: (*) Disguised due to confidentiality of restaurant name.
Gladiator

Casual dining

Downtown,
Neighborhood
Downtown,
Shopping
District
Downtown,
Neighborhood
Downtown,
Neighborhood,
Shopping
District
Downtown,
Shopping
District
Downtown,
Shopping
District
Shopping
District
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Beyond just interviews, I also took photographs of the restaurants in the study (taken
throughout the yearlong data collection process) and collected archival materials (e.g., from
social media and press releases) to provide a richer view of each firm. Prior to conducting each
round of interviews, I visited the restaurants to take pictures of public spaces (e.g., outside and
posted notes). I also collected these restaurants’ social media posts (e.g., Facebook and
Instagram) and tracked local news media about them. Then, I analyzed (a) their BMI decisions
and actions during the COVID-19 pandemic and (b) how and why their BMI unfolded when
confronted with the same external challenge.
Data analysis
Pushing back against the narrative that the Eisenhardt approach is a template with the
potential for mindless application (Köehler, Smith, & Bhakoo, 2019), I have approached data
analysis with a methodological bricolage mindset, which combines methods for solving a
methodological problem (Pratt, Sonenshein, & Feldman, 2022) and focuses on innovative
approaches to data analysis and display (Lê & Schmid, 2022). To make sense of my data, I
started with writing a narrative or mini-case for each of the 17 cases (Langley, 1999). This
described the key facets of each case. Langley suggests creating narratives early on when
analyzing process data as a way to organize the tremendous volume of process data, and to
provide a way early in the data analysis to get a broad grasp on the emergent story in the data
(Langley, 1999). To complement these narratives, I sketched a visual map in which I highlighted
key events over time for each case. Langley (1999) noted that a visual map is an intermediate
data analysis approach for process data between the raw data and theoretical considerations. I
included my photographic and archival data in these narratives and visual maps. I then shared

58

these 17 narratives and visual maps with other researchers who participated in the interviews to
ensure that I accurately captured key aspects of the case.
After I completed the narratives and visual maps for each case, I open coded the cases
using the grounded theory approach Langley (1999) described, which is coding from the data
inductively, rather than using a theoretical lens. Using the Computer Aided Qualitative Data
Analysis Software QDA Miner (CAQDAS) for this open coding, I did not start with a predefined
codebook, but instead let the initial codes emerge from my field notes during interviews,
discussion with dissertation committee members, and review of the 17 narratives.
I used different coding techniques to review, condense, and refine the codes, such as
searching for particular words or phrases, reviewing code frequencies, and other CAQDAS
mechanisms (O’Kane, Smith, & Lerman, 2021) and stepping through the six initial coding
actions suggested by Locke, Feldman, and Golden-Biddle (2022). Locke and colleagues (2022)
suggested the pragmatic use of theory as the codebook is emerging. By iterating through the data
using many of these techniques, I developed a code book which includes facets of the
restauranteurs’ BMI actions and factors they identified as affecting the process. Then, I applied
these codes across all cases. There were several checks on my coding, such as code frequency
checks, comparison of word frequencies and code frequency, and the query by example and code
retrieval, three techniques suggested by O’Kane and colleagues (O’Kane et al., 2021).
After I completed and vetted the coding, I looked at the coding across the three phases of
the data collection to develop a sense for the case over time. This data analysis process is
referred to as temporal bracketing, in which different phases of a firm’s decisions and actions are
compared (Langley, 1999). My analyses included assessing how BMI aspects are associated with
factors that interviewees noted as affecting the process.
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Then, I compared the cases with each other using a synthetic process data analysis
approach (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Langley, 1999). Some of the cases were more similar
to each other, creating patterns of similar BMI processes. Conducting a code frequency
comparison (O’Kane, et al., 2021) helped to determine if there are similar patterns within and
between cases. This case comparison required, “constant iteration backward and forward
between steps” as Eisenhardt (1989: 546) described. Case comparison was iterative and required
the input of others involved in the data collection. The other researchers—who had published
many qualitative studies in top management journals and were experts in qualitative research
methods—and I met with all coded cases in a conference room several times (after the second
and final interviews) to compare and contrast their BMI actions and processes. I hung key BMI
attributes, decisions, and actions of 17 restauranteurs on the wall, and we spent many hours
discussing similarities and differences in restauranteurs' BMI actions and processes.
So, while I describe the overall data analysis process above in a linear fashion, I was
aware of the iterative nature of qualitative data analysis before key themes and findings emerge
from this inductive process (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2017; Crabtree & Miller, 1999). Based on
this process, I present and discuss emergent BMI causes, actions, and processes. This analysis
created rich and detailed explanations of BMI in terms of what has been undertaken, why, and
how.
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CHAPTER 4
QUALITATIVE STUDY FINDINGS
During the pandemic, restauranteurs faced uncertainty resulting from unexpected external
and internal challenges. Owners made sense of these environmental and organizational
challenges in different ways, with some owners identifying them as opportunities for growth and
change and other owners identifying them as threats. Their subsequent business model
innovation actions reflected how owners interpreted environmental and organizational cues to
"make sense" of the unfolding situation and "take action" (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014; Weick,
1995). Thus, the sensemaking frame used emerged as a critical for understanding the array of
business model innovations (BMIs) resulting from the pandemic. Sensemaking processes have
not been fully connected to the BMI literature to date. In this chapter, I make the link between
these restauranteurs’ sensemaking and their BMIs.
A sensemaking frame highlights the process of “meaning construction whereby people
interpret events and issues within and outside of their organizations that are somehow surprising,
complex, or confusing to them” (Cornelissen, 2012: 118). This process includes (1) noticing
cues—how sensemaking started with an event, (2) making interpretations—how meanings are
created and developed, and (3) taking actions—how actions are derived from sensemaking
(Maitlis & Christianson, 2014). This is a continuous process, because taking actions to solve a
problem can resolve the immediate issue while creating new problems to solve (Shrivastava,
1987; Weick, 1988). Also, environmental conditions change over time, creating new challenges,
while changing the character of or resolving existing challenges.
Figure 4.1 shows how 17 restauranteurs engaged in an array of BMIs during the
pandemic. My data show that these restauranteurs made sense of the changes in different ways,
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Figure 4.1. Business Model Innovation during a Crisis
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resulting in a variety of BMIs. Their changes were a result of their sensemaking process. Some
restauranteurs employing an opportunity sensemaking frame identified growth opportunities or
adapted their business models to incorporate new concepts, sometimes radically changing or
expanding existing business concepts into a new business or market. Other restauranteurs, who
faced fewer challenges with their current business models during the pandemic, developed their
models further by expanding the sizes of their restaurants and adding new services and
operations.
Another group of restauranteurs employing a threat sensemaking frame focused on a
single part of their business model, or responded by putting a renewed focus on managing costs.
Restauranters in this group were focused on improving profitability—some were changed
operational processes to reduce costs, while others attempted to increase revenues by adding
sales channels. While some of these changes were permanent, others made temporary service
and product changes that were reduced or removed as COVID restrictions were loosened.
Finally, some restaurants did not actively engage in sensemaking (i.e., low-level
sensemaking), and made any appreciable changes in their business models. Because they
experienced no significant changes in performance, and some of them were even performing
well during the early months of the pandemic, they maintained the status quo and made minor
changes to their business models over the course of my study.
Because my study was longitudinal, I found that some restauranteurs employed different
frames across time, and changes to their BMIs in one period led to changes in their
organizational conditions, which led to different responses in the following period as
environmental conditions continued to change. Thus, changing environmental and organizational
conditions subsequent actions and BMI changes over time. I also found that whereas some
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restauranteurs consistently employed the same sensemaking frame, others switched frames over
time. Next, I will discuss each of the model’s elements (Figure 4.1) in detail, describe the five
general approaches to BMI my multiple case study revealed, and discuss how they differed over
time.
Cues
Environmental changes and organizational conditions provided cues that restauranteurs
interpreted through opportunity and threat sensemaking frames. An environmental crisis, such as
the regulations and other changes (e.g., customers’ behaviors, supply chain shortages or
disruptions, labor market issues) that the pandemic generated can instigate sensemaking
processes that lead to BMIs (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014; Weick, 1988; Zott et al., 2011).
Environmental Changes. In response to COVID-19, federal and local governments
changed regulations, creating a series of disruptions across industries, supply chains, labor
markets, and many businesses. Table 4.1 illustrates how the environment changed over time
during the pandemic in my research context. Table 4.1 contains example pictures that I took
before conducting each round of interviews—the first phase was from March to July 2020; the
second phase was from July to early November 2020; the final phase was from the middle of
November 2020 to May 2021.
On March 20th, 2020, the local government issued an order closing dine-in activities at
restaurants to reduce the spread of the COVID-19 virus, but restaurants were allowed to offer
delivery and to-go services. A few days later (March 23rd, 2020), the local government issued a
closure order for non-essential businesses and urged residents to stay home and avoid social
gatherings. These orders were in effect until May 1st, 2020, and had different effects based on the
organizational cues, which I discuss in more detail below. Along with the regulations,

64

Table 4.1. Examples of Environmental Conditions
Environmental Conditions
st

1 Phase
(March – July 2020)

2nd Phase
(August – Early November 2020)

3rd Phase
(Mid-November – June 2021)

2:11 p.m. April 15th, 2020

8:11 p.m. September 11th, 2020

3:52 p.m. December 23rd, 2020

1:16 p.m. April 15th, 2020

2:30 p.m. October 22nd, 2020

12:50 p.m. February 20th, 2021
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restauranteurs also experienced supply chain disruptions for multiple reasons, such as increased
demand, decreased production, labor shortages, periodic shutdowns due to COVID outbreaks,
and international trade restrictions. Customers were afraid to visit restaurants, employees were
reluctant to work in restaurants, and the government’s restrictions, such as a 50 percent capacity
limit and increased minimum spacing between tables (after May 1st, 2020), and mask
requirements created challenging situations.
During the second phase of my study (August 2020 to early November 2020), restrictions
were similar to the first phase for restaurants (e.g., 50 percent capacity, social distancing, and
mask mandates), and sourcing some ingredients (e.g., meat, fish, grain) and materials (e.g., to-go
containers, food prep gloves) was still problematic. As more people began to visit restaurants
during this phase, restaurant owners posted signs requiring facemasks and social distancing to
reduce the threat of the COVID-19 virus spreading. At this time, having outdoor dining areas
was important for restaurant businesses because customers preferred outdoor seating over indoor
seating due to better air ventilation and a lower risk of infection (See the example images in the
second column of Table 4.1).
In the last phase of my study (middle of November 2020 to May 2021), restauranteurs
mentioned that their sales had improved, and sourcing issues (ingredients and materials) were
mostly resolved, except for a noticeable increase in prices for these goods. Even though the
number of COVID-19 cases significantly increased and similar restrictions were imposed on
restaurants during the winter months of 2020 and early 2021, customers continued to visit
restaurants. Because of the cold weather, providing outdoor dining was difficult, but more
customers were willing to eat inside the restaurants (See the example images in the third column
of Table 4.1). However, many restaurant owners were unable to meet the increased demand due
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to being understaffed. Even when many restauranteurs offered higher wages and better benefits,
they still struggled to find servers and cooks.
In sum, restauranteurs experienced environmental uncertainty and challenges throughout
the pandemic, such as changes in regulations (e.g., no dine-in and 50 percent capacity), customer
behaviors (e.g., more to-go and delivery orders, prefer outdoor dine-in), supply chains (e.g.,
difficult sourcing ingredients and materials), and labor markets (e.g., staffing challenges).
Not all environmental changes were challenging—the U.S. government helped
restaurants with financial support such as the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), the COVID19 Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL), and many other programs; customers supported local
restaurants by ordering food and leaving generous tips for employees (two of our restauranteurs
reported receiving $1,000 tips); and landlords and banks worked with restauranteurs to defer rent
or mortgage payments without penalties. The government also provided increased
unemployment benefits that made it easier to lay off employees during the first phase, knowing
that they would still receive a decent income. These environmental cues evolved across the
pandemic.
Organizational Conditions. Although an environmental crisis is a key trigger for
entrepreneurs’ sensemaking and actions, other cues (e.g., organizational financial, human, and
social resources, physical structures and locations, and primary sales channels) are also important
sensemaking triggers (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014; Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010). Unexpected
environmental changes may not be enough to trigger a sensemaking process because some
entrepreneurs may not experience any challenges from the changes (Maitlis & Christianson,
2014). Some restauranteurs may have large indoor and outdoor dining spaces to provide enough
social distancing; multiple drive-thru lanes and online delivery services as the main sales
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channels; loyal employees who want to stay with the business; a network of individuals who can
share their knowledge of new business operations and market conditions; and enough financial
resources to keep the business running even with reduced sales. However, others were in
buildings or geographic locations that made drive-thru pick-ups impossible, and carry-out orders
difficult; relied on local office worker foot traffic for business, had limited cash reserves, or were
more isolated from the restaurateur networks. Further, whereas some owned single restaurants
and could make quick adjustments, others owned or were part of multi-restaurant chains that
made it difficult to adapt quickly. Regardless, most restaurant owners faced uncertainty from the
pandemic and their organizational conditions were a key input when formulating their responses.
I will discuss further how organizational conditions, along with environmental changes, were
important positive and negative cues for restauranteurs’ sensemaking processes.
During the first phase, sudden restrictions (e.g., no dine-in, followed by 50 percent
capacity with social distancing, and stay-at-home office workers) posed difficulties for
restauranteurs who relied on dine-in services as their primary revenue generators; who had small
restaurant spaces with limited abilities for social distancing; and who were running businesses in
downtown areas with no customers nearby. Some restauranteurs, on the other hand, faced few
challenges or even recognized opportunities to grow because they already had a variety of
services (e.g., drive-thru, online delivery, and to-go) to offer without dine-in services, large
indoor and outdoor spaces for social distancing, a food concept that traveled well within
containers, and enough financial resources they could use to survive.
Later, new restrictions and environmental changes arose, such as the mask mandate rule,
cold weather during winter, disruptions in the supply chain, and staffing issues. Some of these
changes created new issues for restauranteurs. For example, when the pandemic began, large
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restaurant groups furloughed the majority of their employees, making it difficult to bring them
back or hire new employees for the business; small restaurants that tried to retain their loyal
employees faced almost no staffing challenges later in the pandemic. Mask requirements also
posed difficulties for servers. Restauranteurs and servers had to spar with customers who refused
to wear masks. Restaurants that were busy with drive-thru and to-go services but did not offer
dine-in service were not required to enforce the restriction. At the same time, federal PPP and
EIDL loans provided financial resources that allowed many of the restaurants to survive, and
some to pursue opportunities to implement new business models as PPP loans became more
flexible in subsequent rounds.
Throughout the pandemic, some restauranteurs were helped by others, including business
partners, mentors, and other restauranteurs. A group of restauranteurs did not have to learn
through trial-and-error experiments because other restauranteurs with similar organizational
structures (e.g., similar restaurant locations, similar business concepts, owned multiple
restaurants in different locations, or were franchisees with the same chain) shared their
experiences with different BMI actions, helping restauranteurs to vicariously learn what works
and what does not. Ownership also matters—some restauranteurs have partners who can provide
financial resources to expand the business and try new concepts, discuss new ideas, and interpret
cues together. However, some restauranteurs lacked external networks, so they worked closely
with employees and family members to understand environmental cues.
Therefore, during the pandemic, many restauranteurs experienced challenges and found
opportunities with their existing business models that aligned with their organizational
conditions such as physical locations and structures of stores, food styles, available sales
channels, and organizational resources (e.g., financial, human, and social). In addition, some
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restauranteurs were working on previously planned projects like opening a new restaurant,
renovating existing stores, or testing new business concepts. And not all restauranteurs were
solely focused on their restaurant businesses; they had other businesses or personal concerns they
prioritized. All these organizational conditions were fodder for restauranteurs’ sensemaking.
Sensemaking Frames
The restauranteurs made sense of their environmental and organizational cues by
approaching them as opportunities or threats (Christianson, Farkas, Ravasi & Schulz, 2006;
Sutcliffe, & Weick, 2008; Seeger & Ulmer, 2002). Also, some restauranteurs did not actively
engage in sensemaking (i.e., low-level sensemaking). Although the environmental changes were
similar for all the restauranteurs in my research (i.e., data collected in the same area facing the
same COVID restrictions), their organizational conditions (e.g., existing business models,
resource availability, physical structures) varied. Restauranteurs’ perceptions of environmental
and organizational cues resulted in unique interpretations. Table 4.2 provides example quotes of
restauranteurs’ different interpretations of similar environmental and organizational cues.
Some restauranteurs used an opportunity sensemaking frame and interpreted cues as a
growth opportunity. For instance, Traveler was entirely focused on dine-in services in the
downtown area, and his food style did not fit with offering to-go orders before the pandemic. He
worked on developing a new business model by adding a new food style that would work well
with carry-out and bought new equipment to make this new food style. He planned to open a
second restaurant in the near future based on the new concept. After the pandemic started,
Traveler saw it as an opportunity to test the new food style and said, “We knew we liked the
concept [their new concept], but we didn’t know how or when we would roll it out …in the
pandemic, and that concept fits in a world where people don’t want to eat in.” Thus, he
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Table 4.2. Examples of Opportunity, Threat, or Low-level Perceptions
Sensemaking
Frame

Time

st

1 Interview
May – July,
2020

Opportunity
Frame

2nd Interview
Oct – Early Nov,
2020

3rd Interview
May – June,
2021

Opportunity, Threat, or Low-level Perceptions
“I think COVID helped me to take it [a restaurant spot] over. The feel-good
thing that happened since COVID.” (Big Shoulder)
“We knew we liked the concept [their new concept], but we didn’t know how
or when we would roll it out …in the pandemic, and that concept fits in a
world where people don’t want to eat in.” (Traveler)
“In [neighborhood A] specifically, they’ve got a tun of restaurants. Ninety
percent of them are fast food and quick service restaurants... We wanted to
make a good sit-down restaurant, full bar. We’ve never had that before…
We just thought that’s what [neighborhood A] needed. Yeah, change it up.”
(Musician)
“I guess of just some of the deals that are out there. And I think if is a
business is healthy and is willing to really look for growth…I think now is
the time to grow, at least for us. It’s amazing what’s out there right now.”
(Beaver Dam)
“The market is set to be a rocket ship, right?…It’s just like everybody has
extra money, they have pent-up demand, they haven’t done anything in a
while. It’s the perfect recipe for us to be successful.” (Food Network)
“I’m just fortunate that we have had the opportunity to push forward and
have had some help doing that whether it be government, state, or
whatever.” (Rebel)
“This whole thing…nothing has happened like this in my lifetime. Nothing
like this… The devastation of 9-11, it was centralized and it was bad,
but…this [COVID-19] affects everybody and that’s the thing.” (Gladiator)

1st Interview
May – July,
2020

“Once COVID hit, they [customers] weren’t coming downtown
anymore…There’s no one living there, there is no one working down there,
so Monday through Friday was just awful. The weekends, because there are
no theaters, the farmer’s market wasn’t up and active, there was no draw to
bring anyone down.” (Polymath)
“I never really thought that a viral outbreak would be a reason that we
closed, honestly. Yeah, I’m thinking fire, flooding, things like that.” (Golfer)

Threat
Frame

“Our cash situation was so good sitting at March 1 st. On March 15th, sales
went away so fast, nobody expected your cash is disappearing quickly.”
(Mathematician)

2nd Interview
Oct – Early Nov,
2020

“Really, what has hurt us the most is the government more than anything
else… I’ll do whatever it takes, but don’t take my business away from me.”
(Food Network)
“I don’t see the same excitement it was when we opened [Big Shoulder]
Vegan before COVID, so I believe because of COVID less people come to
check the restaurant.” (Big Shoulder)
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Table 4.2. (Continued)
Sensemaking
Frame

Time

Threat
Frame

3rd Interview
May – June,
2021

“We have had a tremendous challenge in the new category or service that
has been created because of COVID, which is curbside delivery…this
curbside has created a monster.” (Special)

1st Interview
May – July,
2020

“Once I get into carry-out, I was very happy because I don’t have to do any
dine-in service, I don’t have to do any delivery service…and I don’t have to
worry about cleaning the tables, about serving the people…I’m happy. I
hope doing this for three more months.” (Steady)

Low-level
Sensemaking

2nd Interview
Oct – Early Nov,
2020
3rd Interview
May – June,
2021

Opportunity, Threat, or Low-level Perceptions

“All my employees got paid. I make some, I’m okay.” (Happy)
“We have been pretty remarkably okay. And I don’t know if that’s just
luck.” (Unconventional)
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interpreted the changes in the environment and assessed his organizational conditions to use the
pandemic as a time to experiment. There were several restauranteurs in my study that interpreted
environmental changes and organizational conditions by using opportunity sensemaking frames
to innovate existing business models.
On the other hand, other restauranteurs interpreted similar external cues as a threat to
their survival. Like Traveler, Golfer was primarily focused on a dine-in business model, and the
majority of his food items did not travel well for to-go services. His businesses were in
downtown areas where there were almost no customers, and no ability for diners to pull up in
front of his restaurant. He thought there was no way to make money with a 50 percent capacity
limit, but luckily, he had enough savings. Golfer interpreted similar environmental and
organizational cues with a threat sensemaking frame, so he furloughed most of his employees
and closed his restaurants for several months. Golfer stated that “I never really thought that a
viral outbreak would be a reason that we closed, honestly. Yeah, I’m thinking fire, flooding,
things like that.” There were other restauranteurs that used threat sensemaking frames and had
similar interpretations of the environment and organizational conditions that they faced.
Finally, a group of restauranteurs did not engage in significant sensemaking. For
instance, before the pandemic, Steady provided a variety of services such as dine-in, to-go, and
in-house delivery. When the pandemic began, he was pleased to eliminate his dine-in services, as
he was close to retirement and did not want to work so hard. Steady stated that,
Once I get into carry-out, I was very happy because I don’t have to do any dine-in
service, I don’t have to do any delivery service…and I don’t have to worry about
cleaning the tables, about serving the people…I’m happy. I hope we keep doing this for
three more months.
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Since he had no interest in expanding his restaurants and sales were sufficient to keep the
business running, he did not consider the pandemic a significant threat or business opportunity.
A few other restaurant owners had similar experiences and interpretations.
Further, whereas some restauranteurs employed the same frame across all three periods,
other restauranteurs’ sensemaking frames changed over time from threat to opportunity, or
opportunity to threat. For example, Traveler interpreted cues with an opportunity frame and
perceived an opportunity to grow early in the pandemic because he was flush with cash and had
ideas for expanding his business; he continued to interpret environmental changes and
organizational conditions as an opportunity throughout my study period. Food Network,
however, changed his sensemaking frame over the study period. Initially he was flush with cash
from selling gift cards, but he still shut down all his dine-in focused restaurants, rather than
pursue opportunities. As the pandemic dragged on and he saw more challenges along with
rapidly depleting reserves, his threat frame intensified and he started taking actions to generate
temporary income. However, in the last phase, Food Network appeared to have switched from a
threat to an opportunity frame, discussing opportunities to open new restaurants and related
businesses, and turning one of his temporary revenue generators into a permanent new revenue
stream. In contrast, Big Shoulder initially employed an opportunity frame and interpreted cues
(e.g., finding inexpensive ingredients, a new restaurant space, and having enough financial
resources) as a growth opportunity, expanding his business early in the pandemic. However, he
later switched to a threat frame due to labor shortages and difficulties managing multiple
restaurants. Thus, restauranteurs’ sensemaking frames can also vary over time, affecting their
BMI actions.
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BMI Decisions and Actions
Unsurprisingly, the restauranteurs’ BMI-related decisions and actions varied depending
on their sensemaking of the environmental and organizational cues. Overall, restauranteurs who
employed an opportunity frame to interpret the pandemic and organizational conditions made
more radical changes to their business models by significantly transforming their business
concepts or actively investing resources to expand their businesses. Others who used a threat
frame to interpret the cues and challenges modified part of their business models (e.g., sales
channels, operations) to solve problems or waited for a while without engaging BMI. However,
some restauranteurs were reluctant to make any changes to their business models. The following
discusses the five primary patterns of BMI decisions and actions.
With an opportunity frame, some restauranteurs viewed external and organizational cues
as opportunities to fundamentally rethink their business models, or explore new opportunities
and make significant business model changes by replacing or adding new business concepts. For
example, a group of restauranteurs realized that their existing dine-in focused business concepts
did not fit with the pandemic and had to come up with new types of food and distribution modes,
whereas others expanded into new lines of business they had not previously pursued. A second
group of restauranteurs’ BMI actions focused on expanding the business’s physical structure by
moving and increasing their restaurants’ physical size and adding more core functions to their
business models. These restaurateurs had fewer existential challenges—for example, they had
menu items that worked well with the to-go business or did not solely rely on dine-in services.
Thus, they could use current business concepts and leverage opportunities from environmental
changes to move into larger locations or open new restaurants.
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Two other BMI actions were primarily based on restauranteurs’ threat frames and
interpretations of the environment as threatening their business models. Some restauranteurs
focused on improving operational efficiency by reducing costs/waste and making the most of
existing resources. For example, they rearranged restaurant layouts, gave their staff new and
distinct roles, reduced employee headcounts, and implemented systems to minimize food waste.
Another group of restauranteurs focused on enhancing sales and revenues by implementing
temporary changes to generate revenue that they discontinued as soon as conditions changed
enough that they could revert to their pre-pandemic business models. For example, offering but
then discontinuing family-style meals, to-go and delivery services. Thus, they attempted to
diversify their offerings to generate revenues, but their efforts were short-lived.
Finally, restauranteurs who were using the same old business model did not actively
engage in sensemaking and BMI. They were able to survive by more or less doing what they had
always done, with only minimal tweaks to their practices during the pandemic’s shutdown phase.
Therefore, different BMI decisions and actions were taken based on restauranteurs’ current
business models and interpretations of cues with sensemaking (i.e., opportunity frame, threat
frame, or low-level sensemaking).
Outcomes and Feedback
Because sensemaking is an ongoing process, we can identify how actions taken at one
point in time become cues for subsequent bouts of sensemaking (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014;
Weick 1988). In my study, restauranteurs’ BMI decisions and actions affected their
organizational outcomes such as financial resources, customers’ reactions, and operational
efficiency. This in turn was factored in with changes to the environment and other organizational
conditions, leading to a new set of cues and a new sensemaking cycle. Therefore, the process of
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changing business models is an ongoing process rather than a one-time action because an
innovative action disrupts the status quo and creates additional cues, and looking at BMI crosssectionally, at one point in time, may lead to misinterpreting the nature and degree of BMI.
First, BMI actions altered organization-environment interactions, creating new challenges
and opportunities. For example, while some restauranteurs' initial BMI responses to
environmental challenges were successful (e.g., generating better revenue, reducing costs),
others’ BMI actions such as adding new services and products caused unexpected business
problems (e.g., food quality, managing orders, customers’ complaints). Second, a new set of cues
stimulated a new sensemaking process. Some restauranteurs interpreted the BMI actions and new
organizational conditions as opportunities to pursue and developed their innovations further,
while others highlighted organizational difficulties or limited improvements as outcomes of their
BMI actions. Restauranteurs also recognized new cues from the environment, which constantly
evolved during the study period. So, restauranteurs continued to make sense of the
environmental and organizational cues in determining whether to engage in additional BMI
actions, and what kinds of actions to take. Third, based on the new cues and interpretations, if
restauranteurs took additional BMI actions, the actions created new conditions and cues—and
sometimes frames—for the next round of sensemaking. Successful initial BMI actions can open
new avenues for restauranteurs to expand their business models into a new concept or market,
leading them to understand more cues of the new area and interpret them. Failed initial BMI
actions pushed restauranteurs to reject or revise the changes while reviewing additional
information from environmental and organizational conditions.
In this section, I discussed the BMI sensemaking process. In the next section, I further
unpack the model (see Figure 4.1) by describing 17 restauranteurs’ environmental and
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organizational cues, sensemaking, BMI decisions and actions, and new challenges and
opportunities as outcomes over time.
Five Patterns of Business Model Innovation
Based on Figure 4.1, across the 17 restauranteurs I identified five BMI patterns: (1)
Replacing or adding new business concepts, (2) Expanding the business’s physical structure, (3)
Improving operational efficiency, (4) Implementing temporary changes, and (5) Using the same
old business model. Each restauranteur’s BMI actions and processes evolved differently
depending on how the restauranteur made sense of the environmental and organizational cues
over time. There is also variability in the timing of changes among restauranteurs in each pattern.
A short summary of each pattern is followed by Table 4.3, which summarizes all patterns with
restauranteurs’ major BMI actions and processes during each phase of my study. I also included
Appendices with more detailed information about each restauranteur’s organizational conditions,
sensemaking frames, and BMI actions in each phase of my study.
During the pandemic, Traveler, Big Shoulder, Rebel, and Food Network were primarily
focused on replacing or adding new business concepts. Although each faced different
organizational conditions (e.g., resource availability, locations, restaurant sizes, and loyal
employees), they had similar dine-in focused business models, and their opportunity
sensemaking frames led them to similar BMI actions of replacing or adding new business
concepts. Yet, within this BMI pattern, some restauranteurs displayed different processes related
to bringing on novel and significant changes. Traveler and Big Shoulder worked on replacing or
adding new business concepts early in the pandemic because they recognized cues as
opportunities earlier than other restauranteurs (i.e., Rebel and Food Network), and thus
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Table 4.3. Major BMI Action Similarities and Differences During the Pandemic
Sense
making

Patterns

Restaurants

Traveler

Replacing or
adding new
business
concepts

Big Shoulder

Rebel

Food Network

Opportunity
frame

Meditation
Expanding the
business’s
physical
structure

Musician

Beaver Dam

Family

Threat
frame

Improving
operational
efficiency

Special

Polymath

Characteristics before
the pandemic
One restaurant,
Dine-in focused
(Italian)
One restaurant,
Vegan Dine-in
(Mediterranean)
One restaurant,
Brunch-lunch focused
(American)
Over 10 restaurants,
Dine-in focused
(American)
Two restaurants,
Casual dining
(Asian Fusion)
Two fast service
restaurants
and catering
(American)
Three stores
without a drive-thru
(Baked goods, Coffee)
One restaurant,
Casual dining
(American)
Two fast-food
restaurants
(American)
Three shops without a
drive-thru
(Baked goods, Coffee)

1st Phase
(March – July 2020)

2nd Phase
(August – Early
November 2020)

3rd Phase
(Mid-November –
June 2021)

Changed operations

Planned expansion
with a new concept

Opened the new
concept restaurant

Managed business

Planned a new
concept restaurant

Changed business
concept

Closed restaurants

Added a new concept

Expanded multiple
business concepts

Relocated a
restaurant to a larger
space

Changed operations

Dropped plans

Worked on opening a
larger restaurant and
sold a building

Changed operations
and services

Opened the larger
restaurant and closed
the existing
restaurant

Closed business and
stopped projects

Restarted a project
(Own coffee
roasting)

Worked on opening a
new store with a
drive-thru

Changed operation

Stopped high-cost
services

Further enhanced
operation efficiency

Changed operation

Further enhanced
operational efficiency

Changed structure
and layout of the
building

Reduced operation
costs

Further reduced
operation costs

Invested in
operational efficiency

Tested New Business
concept
Signed a lease for a
new concept
restaurant
Managed services
(reducing and adding
services)

BMI Process
Differences

Early adopters:
changing business
concepts early

Late bloomers:
changing business
concepts later

Prior commitments:
pursuing a prior
project

Forward
commitments:
postponing a prior
plan

Operational
efficiency: making
efficient operations
Cost efficiency:
developing an
efficient cost
structure
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Table 4.3. (Continued)
Sense
making

Threat
frame

Patterns

Implementing
temporary
changes

Restaurants

Characteristics before
the pandemic

Gladiator

Over 20 restaurants,
High-quality food
(American)

Mathematician

Golfer

Hospitality

Happy

Low-level

Using
the same old
business model

Steady

Unconventiona
l

Over 20 restaurants,
Casual and fine dining
(American, Italian)
Two restaurants,
Dine-in focused
(American, Italian)
One fine-dining
restaurant,
Dine-in focused
(American)
One restaurant,
Casual dining
(Asian)
One restaurant,
Casual dining
(Asian)
One restaurant,
Online delivery and
pop-up store
(Baked goods)

1st Phase (March –
July 2020)

2nd Phase
(August – Early
November 2020)

3rd Phase
(Mid-November –
June 2021)

Offered new services

Added more services

Dropped most of the
new services

Offered new services

Added catering
business

Dropped most of the
new services

Closed business and
dropped menu

Offered new services
and menu

Dropped the new
services and menu

Offered new services
and menu

Changed menu and
reduced operation
costs

Dropped the new
services and menu

Offered new services

Removed services

Retired and sold
business to three
employees

Removed services

No changes

Offered old services

Removed services

Added new services

No changes

BMI Process
Differences
Too large to manage:
having service
flexibility for all,
except for menu
changes

Small enough to
manage:
having the ability to
change services and
menu when necessary

None
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undertook bolder BMI actions earlier in the pandemic. As their organizational conditions
changed, Food Network and Rebel undertook major changes a year after the pandemic.
Restauranteurs Meditation, Musician, and Beaver Dam also employed an opportunity
sensemaking frame; however, their main BMI action was expanding the business’s physical
structure, which is a different BMI action than those taken by the four restauranteurs who
changed their business concepts. The differences in BMI actions are primarily due to these three
restaurants’ existing business model effectiveness, such as their well-developed services and
food items for to-go business.
Restauranteurs who employed threat sensemaking frames pursued BMI actions focused
on improving operational efficiency and/or implementing temporary changes. Family, Special,
and Polymath focused on improving operational efficiency because they relied less on dine-in
services as a primary revenue source, and their food items traveled well; these restauranteurs
changed internal operations to enhance profitability. Family and Special focused on improving
efficiency, while Polymath tried to reduce costs—the first two made enough sales and were even
stronger without some existing services (i.e., dine-in, bake goods delivery), but Polymath’s sales
struggled due to some of his restaurants’ downtown locations (i.e., few workers in downtown
offices; no tourist traffic).
On the other hand, the business models of other restauranteurs, such as Gladiator,
Mathematician, Golfer, and Hospitality, who also employed a threat sensemaking frame, relied
mostly on dine-in services as their main revenue source, primarily focused on implementing
temporary changes in sales channels to enhance revenue. Gladiator and Mathematician, for
example, added new services such as curbside, online ordering, in-house and third-party
delivery, and selling high quality raw meat and seafood, but did not change their menu items.
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Golfer and Hospitality, on the other hand, provided to-go, curbside, and in-house delivery
services, but they had to add or change menu items because their food did not travel well.
The final pattern includes Happy, Steady, and Unconventional. They did not actively
engage in sensemaking (i.e., low-level sensemaking), leading them to continue using the same
business models with minor changes. Thus, I found that restauranteurs’ sensemaking frames of
environmental and organizational cues led them to undertake different BMI actions and
processes. In the next section, I will provide a detailed look at how and why restauranteur
interpretations led them to different BMI actions across each phase of the pandemic.
Making Sense through an Opportunity Frame
I have identified two distinct actions (i.e., replacing or adding new business concepts and
expanding the business’s physical structure) taken by restauranteurs who employed an
opportunity sensemaking frame to interpret their environmental and organizational cues, which
led to substantial changes in their BMIs.
1) Replacing or Adding New Business Concepts
Even in a non-crisis situation, completely changing existing business concepts or
initiating a new concept with no prior experience can be extremely difficult. Because radical
business concept changes may necessitate tremendous effort in establishing new routines
(Nelson & Winter, 1982; Wiklund, Baker, & Shepherd, 2010), restauranteurs may re-initiate the
“liabilities of newness” (Amburgey, Kelley & Barnett, 1993), that can threaten organizational
survival (Stinchcombe, 1965). However, during the pandemic, I found four restauranteurs (i.e.,
Traveler, Big Shoulder, Rebel, and Food Network) who significantly changed their business
concepts or opened new restaurants with a different concept. These restauranteurs did not move
in lockstep with each other over the 13 months of my data collection. Instead, their processes
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linked to more radical BMI changes portray a clear connection between their organizational
circumstances and prior business models, but with some restauranteurs viewing the pandemic
consistently through an opportunity frame, while others changing their frames over the study
period. Figure 4.2 temporally displays the relative degree of change in each restauranteur’s BMI
over time, and when the changes occurred in tandem with their interpretations of environmental
and organizational conditions evolved.
All four restauranteurs operated dine-in focused establishments pre-pandemic. One
restauranteur—the celebrity chef Food Network—operated multiple restaurants in different
states; the others all operated single locations. Traveler and Rebel made significant changes to
their restaurants’ business concepts, while Big Shoulder and Food Network opened new
restaurants with new business concepts, and Food Network also pursued a new revenue option
for selling prepared foods. However, as Figure 4.2 illustrates, two restauranteurs (Traveler and
Big Shoulder) made significant changes to their business models early on, while the other two
restauranteurs (Food Network and Rebel) delayed responding as their organizational and
environmental conditions continued to evolve.
Early Adopters: Traveler and Big Shoulders. Before the pandemic, Traveler had been
planning to grow his business and he had worked on developing different business models before
the pandemic (see Appendix 1). Since his business was primarily focused on dine-in services and
was located near downtown, he wanted to open a new concept business (e.g., offering dine-in but
also to-go friendly Italian food) in a different location. Because his dine-in-focused business
model would not work with pandemic restrictions and his current food style would not travel
well as to-go, when the government imposed restricting on in-restaurant dining at the beginning
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Figure 4.2. BMI Trajectories in Replacing or Adding New Business Concepts Pattern

84

of the pandemic he decided to shut the restaurant. During the first three days of his forced break,
Traveler did not do anything except have meals with his family. After the fourth day of being
closed, he rolled up his sleeves and started to consider changes to his business models, menus,
recipes, and sales channels that he had worked on before the pandemic. Everything was almost
ready to launch the new business model. He went to a different state with a manager to learn the
new food style a year and half ago; had purchased kitchen appliances; and set up a kitchen for
the food style. He just had not did not started it because the new model and food style were
significantly different from the existing business model, which was doing quite well. However,
Traveler thought a different food style could work well during the COVID shutdown, testing a
new model and concept very early in the pandemic, he said,
Now that less people are eating in, we went from 10 percent take-out to switching our
business model to a new style of [food] … that traveled much better in a box …, which
was very difficult for us to transition to because we had to use all new equipment, new
staff, new recipes, new layouts, new ordering, and a new point-of-sale set-up.
Traveler believed that the pandemic provided opportunities to develop a new business concept to
solve environmental challenges and to grow the restaurant. He stated,
We had the information [about a new business concept], we already spent some money
on it, and we just chose to take the time to do it. And since we thought the concept might
work in the future, we just figured what a good time to test it out because people are
really patient right now.
Another restauranteur, Big Shoulder also wanted to expand his business with a new
concept before the pandemic (see Appendix 2). His sales dropped because his company was in a
downtown area (i.e., few workers in downtown offices; no tourist traffic), and there were no
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events that drew people to the area. However, Big Shoulder explained that he had enough
savings and had received generous government financial support, so he did not worry about
survival and instead he could search for appealing opportunities. Using his financial resources,
he was able to obtain high-quality ingredients at a lower cost because vendors were struggling to
find buyers for their products. He also found that a struggling restaurant adjacent to his store was
going out of business. Big Shoulder had his eye on this spot and had considered opening a new
concept and new location before the pandemic. During the first phase, Big Shoulder decided to
take over the failed restaurant’s space and implement his new concept. He described his side-byside concept,
One side with vegan and the other side with meat. That’s it. I think it’s a nice concept.
Two months after I opened [Big Shoulder] Vegan, I know that the Vietnamese restaurant
[next door] was struggling... I put an offer eight months ago, and she didn’t accept it. In
the end, I got it. It was in my head all the time.
He thought that the pandemic provided an opportunity to grow his business: “I think COVID
helped me to take it (the new restaurant location) over. The feel-good thing that happened since
COVID.”
Both Traveler and Big Shoulder had enough knowledge of the new concepts and
available financial resources to see the pandemic as a time of business growth, investing quickly
in their new business concepts. Thus, as soon as they interpreted multiple cues as opportunities
to grow their restaurants, they immediately pursued new concepts they had been thinking about.
Sensemaking is an ongoing process (Gephart et al., 2010; Weick et al., 2005), so prior
sensemaking and BMI actions may lead restauranteurs to another bout of sensemaking,
particularly if there is another environmental or organizational change. After my first interview,
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Traveler’s new food style and business concept drew more customers, resulting in a 25 percent
increase in sales over the previous year. He said that “keep in mind, that growth is now coming
with a 50 percent capacity restriction.” Although restrictions remained the same (e.g., 50 percent
capacity and mask mandating restrictions), he felt people became more comfortable with going
out to eat. His new business concept also allowed him to partner with local breweries by
delivering their food, as their food now travels well.
Thus, at the time of my second interview, Traveler still used an opportunity sensemaking
frame to see environmental and organizational conditions as an opportunity for his business. He
focused on mainly managing the new concept, which touched all aspects of the business
including hiring employees, developing new systems for retaining employees, modifying the
restaurant’s layout, and adding new operating systems. Although Traveler returned to offering
his traditional food when inside dining returned, he again modified his to-go offering, which was
distinct from his dine-in cuisine. Also, he was still considering launching his initial plan of
opening a separate restaurant with a new concept to expand his business, working on relocating a
tenant who occupied another part of his building (which Traveler owned).
Big Shoulder opened his new restaurant after the first interview. However, when we next
spoke, he said managing the two restaurants was challenging, because he kept their operations,
employees, and food preparations separate, even though the restaurants were next to each other.
Finding experienced employees and training them for both restaurants was a significant
challenge, which he continued to face even at the time of our third interview. He explained, “It’s
difficult to find people that have experience and they’re willing to work and make the effort to
the place to make it succeed... For me, the most difficult thing is manpower, just manpower.” Big
Shoulder worked more hours to manage the two restaurants, but he was still interested in opening
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additional restaurants with new concepts and locations. His network of friends and other business
owners were offering him possible business locations. For instance, a hotel owner who is a
regular customer of the restaurant was asking Big Shoulder to open the same vegan restaurant in
his hotel in a different city. Thus, in the second phase, both restauranteurs (Traveler and Big
Shoulder) still interpreted the pandemic as an opportunity to develop new business concepts and
grow their businesses.
Before the last interview, various government restrictions (e.g., the 50 percent capacity
rule and mask mandate) were removed, and businesses were filling empty stores and fully
opening dining areas. However, some restauranteurs encountered difficulties with human
resources (i.e., training, retaining, hiring) and the cost of ingredients and materials (i.e.,
inflation), particularly during my third round of interviews. Hiring employees, inflation, and
managing multiple businesses posed substantial operating difficulties for Big Shoulder, in
particular. Despite seeing numerous potential locations to open vegan restaurants, Big Shoulder
decided not to expand the business further, because managing two businesses, making them
profitable, and hiring employees were major issues he had not yet resolved. He observed,
A lot of people from [City A], from [City B], from [City C] are begging me to come and
open the same concept. They have a spot for me inside of one of the hotels over there,
even in [City D]; and I said, ‘I don’t think that I’m going to go there because I can’t. I am
not 21 years old. I’m tired; and to build a system like this through control, like five or six
locations like this, it’s going to give me a big headache. Maybe if I’m going to find
somebody with a vision that’s going to help me and going to hire the manpower and do
everything, maybe it’s a good idea. But now, I don’t see any way that I could do it.
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Overall, Big Shoulder’s countenance was markedly more negative than during our
previous interviews, and during our third interview, it appeared his sensemaking frame had
shifted toward more of a threat frame, and he responded to his challenges by reducing business
hours and continuously hiring employees due to a staffing shortage. Indeed, following our last
interview he closed his new location and combined both menus in his original location, although
he kept separate knives, cooking implements and oil for the meat and vegan dishes in the
kitchen.
While managing the new business concept and its success, Traveler already increased
employees’ salaries, so he was able to hire ten more staff compared to before the pandemic.
Also, he created a “fun project” with employees by letting them design the restaurant’s
merchandise (e.g., t-shirts and hats), which helped to create a good culture for business and
provide a sense of value for staff. Thus, he had no staffing issues, and his sales were even
stronger after all the restrictions were removed. These environmental and organizational cues
allowed him to develop a new concept for his second restaurant and test it by offering pop-up
dinners. Traveler said,
We have decided on the concept, yes. We just haven’t gone public with it. This isn’t
public information; and so these pop-up dinners that we’re having will tease it, will tease
the concept. People may make assumptions based off of that, but we won’t actually
release that until we have more of a firm timeline with construction and design … so
there are a lot of moving pieces.
Thus, Traveler still saw opportunities, and he kept pursuing opening a new restaurant with a new
business concept.
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Late Bloomers: Food Network and Rebel. Unlike the fast movers in the early adopter
group, the other two restauranteurs—Food Network and Rebel—did not change their concepts
until a year after the pandemic began. COVID restrictions created challenges for Food Network’s
restaurant because his business model was mainly focused on dine-in services (see Appendix 3).
Switching to to-go services was not ideal for his business because the service required different
operations that did not fit with his existing business model and food style. He noted, “Switching
to takeout just didn’t seem to be right because there seemed to be something new you had to do,
and it was just so taxing on the team; so, we just focused on something we knew we could
execute and we could help the community.”
Instead of changing business models to operate his multiple restaurants, he initially
employed a threat frame; furloughed most of his employees except 52 managers; used the
reserves from gift card sales to sustain his business financially; and used other financial
resources (e.g., government financial support) to maintain the status quo and ensure survival
until he could open his physical locations back up at 50 percent. Also, Food Network donated
food to support the community and did not identify business opportunities to pursue in the early
pandemic, he stated,
Well, when we first shut down, …we brought all of our product back to our corporate
office, and first concentrated on taking care of people in our industry. We switched over
to giving away meals, lunch and dinner, with all the product that we had from all of our
restaurants. We did community lunches, community dinners for the first eight weeks that
we were shut down... I said, “You know, the best thing to do in a situation like this is
figure out a way to take care of people that are worse off than we are,” so we did that…
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That’s what we did all the way through about, well, actually May 1st, when we opened
back up.
Rebel also experienced an initial significant decrease in sales during the shut-down
phase of COVID (see Appendix 4). Rebel’s restaurant was located in a neighborhood shopping
center without a lot of other restaurants or businesses around. Even before the pandemic, Rebel
recognized problems with his dine-in and brunch-lunch focused business model, and felt a
dinner-and-bar-focused business model would be more effective and profitable. Rebel
considered this new concept for a couple of years prior to the pandemic, and he had even begun
renovating his restaurant to make an eventual shift to dinner-and-bar service easier. He saw the
pandemic as a time of opportunity but lacked the resources, especially financial resources, to
pursue it early in the pandemic. He was also very connected to a network of young restauranteurs
in the city who had worked at a resort together; this network provided a sounding board during
the pandemic. So, in the initial phase of the pandemic, Rebel had a mix of positive and negative
cues from its organization: a poor location, a cuisine that did not translate well to to-go, a
network of advice, an idea for a new business before the pandemic, and weak financials. He
stated,
My thought process, everyone in the neighborhood and everyone I’ve talked to, is you’ve
got to do dinner. You’ve got to do dinner. You’ve got to do dinner. That was the main
reason for the renovation was to have, one, a restaurant that we could clean much easier
because it was an older building and, two, it was more presentable and [we could] take
care of the sound.
Rebel did not initially begin to implement the new ideas; his sensemaking frame was a
threat frame, and he focused on his weak financial resources and poor location along with the
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pandemic environmental challenges. Thus, rather than changing the entire concept, he initially
worked on minor changes such as removing services (e.g., breakfast, bakery) to manage costs
and adding new services (e.g., curbside pickup, family-style meals, selling raw meat) to increase
sales. In addition, he got a second job representing a meat distributor to maintain his income and
health benefits;
I also have a second job. I work for a protein distributor as their [city] rep part time.
That’s one I just needed something else to do, obviously. To say that, that does not
provide a ton of income; but they were kind enough to give me full benefits.
The longer the COVID-19 pandemic lasted, the more difficult it was for restaurant
owners to keep their doors open with existing business models. As the pandemic dragged on,
both Food Network and Rebel discussed their fear of losing their businesses, even after they reopened at 50 percent capacity. Environmental and organizational cues continued to send more
negative signals about potential threats to their businesses—capacity restrictions, increased
COVID-19 cases over the summer, the diminished profits, and depleted financial resources. It
became clear by the second interview that these two restauranteurs were considering more
radical changes. During my second round of interviews, Rebel said,
It’s very obvious we can’t continue to do what we’re doing and be successful. I want to
keep doing this for the most part, but I’m not going to do it to the point where I’ll deal
with a bankruptcy lawyer and figure that out before I’ll just deplete everything.
Food Network expressed his difficulties when the second rise in COVID cases hit during July of
2020:
Revenues drop off and everybody is like, ‘What the heck is going on?’ and it’s like, ‘No,
we’re going to be great. We’re going to be great.’ And then I go back to my office and
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curl up and almost cry and it’s [the virus] never going to go away ... I’m like, ‘Man, this
ship could sink. I mean, I’ve used up all my reserved cash, like this is getting real here,
you know?
Although both restauranteurs took limited actions at the onset of the pandemic, they
eventually began making more significant changes to their business models, especially
expanding sales channels by integrating new services. Rebel described adding services (e.g., a
private chef service—cooking at customers’ houses—and online orders) that were new and
began actively searching for the financial resources to change his business concept to a dinnerand-bar format. During the second phase, Rebel wanted to change his business, even if it meant
failing. He explained,
I could sell the business now and clear my debt almost just from an asset standpoint.…
but I’m not willing to go down without a fight. It’s one of those things, if we make this
change and put a bar in, quite frankly that just increases my value of my business and if
push comes to shove, … I have no idea, my wife does [a farm], so I guess I could shovel
manure for the time being. She’s always looking for help.
With his kitchens up and running, but with excess capacity, low financial resources, but
capable staffs, Food Network began employing a “ghost kitchen” concept2 and selling Mexican
food via delivery and to-go services, and through neighborhood “pop up” stands. Because of the
prolonged organizational challenges during the pandemic, both Rebel and Food Network saw the
need to adapt, and they engaged in what we describe elsewhere as largely “temporary”
innovations, but with some surprising results.

2

Ghost kitchens are restaurants that exclusively serve delivery meals and have no physical storefronts or dining
rooms (Cai, Leung, & Chi, 2022).
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My third round of interviews revealed that both restauranteurs were employing new
business concepts a year after the COVID-19 started, as both their environmental and
organizational cues had changed (e.g., lifted restrictions, vaccines became available, and
increased sales), as had their sensemaking frames. Externally, COVID restrictions were lifted, so
dining rooms could seat at 100 percent capacity and there were no indoor mask mandates. Also,
older and regular customers began to visit more often for dine-in services once vaccines became
available. So, they began to make more sales and see the situation as returning to normal. Also,
subsequent rounds of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP)3 and other grants helped Rebel
cover the construction expenses for adding a bar. Rebel considered these cues as an opportunity.
He had renovated his restaurant, added a bar and removed the underperforming bakery, and was
starting to offer a dinner service while still maintaining his brunch-lunch service. He stated,
The last PPP we got, which was just over $100,000, it was huge. I was starting to have
another freak-out, to be honest. I’ve got some other applications in for grants right now
too. I just was sitting there thinking, ‘I don’t know when the catering business is going to
come back. Being a father is very important; so short story is if I can’t generate more
revenue, then I can’t stay at home.’ I just took a gamble [changing the concept].
Food Network also observed positive environmental and organizational changes for his
business. In addition to the other changes, he found a significant increase in demand in the
hospitality industry in the city where most of his restaurants were located. Food Network
explained, “Everybody is saying, ‘In our industry we feel like it’s going to be the roaring 20s for
about the next 18 months, so we want to take full advantage of that.” Food Network also found a

3

The first round of PPP loans only allowed business owners to use the money for employee compensation;
subsequent rounds allowed them to use the money for other expenses such as rent and capital improvements.
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significant redevelopment project in a district near his existing restaurants, highlighting the role
of partners as a key part of his BMI change. He said,
There is a group called [X], and they put about $200,000,000 into the redevelopment of
the district. They are basically spending $1,000,000 a month on marketing, and we get to
take advantage of it. We are not actually in the district there is marketing for, but the
three new places I am doing are in the actual district that they redeveloped. I’ve been in
[the area] for 21 years, and I didn’t want anyone to take advantage of it without me being
in the middle of it; so we are going for it.
Thus, in the third phase, he decided to enter various businesses other than restaurants and
introduce to the market his projects that he had worked on during the pandemic. The new
businesses Food Network described included a boutique hotel, a live-music venue attached to a
restaurant, new restaurants with different cuisines, and developing prepared food items to sell
through a retail business with whom he had a relationship. He was able to expand businesses and
concepts by leveraging his celebrity chef reputation and financial resources, as well as
converting many restaurant leases to straight percentage rent (i.e., paying rent as a percentage of
sales) rather than ground rent (i.e., paying a fixed amount each month).
In addition, Food Network’s most interesting BMI resulted from his “temporary” effort to
make use of his excess kitchen capacity. Although his “ghost kitchen” business helped generate
revenues during the middle phase of my study, he had to pull back from this because all his
restaurants were operating at full capacity and no kitchen space was available for the ‘ghost
kitchen’ services. Instead of “exorcising” the ghost kitchen from his business, he restructured the
operations—from his staff working on all aspects of the process (i.e., cooking to selling) to only
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preparing food items and selling them through an online marketplace (Goldbelly), while
negotiating to all sell them through his retail partner.
To summarize, all four restauranteurs faced significant challenges in their existing
business models and implemented significant business model innovations. They replaced or
added new business concepts based on the restauranteurs’ sensemaking of changing
environmental and organizational cues, and in some cases shifts in their sensemaking frames
from threats to opportunities, or vice versa. Traveler and Big Shoulder shifted their business
models early on because they used opportunity sensemaking frames early in the pandemic and
had sufficient resources (e.g., financial resources, physical spaces, knowledges about a new
business concept) to carry out the BMI action. In contrast, Rebel and Food Network changed
their business models later in the pandemic as compared to Traveler and Big Shoulder. These
restauranteurs used opportunity sensemaking frames or obtained resources (e.g., financial
resources, networks for getting business support, knowledges about a new business concept) later
in the pandemic. In contrast, Big Shoulder’s sensemaking frame shifted to a threat frame, and he
reduced his ambitions as he focused on dealing with the labor challenges he (and many others)
faced. As a result, restaurant owners who experienced significant challenges with their existing
business models but had sufficient resources and interpreted cues as opportunities ended up
replacing or adding new business concepts to their operations.
2) Expanding the Business’s Physical Structure
Restauranteurs in the first BMI pattern saw changing concepts as opportunities.
Restauranteurs in this pattern (i.e., Meditation, Musician, and Beaver Dam) pursued growth
opportunities by expanding their businesses’ physical spaces and structures while essentially
maintaining their existing business practices (e.g., to-go, delivery, and dine-in) with only minor

96

changes to their business models. These restauranteurs all employed an opportunity sensemaking
frame and believed that changes due to COVID-19 allowed them to expand their business.
In my interviews, these restauranteurs’ emphasized the positive cues of growth
opportunities resulting from environmental changes. While maintaining their pre-COVID
business concepts, these restauranteurs expanded restaurant spaces and added new physical
structures for increased sales and improved operations. For instance, Beaver Dam added coffee
roasting in a separate warehouse because he planned to have it before the pandemic, found a
good lease deal due to COVID, possessed enough financial resources, and had an employee who
knew how to manage the operation. He also opened a new store with a drive-thru lane after being
approached by well-known investors and entrepreneurs in the city. Beaver Dam realized the
importance of drive-thru service even more during the pandemic, given that his existing locations
lacked them. Meditation and Musician closed old restaurant locations and relocated to larger
spaces to provide more services (e.g., outdoor dining, a bar) because they planned to relocate for
business growth prior to the pandemic, had small restaurants, and COVID occupancy restrictions
created challenges to generate enough revenues. Thus, these restauranteurs used an opportunity
sensemaking frame to expand the business’s physical structure. Figure 4.3 shows their BMI
evolution over time.
As the figure illustrates, although all three firms increased their “footprint” through new
spaces and new activities, their processes were different: Meditation and Musician had already
committed to these expansion actions before the pandemic and accelerated the process, hence
their faster start reflected in the graphic below. In contrast, Beaver Dam committed to his growth
after the pandemic was underway, and thus had a delay before his BMIs occurred.

97

Figure 4.3. BMI Trajectories in the Expanding the Business’s Physical Structure Pattern
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Prior Commitment: Meditation and Musician. Meditation4 and Musician had already
signed leases for new locations before the pandemic; this was an important organizational cue
that influenced their interpretation and BMI actions (see Appendices 5 and 6). Both
restauranteurs mentioned in the first interview that they were working on opening new
restaurants because larger spaces would allow them to do more business. Although they
considered expanding their physical locations to be an opportunity, each restaurateur had
different cues based on the environmental changes and organizational challenges, which led to
different sensemaking processes.
Meditation had worked on opening a new restaurant location before the pandemic and
considered transitioning one of their existing restaurant concepts to a to-go focused business—
the current location was small, and it had a big window which they used to service to-go orders
when indoor dining was shut down. Following the pandemic and the local government’s sudden
dine-in restrictions, challenges in sales, operations, and relocating a new restaurant arose.
Meditation’s restaurants were located on downtown side street where there were few customers
early in the pandemic, and they lost sales when one of the area’s major events was canceled,
which was a huge economic driver for downtown restauranteurs. Moving to a new location was
also slowed by sales challenges caused by major event cancellations near the restaurant.
According to Meditation,
COVID’s main impact on that moving was delaying a little bit ... It’s kind of a complex
situation for us. We lost [a major event], which is a huge economic driver for downtown
and downtown restaurants. That was something we were relying on a little bit to push us

4

Meditation owned a second restaurant with larger indoor and outdoor spaces, and also operated an event space. I
am not focusing on these businesses for parsimony, and because they didn’t experience the same significant changes
as the focal restaurant’s operations.
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financially into that move …We were still going to pursue those plans to move because
despite everything it was our only way to grow … and try to put a positive spin on it
when we opened. At least our new spot has a really large outdoor space, which is
something that’s really valuable right now that [our current location] doesn’t really have.
Meditation only offered to-go services during the shut-down phase, but the business
generated enough profit because their overhead was extremely low. They were unable to open
their doors when the 50 percent capacity restriction was implemented, however, because the
restaurant’s space was too small, with limited indoor and outdoor seating. For example, if they
followed the six feet of social distancing guideline, only one or two tables could be served in the
outdoor seating area, and only about three tables could be seated indoors. Providing enough
social distancing and generating profits were almost impossible. They said, “we really can’t
reopen [the old location] unless we’re at 100 percent capacity because … it’s really small.” Thus,
Meditation considered moving to a new location with larger indoor, outdoor, and kitchen space
as an opportunity, and keeping the current small restaurant for to-go business as another business
opportunity. They stated,
We made plans back in December [2019] to move [the restaurant’s] current location,
which we’re still on track to do. We should be opening the new location in a couple of
weeks. And then we plan to pivot the current location into a different concept, something
more like a fast to-go concept.
Musician also signed a lease for a new restaurant space on March 10th, 2020. He stated,
“In fact, we were in the process of trying to grow the business. I was about to sign a lease for a
fourth location.” The process was slowed down because of organizational challenges such as
managing multiple locations (i.e., one downtown and one suburban) and businesses (i.e., a

100

catering business). Musician’s fast-service business concept worked well at the downtown
restaurant, which had a large parking lot surrounding it. However, it was difficult to operate and
offer to-go and curbside services at the suburban restaurant because the location was relatively
far from the city and difficult for customers to access.
Moreover, the catering business was challenged due to the complete cessation of social
events, eventually leading Music to sell the catering building, although he intended to continue
catering out of his new, larger location once the business returned. The catering space thus was a
negative organizational condition that affected his BMI actions. In addition to closing the
catering business, Music temporarily closed the suburban restaurant a few weeks into the
pandemic. Managing multiple businesses and different locations created various challenges for
him, so he focused on expanding the downtown restaurant’s services, including offering precooked meals using a vacuum sealer (from the catering business), providing additional services
(e.g., online ordering and third-party delivery) and selling food to his friends’ bars once in-door
service was restored. However, his primary focus was on the opportunities the new restaurant
location offered because the new restaurant could allow him to accommodate both catering and
expanded restaurant services. Thus, Musician pushed to open a new restaurant and stated that,
My mind was, “Okay, maybe we just need another location with a really big kitchen.”
There’s ordering and all that stuff. When you have a restaurant, there’s constantly food
there so if somebody calls last minute, I can do it. At the catering kitchen, I made all my
orders for the week’s stuff. If somebody calls on a Thursday and wants something on a
Friday, … all of my food is spoken for, you know …. Now I think the best model is to
have a restaurant with a kitchen large enough to handle it. So my hope is we do get [the
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new location] restaurant open. The kitchen is big enough and when the catering comes
back, I got the space.
These BMI decisions early in the pandemic influenced their future BMI actions. The
decision to have larger spaces and relocate restaurants presented new challenges and
opportunities later. Meditation moved to the new location, and when COVID restrictions were
changed to a 50 percent capacity restriction, their sales were strong and even better than they
were doing before the pandemic at the old restaurant. Having a large outdoor and indoor space
made customers more comfortable dining out. A larger kitchen space also allowed cooks to offer
a variety of menu items, as well as enough space to mount a large broiler on the wall and a
charbroil grill in the kitchen’s corner. However, the new space required additional changes to the
restaurants’ operations and layout. Meditation explained,
Well, one big change is [that] we moved [one restaurant] into a bigger space into [a new
location], which was a blessing because we gained a patio that seats 50+ people [outside
only]. The old space pre-COVID inside and out only sat 48, so we had a net gain of seats,
even with restricted seating; so that’s helped.
During our second interview, the owners also noted,
Moving into that building …. [The new restaurant] probably wasn’t routinely maintained
as much as it should have been, and it is an older building; so it comes with a host of
issues that you get with older buildings …. We just didn’t think that they would all bear
fruit around the same time. Then we also had a positive COVID person in the restaurant
that came into contact with one other employee, so it took them out for two weeks right
in the middle of everything. I think it was like five COVID tests, and I had to tell these
two guys to stay home for two weeks. Exhaust fans go out. A host of plumbing issues.
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Exhaust fans get fixed, fans go out again. So, it was a lot. I think I cried more just from
sheer stress and exhaustion in August and the beginning of September than I ever have in
my entire life, probably since I was maybe four.
While Meditation mentioned at this time that they still wanted to open a to-go concept
business at the old location, they eventually dropped this plan. In the last interview,
environmental and organizational cues were no longer interpreted as opportunities for
Meditation, but rather as threats they needed to address. At this point their actions were focused
on managing their businesses and revising business models rather than innovating them further;
since our second interview they had added and changed services (e.g., third party delivery,
integration of the other business, menu changes), remodeled restaurants (e.g., layout of dining
area, new equipment, and kitchen space), and redesigned employees’ pay and benefits.
Therefore, Meditation said,
We finally got overwhelmed enough, and there was enough going on; and we saw that
the next year would still be challenging enough that we just personally didn’t have the
bandwidth for it. We decided maybe not to do anything else right now; so we just had to
focus on the things that we did have.
In the second phase, Musician’s previous BMI action created new cues that can be
interpreted as challenges and opportunities. As more employees returned to work at downtown
firms and local organizations held events, customers began to request catering services from his
business. However, catering was difficult because he lacked dedicated catering space (he had
sold the catering building) and furloughed catering employees. Thus, Musician changed catering
buffets to providing boxed meals for customers’ events. He said,
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I think we talked about how it really decimated my catering. Spring and fall are my two
biggest seasons for catering. That is where I’ve lost the most revenue, but I am still doing
some catering. We’re doing some weddings. I’ve picked up a lot of corporate box
lunches, something we had never done in the past. My corporate box lunches, 200 or 150
individually packed lunches that we drop off on a table. We don’t see anybody.
Unlike Meditation, Musician waited to open a new restaurant until after the winter of
2021, because he reasoned that winter is generally a slow season for the restaurant industry.
Although he interpreted opening a new restaurant as a promising opportunity, the timing was
interpreted as a threat. Thus, while he was slowed down working on opening the restaurant, he
used the time to plan new services and adapt the restaurant’s layout based on his COVID
experiences (e.g., a drive-thru lane, a to-go business-friendly layout, a separate bar menu, and a
larger outdoor dining area).
In my last interview, Musician discussed organizational challenges such as the new
location and labor shortages. Opening the large restaurant required more employees to operate
the business, and this was the first time he had offered sit-down service at tables rather than fast
casual counter service. Although he held a job fair at his new restaurant, advertised in the local
news media, and spent eight hours waiting for potential employees outside, he only ended up
hiring three people. “The job fair itself was a bit of a disaster,” he said, and finding employees
was difficult for many restauranteurs. At the same time, the suburban restaurant was having
difficulty hiring, was not making enough money, and he was having disagreements with the
landlord about renovating the restaurant.
Given these challenges, Musician shifted from an opportunity to a threat sensemaking
frame. He decided to close the suburban restaurant and relocate employees from the restaurant to

104

the new location. He postponed or canceled previously planned services for the new restaurant
and decided to forego putting in an outdoor eating area due to the overwhelming amount of work
required to manage the new restaurant’s operations, especially with limited employees.
Nevertheless, overall, Musician interpreted cues during the pandemic as providing opportunities
and positive reasons to make these changes:
You know in some ways, at least for my company, the pandemic kind of helped us in
some weird ways. We knew we were wanting to get out of [the suburban location], and
we knew we wanted to come to [new location]; but it just forced our hand and showed us
what was important to us, gave us a reason to get out of that. I don’t know if it would
have happened as quickly if it hadn’t been for the pandemic. It really streamlined us.
Therefore, these restauranteurs’ prior commitments and endeavors became opportunities to
pursue during the pandemic to grow and evolve their existing business models.
Forward Commitment: Beaver Dam. Unlike Meditation and Musician, who acted on
their growth plans early in the pandemic, Beaver Dam stopped planned growth (e.g., opening a
new store and roasting coffee) early on because he experienced a decrease in sales early in
March 2020 (see Appendix 7). Right after indoor dining was shut down Beaver Dam decided to
completely close all his restaurants, even though their coffee and baked goods could be
objectively viewed as suitable for to-go and delivery services. He undertook these actions
because he had enough financial resources available from his savings and government
programs—i.e., PPP and EIDL, his brother was his business partner, and also supported the
temporary shutdown to ride out the pandemic, which some assumed would be over soon. He
explained,
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We wanted a clean break, we just wanted a clean closure and clean opening; and I didn’t
want to play around with … half of our services or curbside, to-go, or anything like that.
The businesses that needed to do that, of course, I don’t blame them one bit, the
businesses that really needed to keep some cash flow coming in; but I knew we were in a
financial position to not have to do that.
After the local government lifted the shutdown order on May 1st, 2020, all the Beaver
Dam restaurants were reopened at 50 percent capacity with new services (e.g., third-party
delivery, dollar menu promotions) and minor operational changes. Beaver Dam considered
proceeding with his growth plan after reopening the restaurants because sales were strong, and
challenges were manageable. Thus, he slowly changed his frame from threat to opportunity.
During my second interview, Beaver Dam stated that the pandemic created an
opportunity for growth:
If a business is healthy and is willing to really look for growth opportunities right now, I
think now is the time to grow, at least for us. It’s amazing what’s out there right now….
This is a little pessimistic way of viewing it, but it’s kind of a transfer of assets and
resources from those who are fearful and conservative and closing down to those who are
aggressive and growing and hopeful about the future. That’s the way it seems to me.
Beaver Dam focused on positive environmental cues—low interest rates, good leasing
opportunities, and ingredient deals. Also, his restaurants were a roaring success—his sales were
soaring, and he was breaking records almost monthly, especially since some other coffee shops
had been less aggressive in reopening. He was could not offer a reason for the great sales, he
said, “I’m really, I’ve been trying to figure out what has been going on.” After finding lowinterest financing from a bank, an available warehouse lease, and an employee who could
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manage roasting coffee and wholesale activities, he decided to roast his company’s own coffee
beans to expand the business and reduce the cost of his retail coffee products.
In the last interview, when no restrictions were in place, Beaver Dam was performing
extremely well in sales. He stated, “Yeah, and we set another record in April and we’re on track
to set another record in May.” Also, the new addition of warehousing provided positive cues, and
Beaver Dam believed that roasting the restaurant’s own coffee helped reduce costs for better
margins and the ability to offer a subscription model. Despite challenges in managing the coffeeroasting business, he gave the employee in charge enough time and space to ramp up the
business. He also signed a contract for the first drive-thru coffee shop in partnership with wellknown local entrepreneurs and investors. Instead of paying rent on the retail store, he paid a
percentage of revenue to the investors/partners. He said, “It didn’t really have anything to do
with the pandemic; it was just the right guys approaching us at the right time and making the
right offer [laughter], a great offer.” Thinking the deal was very positive because the partners
handled very high construction costs that emerged during the pandemic, he added,
And thank God I don’t have to worry about that right now because of those outside
partners who came in for the fourth store, they’re handling it. I don’t even want to know
what they spent on that building; it’s just … construction costs are just outrageous.
Thus, the COVID-19 environment aligned well with the owner’s original plans of expanding the
size and space of the restaurant during the pandemic.
To summarize, while existing business models served these three restauranteurs well
during the pandemic, they were all actively engaged in business model innovation. Expanding
the businesses’ physical structures was based on the restauranteurs’ interpretations of changing
environmental and organizational cues, as well as a shift in their sensemaking frames from
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threats to opportunities or vice versa. Because Meditation and Musician interpreted cues as
opportunities early in the pandemic, they continued to pursue their prior growth plans. Beaver
Dam, on the other hand, engaged in the BMI action later on as he used an opportunity
sensemaking frame later in the pandemic. All these restauranteurs also had sufficient resources to
engage in the BMI actions. Thus, I found that restauranteurs who experienced relatively low
challenges with their existing business models; had sufficient resources (e.g., financial,
employees, networks); and interpreted cues as opportunities ended up expanding the business’s
physical structure to their operations.
Making Sense through a Threat Frame
I have also identified two distinct actions (i.e., improving operational efficiency and
implementing temporary changes) taken by restauranteurs who perceived their environment and
organizational cues and used a threat sensemaking frame to take BMI actions. Although
restauranteurs’ environmental cues were similar, their organizational cues differed, so their
sensemaking frames and BMI actions differed from those of other restauranteurs who interpreted
their cues as opportunities. I discuss these restauranteurs’ cues, sensemaking, and BMI actions in
more detail below.
3) Improving Operational Efficiency
While some restauranteurs interpreted cues as opportunities to grow their businesses
during the pandemic, others struggled to manage the situation, and focused on dealing with
perceived threats from both inside and outside their businesses. In response to the COVID-19
crisis, Family, Polymath, and Special changed their business models by focusing on improving
efficiency and reducing operating costs, rather than pursuing new opportunities to grow their
businesses. Their business models and concepts were well-suited to the COVID-19
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environment—i.e., their food traveled well and some services (e.g., to-go, delivery, and drivethru) were already in place. Thus, these restauranteurs focused on reducing costs and waste,
optimizing inventories, improving efficiency in taking and fulfilling orders, and improving their
operating margins.
Their BMI actions reflected sensemaking using a threat frame to assess and respond to
their environmental and organizational cues. The three restauranteurs believed that managing
internal operations and changing the cost structure were the best ways to keep their business
open. Thus, Family, Polymath, and Special undertook incremental changes in routines that did
not necessitate a new business concept; but whereas Family and Special were more focused on
improving operational efficiency (e.g., simplifying services, managing employees’ tasks) to meet
high demand, Polymath worked on lowering costs (e.g., managing inventory, owner worked long
hours) due to limited sales. Figure 4.4 shows the trajectories of these restauranteurs’ BMIs.
Operational Efficiency: Family and Special. When the government shut down indoor
dining early in the pandemic, Family and Special moved seamlessly to manage their sales. They
both owned buildings with large parking lots that they repurposed to provide additional services
(e.g., curbside, online-order pick up, and delivery) to customers. Also, both restauranteurs
benefited from having profitable businesses before the pandemic and maintained excellent
reputations for serving quality food for over 30 years; these organizational features helped their
early pandemic sales.
During the early pandemic months, customer demand was significantly higher because of
Special’s fast-food offerings; contactless services via drive-thru, to-go, curbside, and online
ordering; and his access to information about successful fast-food restauranteurs’ operations (see
Appendix 8). He said, “I came to work during the valley of this epidemic, and there were more
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Figure 4.4. BMI Trajectories in the Improving Operational Efficiency Pattern
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cars in my parking lot than there were on the interstate on the way to work. I mean, it was
amazing.”
The business was selling more food without having a dining room open and without offering
catering services. Because of the high demand, Special did not pursue a governmental PPP loan.
However, its main challenge was sourcing ingredients. One of his suppliers closed for several
weeks due to a COVID-19 infection among employees, so Special described having to search for
other sources of ingredients and driving a truck to different cities to get ingredients.
These restauranteurs interpreted environmental and organizational cues as threats they
had to manage. As the pandemic started, Special was in the process of planning the tear-down
and complete rebuilding of one of his restaurants because it was too small for its business
volume. At the beginning of COVID-19, Special postponed the location’s overhaul to take
advantage of how well suited his business model was for pandemic demand. Also, focusing on
the importance of operational efficiency, Special searched for answers to such questions as
“What are we going to do facility-wise to meet the demands customers are putting on us to get
them the food quicker?” By changing employees’ tasks and positions and using the dining room
space to help fulfill orders, he focused on enhancing the efficiency of the drive-thru and (new to
him) curbside businesses. He noted,
I have 32 spots in this parking lot that we carry food out to. Right now, as we speak, there
are four people doing nothing but running back and forth with food going to cars. That
was a big change in staffing and how we ran that. I went from three people outside in the
drive-thru, and I think today there are 11 doing the business in a non-contact way.
Similar to Special, after the local government’s shutdown order early in the pandemic,
Family also closed his dining area and focused on curbside service (see Appendix 9). Although
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his business was mostly focused on dine-in services before the pandemic, he leveraged the fact
that his food travels well and is ready quickly after the order. “Within 15 minutes usually, we got
the order ready,” he said. He had enough parking spaces to operate curbside service and
experienced demand as soon as this service was set up. Family recognized early on the limits of
the restaurant’s financial reserves, but government financial support (i.e., PPP), re-costing every
menu item and increasing prices, and early strong sales allowed him to keep his staff employed
and business profitable. Yet, offering only to-go and curbside services posed operational
difficulties. At the beginning of the pandemic, Family did not have an online ordering system,
and incoming orders over the phone were cumbersome. Family described that he struggled to
take orders from the constantly ringing phone, to relay the orders to the kitchen, and to get orders
staged for pick up. He explained,
We had three phones going and we couldn’t get the orders in. I mean it was just bang,
bang, bang. You know, you’d hang up and then there would be another…We got up to 45
minutes to an hour wait on coming to get your order.
From these environmental and organizational cues, he used a threat sensemaking frame to
innovate and take actions. Family focused on increasing the efficiency of to-go and curbside
businesses by changing employee tasks and positions constantly. He noted,
We took all of our servers, and we went to the front, went to the phones; and we had
three people answering the phone. We had our full kitchen, and we started delivering
food in the parking lot to everyone that called.
Also, because the service was new to the servers, Family consistently revised internal processes
to manage the curbside operations. He stated,
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What I did by managing, is for 12 hours a day, I would stand in the very front where the
registers are at, on the phones; and I would make adjustments constantly. I wasn’t always
the nicest guy in the world doing that; but I would explain to my employees, ‘Listen,
we’re having to learn this, the to-go.’ It really was changing constantly.
In the second interview in early November 2020, Special and Family described how they
gradually changed their restaurant spaces, processes, and structures to improve operations. Still,
both restauranteurs interpreted the environmental and organizational conditions as threats.
Externally, hiring employees was the main challenge, as was sourcing ingredients/materials and
dealing with product/labor cost issues. Internally, both restauranteurs were generating enough
sales, but were both challenged by managing newly added services and operations due to staffing
issues. Thus, they still used threat sensemaking frames to improve operational efficiency.
Special complained about the labor market issue. His main environmental concern,
among others, was staffing. Although he added a new drive-thru lane and mobile ordering
stations to meet the demands and speed up sales, he had to change operations further to manage
the sales volume because his business was at capacity. Also, at this time regulations permitted
him to open up 50 percent capacity of the dining area. Because Special was selling more food
without the dining room service, he decided to keep the dining room closed, continue to run
efficient operations with fewer employees, and save costs by not offering in-store dining
amenities (e.g., beverage refills, extra condiments or napkins, and not having to constantly clean
the dining area). Indeed, Special noted that his margins increased 1.5 percent just by no longer
offering drink refills.
Unlike Special, Family had loyal employees who had worked for his restaurant a long
time before the pandemic. He stated, “We’ve got people who have been with us 20, 25, and 30
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years,” he said. However, because he added new services (to-go and curbside) and changed
operations, he wanted to change the culture and operations by bringing in new people who had
abilities suited to the new services being offered. Family worked on hiring people to assist with
the new services and operations. He said,
We’ve got employees that have been around for a long, long time. I’m going to have to
kind of move them a little bit.… They’re wearing out with it with the COVID and the age
that they have and stuff. I do not want to get rid of them. They’re what makes this
restaurant, but we need to get a new set of new ones coming along with the different
culture…. My baker is 74 …she’s still here at 4:30 every morning. That’s the kind of
people I have…we’re trying to hire a couple of people that can do stuff. Their [his
employees] attitudes are pretty good. Some of them are just, they need a new challenge
too…. We need to get a new breath.
A year after the pandemic began, vaccines were available, and restaurants were able to
operate at 100 percent dining capacity. Environmental challenges for these restauranteurs shifted
to managing customers for dine-in service along with to-go, curbside, drive-thru, and delivery, as
well as the issue of hiring employees. Opening at full capacity while trying to maintain efficient
to-go services, as well as dealing with the lack of staff, became strong negative organizational
cues for Family and Special. Thus, both restauranteurs kept using threat sensemaking frames to
take BMI actions—Family adopted more internal structuring efficiencies and Special relocated
employees to the other store.
Even after the pandemic restrictions had waned, Special’s dining room was closed for
more than a year. The owner was hesitant to reopen the dining area because of the benefits (e.g.,
better margins and operations) and challenges in operations (e.g., staffing, dealing with mask
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mandate restrictions). He did eventually open the dining room (at the end of May 2021) after
seeing many other restaurants open up. He also decided to rebuild his second restaurant with a
smaller dine-in footprint and relocate employees to the other restaurant to help with the operation
while the renovation construction on the second restaurant was underway. In addition, based on
his pandemic experience, Special decided to maintain certain structural changes he undertook
during the pandemic (i.e., adding a new backdoor for walk-out delivery, dividing the parking lot
into to-go and curbside services, changing the dining area’s layout). Special explained,
We had really two areas of meals being assembled, drive through and dining room. That
is simple. The curbside added to the dining room. So, all of the sudden, that has become
the harder ... because of the curbside demand ... the production area is feeling a lot of
strain. It is being pushed. We took off some of the waiting area, the queueing as such for
inside food, and created an ‘exit only’ back door for us to be able to get outdoors without
fighting upstream as such with customers with these trays [in the dining room] with
drinks and food.
With no restrictions on dine-in service, more customers dined in, while many customers
continued to use to-go and curbside services. Family needed five more employees to keep the
service running smoothly, though no staff members left or were furloughed during the pandemic.
Given the labor market conditions, he was only able to hire two more employees. He interpreted
these cues as a threat he needed to manage and solve. As a result, Family changed his operations
even further by adapting a process he had learned at a large franchise restaurant. He explained,
I learned this [efficiency] from [a Darden Restaurant franchise] years ago. They have
what they call a ticket time, and your ticket time needs to be 10 to 12 minutes if you’re on
the fast food type of thing. You have to work that. All your cash registers tell you that
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sort of thing, you see? That’s important because that keeps the level of your service up.
Well, in order to do that, you’ve got to have someone that’s in the window in front of that
calling for the people to come and get it. You’ve got to take and separate the to-gos from
the other. You’ve got to have everyone helping each other. We turn so fast, everybody
has got to help everybody.
Therefore, during the pandemic, these restauranteurs fine-tuned their internal processes and
focused on revenue generation and internal operational efficiency.
Cost Efficiency: Polymath. Polymath opened a new restaurant just before the pandemic;
its 2020 goal was to make the new business profitable. The COVID-19 pandemic made it
difficult to achieve this goal (see Appendix 10). Unlike organizational cues faced by other
restaurants in this pattern (i.e., located in neighborhoods and shopping districts with plenty of
parking spaces), many downtown restaurants such as Polymath’s new restaurant struggled
because of limited parking access; many people were working from home, resulting in a lack of
customer foot traffic, and its entrance was located within another building, so it did not have
direct street access. Although the food traveled well and was well suited for to-go, curbside, and
delivery services, Polymath’s downtown restaurant struggled with sales, while the other location
(outside the downtown area but without drive-through service) performed better. Polymath
interpreted these organizational cues as a threat, and prioritized cost reduction over operational
optimization because his main challenge was lack of revenue. In our first interview, Polymath
said,
The first thing we did was we had to shut our [downtown] location down completely. I
mean, the first problem with [downtown] was none of the offices, none of the employers
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had their employees coming in. All the restaurants around us were closed, all the theaters
were closed; so during the week, you really had no available customers.
He decided to reduce business hours and open the downtown location only three days a
week. Simultaneously at his other restaurant, he focused on reducing food waste; he
implemented an inventory system (created by an employee, a supply chain management student
at the local university) to determine how much of each item he was selling each day, so that he
threw out less food at the end of the day. It also gave him a better sense of his costs, so that he
discontinued items on which he made too little money. Polymath also worked extremely long
hours to reduce labor costs, coming in at midnight to prepare the following day’s inventory.
Polymath explained,
When COVID really sunk in and we knew what our sales were going to be for the next
month or so, we had to reduce our labor costs; that was just it. That’s the next thing I was
going to get to, is that myself, my wife, and my partner had to start working a lot more…
we pretty much do everything in the business.
Following the initial interview, he kept using a threat sensemaking frame and tried to
reduce costs and obtain financial resources. When the local government relaxed COVID-19
regulations, and customers’ consumption patterns (i.e., different sales patterns in time) changed
again. Polymath had difficulty balancing shifting consumption patterns with his new inventory
system: “It’s hard to establish a pattern. I’ve been underproducing. I’m not producing at the
same level I did this time last year. I’ve cut it back by about 20%.” He tried to open his
downtown store more days, but this failed to increase sales. With concerns about revenues, he
needed more financial resources for his business. Thus, he applied for various government
programs (e.g., U.S. Small Business Administration loan, state grants) in addition to PPP and
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EIDL loans. Along with reducing costs and obtaining outside financial resources, he also worked
a lot of hours in the kitchen and managed the company’s finances. He was always looking for
additional government financial support programs, so he applied whenever he came across new
funding opportunities for his business. He stated,
On October 7, I was in the kitchen. It was a Wednesday morning. At 5 a.m., the NPR
National Broadcast comes on; so I always turn the radio on to listen to the news. At some
point, they mentioned that day there was a new grant. It’s [the state loan]; and businesses
could qualify for up to $30,000, depending on how much lost revenue they can show. I
thought, ‘This is easy. All of our financials [are] ready.’ Before I went to sleep [that day],
I went online, I applied for the grant, I uploaded all my documents, hit send, and now I’m
just waiting. I was one of the first ones to apply.
Finally, as various COVID-19 restrictions were lifted in early 2021, he still worked
extremely long hours to reduce labor costs. “I worked from start to finish, starting December 3rd.
I can’t remember what day it was when I finally got a break, but I worked 103 nights straight in
the kitchen. It was insane,” he said. However, based on many organizational cues, Polymath used
a threat sensemaking frame to manage his business by slowly opening his downtown store and
focusing on operational efficiency by outsourcing managerial tasks. Again, he explained,
We were able to take our accounting firm and hire them to be our full-time bookkeepers.
So now all I do is I place kitchen orders, I run the kitchen, and I might spend five hours a
week in the office and that’s it; and they handle everything else … hire an accounting
firm to take the burden off me so I can just stay focused on the kitchen. I think that’s one
of the reasons why we’ve seen our business get busier and grow over the last couple
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months—I’m solely focused on one thing instead of trying to wear many hats at the same
time. It’s worked out.
As a result, unlike restauranteurs following this pattern, Polymath faced revenue challenges due
to geographical constraints (i.e., downtown). Thus, he was constantly lowering operating costs
and seeking financial resources to ensure survival and profitability during the pandemic.
To summarize, while their existing business models served them well during the
pandemic, all three restauranteurs worked on improving operational efficiency. Their BMI
actions were based on using a threat sensemaking from to interpret environmental and
organizational cues. Although Special and Family made enough sales to focus on operational
efficiency during the pandemic, Polymath focused on cost reduction due to his reduced sales.
Therefore, I found that restaurant owners who faced relatively few challenges with their existing
business models but faced operational challenges and interpreted cues as threats ended up
improving operational efficiency to increase profitability.
4) Implementing Temporary Changes
The pandemic posed severe challenges for restauranteurs who emphasized the dining
experience as their restaurant’s core focus. Four restauranteurs (i.e., Gladiator, Mathematician,
Hospitality and Golfer) who highlighted dining services as their core business concept faced
sales challenges during the pandemic. However, whereas two of these restauranteurs owned over
twenty restaurants each (Gladiator and Mathematician), one (Gladiator) in multiple states, the
other two (Hospitality and Golfer) were fine dining establishments with one and two locations,
respectively. Although they varied greatly in size, and thus differed in the ease with which they
could adapt, I found that unlike the other restaurateurs discussed thus far, many of the new
services and modifications to their business models made during the early part of the pandemic
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did not “stick,” and, soon after pandemic restrictions were lifted, these four restauranteurs
reverted to their pre-pandemic business models focused on the dining experience.
These restauranteurs all employed a threat sensemaking frame and emphasized that their
goal was survival rather than growth during the pandemic. Thus, they changed their business
models to maintain sales, but only until they could revert back to “normal.” Their BMI decisions
were more focused on changing sales methods and food offerings than on operational aspects.
More specifically, these restauranteurs added delivery modes—e.g., to-go, curbside, third-party
delivery, and online ordering—that were new to them, although commonly found in the
restaurant industry. The fine-dining restaurants, in particular (Hospitality and Golfer), also
modified their food offerings to work better with to-go (e.g., limiting their menu items to only
food that traveled well) and to drum up interest (e.g., family style, meals or specials such as fried
chicken night, or hamburger Tuesdays). The big restaurant groups (Gladiator and
Mathematician), in contrast, added new services rather than changing menu items. Figure 4.5
maps these restauranteurs’ BMIs over time.
Giants Running in Circles: Gladiator and Mathematician. Gladiator and
Mathematician are big restaurant groups, each with over 20 restaurants. Because of the high
operating costs associated with managing a large restaurant chain, these restaurants’ owners
found that their cash reserves and savings were depleted early in the pandemic, with not enough
sales to sustain commitments to employees (see Appendices 11 and 12). Also, prior to the
pandemic, both restauranteurs operated dine-in focused establishments, which were their main
revenue source, and employed hundreds of wait staff to offer the service. Thus, soon after local
governments prohibited in-person dining (on March 20, 2020), these restauranteurs interpreted
the environmental and organizational cues as a threat and took BMI actions to survive. Both
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Figure 4.5. BMI Trajectories in the Implementing Temporary Changes Pattern
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restauranteurs cut expenses by furloughing most of their employees and closing some restaurants
with no or marginal profitability, while increasing sales by introducing new services (e.g.,
curbside, delivery) in their open restaurants. Also, both restauranteurs reduced menu items due to
sourcing issues and travel issues with some of their food items. I discuss each restauranteur in
detail below.
Mathematician was unable to respond quickly enough to the pandemic. He said,
We were up for every restaurant and very, very, very positive until Monday, March 9th,
when the first scare started. By Sunday, the 15th, the restaurants were completely empty.
We were looking at the biggest year in the history of the company; and then, like a light
switch, it was gone. It was almost so fast you couldn’t react fast enough.
Mathematician was unable to keep all his restaurants open because nearly half of them did not
have enough sales to cover the pay of their cooks and staff. Therefore, he had to furlough about
85 percent of his over 1,000 employees. With half of the restaurants open and with the remaining
employees working, he started focusing on services that the government allowed (i.e., to-go,
delivery, and curbside). He installed curbside tents in the parking lots, promoted online ordering,
provided in-house delivery, reduced menu items due to food travel and sourcing issues, and sold
to-go alcohol (recently allowed by the local governments).
Similarly, Gladiator experienced a significant sales drop in the early pandemic. His
company had many partners and managers who worked with him from different locations, so
they had weekly online meetings to discuss solutions. During the meeting, they exchanged ideas
and brainstormed potential solutions together. He explained,
One of our guys in [a location], when it first started... he was kind of depressed when
they were just closing down, having to do to-go; and he started thinking about it, and he
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said that then he got mad. And he said, ‘I’m not going to let this happen. I’m going to
fight like hell’ We coined the term … #FLH.
They even made “#FLH” (i.e., fight like hell) wristbands that they distributed to their staff (See
Figure 4.6). They also had to furlough most of their employees to reduce operating costs. With
the remaining employees and managers, they provided new offerings—such as 20% off items for
to-go and curbside, family meal promotions (i.e., inexpensive meals for large groups), in-house
and third-party delivery services (e.g., Uber Eats, Grub Hub), and selling raw meat and
seafood—to expand sales channels to reach as many customers as possible. They also erected
curbside tents at building entrances.
To-go, curbside, in-house deliveries, third-party deliveries, and online orders generated
revenue and helped keep the doors open. However, adding new services and transitioning from
primarily dine-in services to a mix of dine-in and to-go based services was challenging. For
instance, Gladiator said,
We had some of our restaurants going to free home delivery. That went over well, so it
wasn’t a clear victory for that versus the 20 percent off.... I think that with the free home
delivery, it is also something that we may continue going forward, potentially. There are
lots of issues with that. Sometimes, it is uncomfortable to go to a certain area of town in
some places where we have restaurants. How do you do that? We don’t deliver to that
part of town; we only deliver to this part of town. That’s problematic.
Mathematician also noted,
The biggest problem is when [we] opened back up at 50 percent. The majority of our
business was still to-go business; but at the same time, you’re also having to go back and
do everything that you used to do. And the kitchen lines, I would call them the
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Figure 4.6. Example Picture of Gladiator’s Action
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manufacturing plant of the restaurant. They were not set up to have to-go lines going at
the same time.
By the second interview the restaurants were open at fifty percent capacity, and more
customers visited them. However, the main challenges were staffing and managing newly
introduced services. After both restauranteurs furloughed many employees due to offering only
certain services during the early pandemic and the availability of generous unemployment
benefits, they found that bringing employees back to the business was challenging. Their
previous decisions undoubtedly changed organizational conditions (i.e., more new services, but
fewer staff). Both restauranteurs believed that external factors such as unemployment benefits
and inflation made hiring more employees difficult. Gladiator noted, “In fact, it was a battle
against unemployment, right? They were getting their check [unemployment benefits]; and they
realized, ‘Hey, this is a pretty good gig here,’ so we did [have a] challenge with that.”
Mathematician also stated, “We don’t have a lot of employees. Employee tensions are very, very
high right now ... especially back of the house, kitchen labor... that’s where our inflation is.
We’ve had to give out raises [to attract them back].” Thus, both restauranteurs still interpreted
environmental and organizational cues as a threat to manage for their businesses.
To respond to the challenge, Gladiator added an online order system for to-go, curbside,
and delivery businesses to enhance sales with limited employees by making operations easy for
staff. He said,
That [new online order system] takes a person away from being on the phone for a long
time, it also eliminates the error that a server might make from what she writes down and
hears from the guest, and in terms of ringing it into a POS system and maybe not even
doing it correctly, whereas the guest is doing their order, reviewing their order
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themselves online, and all of a sudden the check pops up in the kitchen. That’s how that
works. Then, we simply just need to get it, bag it, and have it ready for DoorDash or for
the curbside, when they pick it up, so we’ll see what that does for our sales volume. It
could be significant.
Mathematician, on the other hand, had to turn off their online-order capability at times so
that they could sustain operations at a manageable level. He stated,
We’ve had a few Friday and Saturday nights where we’ve had to turn ChowNow off. We
have to call ChowNow and just say we’re down for the next three hours. We’ve had that.
The bigger restaurants...[one of Mathematician’s large restaurants] is the perfect example.
They’ve got two lines coming in and they got ChowNow coming in. They’re coming in
so fast we can’t get them rang up fast enough, and so we do have to turn it off.…we have
to accept the order and until we accept the order…the order is pending.
A year after the pandemic began (March 2021), people were getting vaccinated, dining
areas were completely open, and masks were no longer mandatory. More customers visited their
restaurants and sales improved. However, labor shortages continued to be a major environmental
and organizational issue. Both restaurant owners observed similar challenges within their
businesses, such as managing newly added services, preventing employee burnout, and rapidly
increasing labor, ingredient, and material costs.
Thus, Gladiator and Mathematician quickly discontinued the new services they added
during the pandemic but were no longer profitable. Gladiator achieved higher sales and
profitability from online orders (i.e., to-go and third party delivery) and dine-in services during
the final phase compared to pre-pandemic. Therefore, he kept the services while discontinuing
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others (e.g., in-house delivery, 20 percent off promotion, family meal promotion) that were
unprofitable, he said,
We had Marketplace [where they sold raw meat and seafood] and we also had some
family packages that we were doing …. We stopped that, it was really a good deal for the
guest …. We did also give 20 percent off [for to-go and curbside orders] …. We had free
delivery in some restaurants and then we also did 20 percent if you did curbside but tried
to really kick it and then try to have an attitude of ‘Hey, we know this is hurting
everybody, this whole thing.’ So … we cut it off at some point. We said, ‘We can no
longer do it.’ Once the dine-in happened we pretty much cut that off.
Mathematician interpreted the labor shortage issue as a serious threat for his business, he
said,
We don’t have any extra labor around, everybody is doing their job and want to go home
…. We are truly experiencing the fact that we are, at this time, very beat up; our people
are very tired. We lost a kitchen manager this morning in [Location A], because of stress
and working too much. All of our people are very stressed right now.
Thus, he reduced business hours for some of his restaurants and actively relocated employees if
some restaurants required assistance. Indeed, when we conducted our last video interview with
Mathematician, he was taking a shift as a floor manager at one of his restaurants because of his
manager shortage. Also, he removed some services added during the pandemic (e.g., curbside,
in-house and third-party deliveries) to make the operation run more efficiently. However, he kept
the other services that help with sales (e.g., online to-go ordering services). He said,
During the first two months of COVID, whenever we were take-out only or delivery, we
did it… but we are not a part of their programs…. We try to [use different lines in the
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kitchen]. It’s just right now, you don’t have enough people to do all those things, so
you’ve just got to mix it all together. I mean, if you could have seen Mother’s Day at 6:00
at night, and this is where it goes back to at 6:00 on Mother’s Day night, you have a
restaurant that is relatively full, but the take-out is such a big part of it that it dominates
the situation.
Therefore, these restauranteurs’ prior actions (i.e., furloughing many employees) and business
models (e.g., dine-in focused business, large restaurants with multiple locations) were interpreted
as threats to manage, along with environmental changes. Some early changes (but not all) were
abandoned to return to their in-dining experience.
The Party is Over: Golfer and Hospitality. Golfer and Hospitality run chef-driven
restaurants that are smaller (i.e., number of restaurants and employees) compared to the two
restaurant groups discussed above. Before they started their own businesses downtown, these
restauranteurs had worked as chefs for a high-end resort and learned to provide customers with
excellent dining experiences and higher-end cuisine. With their experiences, their business
models focused mainly on dine-in services for dinner only. Prior to the pandemic neither
restauranteur offered online ordering, to-go, or delivery services.
Due to changes resulting from the pandemic (e.g., shutdown orders and limited-capacity
rules), Golfer’s and Hospitality’s business models faced significant and early sales pressure,
resulting in having to create new revenue streams to survive (see Appendices 13 and 14). Similar
to the larger restaurant groups described above, these restaurants used some of the industry’s
service solutions, such as delivery, online ordering, and to-go menus. However, their actions
compared to those of Gladiator and Mathematician were more adaptable and flexible.
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Just before the government’s shutdown order, Hospitality was on vacation and was
alarmed by how quickly COVID-19 was progressing and how rapidly sales were declining. His
business model did not fit with the shutdown restrictions imposed; his food did not travel well,
and it took time to prepare after the order because his business was mostly focused on dine-in
services and offered high-end cuisine primarily prepared at the time of the order. However, he
anticipated a recession in 2020 and had saved sufficient financial resources to retain most of his
employees early in the pandemic, using his own savings and government financial support.
When Hospitality returned from his vacation, he immediately closed the doors and started
brainstorming with his team to find possible solutions based on the environmental and
organizational cues and his threat sensemaking frame.
After several weeks, he used ideas from his employees and his external network of
restauranteurs (who had worked at the resort with him) to develop a to-go menu, including
alcohol, and delivery services. He said, “Before that, we never did to-go food, so to speak. We
were considered a dine-in only type of restaurant. We had to completely change our mindset, our
model, the type of food we cook in a day.” To provide the new services, he had to change the
menu items to maintain food quality during transportation. Hospitality began serving
sandwiches, hamburgers, fried chicken, and even house-made ice cream, some of which had not
previously been on his menu. Also, he began offering lunch service, which he had not done
before. Hospitality explained, “It was anything that we could do to make a couple of bucks, we
were doing it.” Early in the pandemic, he actively changed business concepts and models. Thus,
during the first round of interviews he appeared to be one of the most innovative restauranteurs
making the biggest changes.
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As pandemic restrictions eased before the second interview, customers started returning
for dine-in service. Sales increased slightly more than they had earlier in the pandemic, but
hospitality still employed a threat sensemaking frame. Because he faced various environmental
challenges, such as increased food costs and limited customers in the downtown area, he actively
managed food waste and inventory. Hospitality found that managing both to-go and dine-in
services added significant complexity to the business because it required extensive planning in
food inventory. Because they were a reservation-only restaurant prior to the pandemic, the
changes entailed more inventory work. Therefore, he focused on smoothing operations by
offering a common prix fixe menu (i.e., a four course menu at a fixed price) for both dine-in and
to-go customers. Discussing the prix fixe menu, he said,
[It] helps us streamline what we’re doing from a food cost and from a labor cost. Across
the board, it just streamlines everything. We kind of know how much food to order
because we’re trying to do by reservation only for the most part. On the weekends, we
can guesstimate how many walk-ins we’re going to do.
By the last interview, instead of always offering the same menu items, Hospitality
frequently added and changed menu items for to-go and dine-in services to capture revenue.
However, when the restaurants were fully open and more people began dining out after
vaccinations became available, Hospitality dropped or limited most of the new services (e.g.,
prix fixe, to-go, and lunch business), added a hefty fee to to-go orders, and tried to return to prepandemic offerings. He removed the majority of their BMI actions due to difficulties in
managing new services and food items, since he could now offer full dine-in services. Thus,
Hospitality interpreted new environmental and organizational cues as a threat to their business to
operate and generate revenues. He commented,
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I think people were just ready to get out and eat. So we saw a huge uptake. We had
switched. We were doing the prix-fixe menu, and then right after Valentine’s Day we
switched back to kind of our somewhat regular menu where there are multiple choices; so
there is more of kind of our full menu. In essence, it was kind of back to what we were
doing before.
Unlike Hospitality, who made immediate changes, Golfer slowly altered his business
model. Early in the pandemic, Golfer did not aspire to do more business because he believed that
the restaurants located downtown were well-established and that sales were promising. Rather,
he wanted to take a break, he commented, “2020 was going to be where I take some time off.
Luckily, my hand was forced. I had to take some time off. I kind of decided everything was
going so well.”
When the pandemic hit, he employed a threat sensemaking frame to interpret
environmental and organizational cues. He had no debt and had amassed reserves for unexpected
business challenges, so when restaurants were shut down in March of 2020 Golfer believed that
he would be able to get through the pandemic. He explained, “We were financially prepared to
weather a storm, especially if we had to close down for good. Our fixed costs are manageable
with the funds that we had set aside.” Thus, he closed his restaurants while furloughing
employees, and he explained,
At that point, we can’t operate. There’s no point of trying to operate with less than 10
people or whatever. We made the call on Monday that we’re done for the time being. We
had reservations later in the week. We had to call those people and explain to them what
was going on. We did nothing. We did no takeout. We did nothing. We donated food to
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United Way and cleaned out our walk-in and just kind of hunkered down to see what’s
next.
Golfer closed the doors for several months. He did not want to open his restaurants at 50
percent capacity. Yet, one restaurant was in a hotel and in partnership with the hotel, so he kept
that restaurant open to maintain the partnership. Soon after he re-opened the hotel restaurant
Golfer re-opened his second restaurant, but he experienced low sales in both. He started
providing services (e.g., online to-go orders and lunch) that were new to his business. He also
made menu changes because some of the food did not travel well. However, the restaurants’
locations and structures made offering those services challenging because neither location
offered parking. As Golfer described:
The physical spaces that we’re in, I found it to be a little bit of a hurdle towards any sort
of to-go type of thing. It took a while for me to wrap my brain around how we were going
to do it.
Finally, as various COVID-19 restrictions were lifted, he noticed customers’ needs
changed. However, serving customers’ needs were challenging because of the labor shortage
problem. Golfer’s business did not have enough employees. He also discovered that he had a
restaurant manager who was hurting business sales by limiting reservations and undertaking
other ways to ensure the restaurant was not busy, he said,
We discovered there were some things being done that were just… would prevent us
from being busy … like limiting reservations on Open Table, and just really strange,
bizarre things. I think my general manager was afraid to be busy (laughter), so he made
sure that we weren’t (laughter).
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In addition to firing the manager, given his threat sensemaking frame he decided to drop
some services and considered discontinuing more later. In the last interview, he described his
current thinking and how he might cut services in the future:
Our system works pretty well for us, so we’ll probably continue with it unless [new
services] ... get overwhelming for the kitchen, once we ramp up because, you know, on a
busy Friday or Saturday night if we’re doing, you know, 200 in the dining room, it
doesn’t make sense to like overwhelm them with a, you know, four orders to go, or
something like that. So, we’ll have to play that by ear, but it’s not a huge driver.
After our interview, Golfer discontinued online to-go orders.
Therefore, Hospitality’s and Golfer’s new business models required changes in many
areas such as menu items, layout, and delivery, but they only served as temporary measures until
they could re-open their dining rooms at full capacity. Although these BMIs helped these
restauranteurs survive, they discontinued them when pandemic restrictions were lifted, rather
than using them to create new revenue streams.
In summary, all four restauranteurs faced significant challenges to their existing business
models but implemented BMIs as temporary solutions. Their temporary changes were based on
employing threat sensemaking frames to interpret their changing environmental and
organizational cues. Gladiator and Mathematician actively added new services while reducing
operating costs because their businesses were too big to continue staying open, given their
financial resources. Although these restauranteurs removed many services, they did integrate
successful services (primarily online ordering systems used to facilitate carry-out orders into
their business model after my final interviews. On the other hand, Hospitality and Golfer also
added new services and changed menu items because they also interpreted cues as threats.
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Although both restaurants were small (compared to the two big restaurant groups), providing
flexibility, the speed with which they responded was affected by their cash reserves. However,
they never really modified their view of themselves as dine-in only establishments, and removed
(or planned to remove) all the new services they offered when environmental conditions
normalized. Therefore, because they employed threat frames and never really modified their selfconcepts as dine-in restaurants, these restaurateurs ended up implementing temporary changes
until the crisis had passed.
Making Limited Sense through Low-level Sensemaking
Finally, I have identified one action (i.e., using the same old business models) taken by
restauranteurs who did not actively engage in sensemaking to interpret their environmental and
organizational cues, and thus seeing them as providing neither serious threats nor promising
opportunities, which led to taking no or very minimal BMI actions.
5) Using the Same Old Business Model
While fourteen of the restauranteurs innovated their business models to varying degrees
during the pandemic, the other three restauranteurs (i.e., Happy, Steady, and Unconventional)
engaged in minimal or no BMI. They attempted to maintain the status quo and made minor
changes at the margin to mitigate the pandemic’s negative effects. Restaurants in this pattern did
not experience a significant performance change compared to the restaurants in the other
patterns. Two of the restaurants even outperformed their previous performance levels without
any business model changes during the pandemic.
The lack of BMIs was due to several factors. First, all three restauranteurs expressed a
lack of concern about their businesses’ profitability because their business models were suitable
during the pandemic. Second, all three owners described personal attention to other issues (e.g.,
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retirement, relationships with customers and employees, another business venture) rather than
pandemic-related business issues. Although these restauranteurs had different business models,
cuisines, and faced different organizational conditions, their lack of interest in BMI was similar.
Figure 4.7 maps of these restauranteurs’ BMI actions over time.
Not about Money. Happy owned a restaurant that provide dine-in, to-go, and delivery
services before the pandemic (see Appendix 15). Her sales were slightly reduced after the
shutdown was issued, but she still made enough to keep the business running. Rather than her
business, Happy was more concerned about her health and her employees. In the first interview,
Happy stated, “The main important thing is to protect your employees and protect yourself and
take good care of yourself and to make sure everybody’s all right.” Thus, to the extent she
employed a threat frame, it was with respect to her own and her employees’ health, not her
business. Therefore, rather than taking active BMI actions, she mainly followed government
orders and CDC guidelines to minimize personal contact in operations. She added a new online
order system and created a physical to-go space on a counter in the restaurant. Otherwise, she
mostly maintained the existing business model. She explained,
Number one is relationship loyalty, number one, yes.... I want my product in a good
quality. I’m willing to pay more and make sure it’s the same and the customer is happy.
Sell more, make less is all right as long I survive. That’s my philosophy.
In the second interview, she kept everything the same and did not make any changes in
her business model. However, before the last interview, Happy retired from actively managing
the restaurant and formed a profit-sharing partnership with the restaurant’s cooks. She said, “You
see the boy in the kitchen? He’s been with me for so long .... Now that I’m not working I told
him, ‘We’ll share the profits’…. I am retired.”
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Figure 4.7. BMI Trajectories in the Using the Same Old Business Model Pattern
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Steady owned a restaurant that also provide dine-in, to-go, and delivery services (see
Appendix 16). His sales were significantly improved after the dining shutdown was issued.
Steady did not want to grow his business because he was considering retirement and his children
did not want to take over the business. “I’m getting ready to retire pretty soon, so I’m not that
ambitious,” he said. Thus, he also considered environmental and organizational cues as neither
opportunities nor threats because he did not even want to keep the business open when COVID19 first started. He said,
I talked to my employees … and most of them don’t agree with me to close. They said,
‘Why don’t we try and see what happens?’ So I did. I immediately took off all the dine-in
service. I took out the delivery service, just doing take-out.
Thus, he offered only to-go service because the process was easy to manage given his
existing business model, which largely revolved around take-out already. Also, given his age (a
high risk group for COVID-19), he believed that doing to-go only business was a safer way to
operate business because it limited contact. Although dine-in service was permitted after May 1,
2020, he refused to provide it for more than a year because the restaurant was already
overwhelmed with to-go orders. He noted,
It’s crazy. I have people from everywhere who call me. You know, I have customers
from [West part of city A], [South part of city A], and now somebody even from [City B]
came to visit us. They haven’t been to our store before. A lot of [Asian food] restaurants,
they closed. I’m the only one … open and doing carry-out.
Adding more services would require more of the owner’s time to work at Steady. At the
time of the second interview, Steady refused to reintroduce dine-in and delivery. He said,
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I would just try to maintain this kind of situation, so I don’t have to work that hard … I
don’t want to overload myself that much. Yeah, I think I’m happy with steady business
so I can plan instead of going back and working overtime and try to make sure I have
enough food to sell. This is not what I want to do. I just like to make it easier.
In the spring of 2021, customers kept complaining about the lack of dine-in services. Steady
finally opened his dining room, but he was not enthusiastic about this action.
Unconventional started a gourmet dessert business as a second job because she enjoyed
feeding people (see Appendix 17). She wanted to keep the business small, explaining, “I have
really always been totally a lifestyle business with no aspirations to do anything other than just
make a living for myself and enjoy the work that I do and enjoy connections with people.” Her
business model consisted primarily of selling the desserts via an online marketplace (Goldbelly)
as well as in regularly scheduled pop-up shops in the local market. Early in the pandemic,
business was busy because people ordered more comfort food items via online stores. However,
because she was uninterested in business growth and unworried about survival, she did not
consider the cues as an opportunity or a threat. Unconventional added some services (i.e., selling
from the restaurant’s website, contactless pick-up, in-house delivery service) during the
pandemic, but she expressed relief that the business’s sales slowly waned. In my last interview,
she explained,
If I was operating at the pace that I was operating at during the peak of the pandemic,
shipping out, you know, 50-60 boxes of [desserts] a week, I mean that would be just
really hard for me to keep up with as I’m reopening [another business]…I don’t know;
but for now, it’s kind of been this very nice and convenient, like slowly ramping down of
[desserts] shipments as [her other businesses] are kind of ramping up. So I haven’t been
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[going] crazy, and I haven’t gone broke. So that’s been really nice, how that’s all sort of
panned out.
She was more focused on an event space she owned that was contiguous to the kitchen
where she made the desserts and local restauranteurs operated ghost kitchen services. Thus,
unlike the other restauranteurs actively engaging in BMI, these restauranteurs maintained the
status quo and did not perceive either significant opportunities or threats from the pandemic.
Rather, their ambitions were to limit their efforts to the extent possible.
In sum, I found that many restauranteurs actively engaged in BMI, but some did not.
Restauranteurs’ sensemaking frames shape whether they interpret environmental changes and
organizational circumstances as opportunities or threats, and thus influence their BMI decisions
and actions. In all, I identified five BMI patterns: (1) replacing or adding new business concepts,
(2) expanding the physical structure of businesses, (3) increasing operational efficiency (4)
implementing temporary changes, and (5) using the same old business model. However, I
interviewed restauranteurs located in one city in the Southeastern United States, where the
environmental changes were the same for all restauranteurs. Restauranteurs’ BMI actions may
differ when faced with different environment conditions. For instance, having cold winter
weather and more restricted and prolonged regulations (e.g., capacity restrictions and mask
mandates) may create different environments for restauranteurs to operate their businesses. Thus,
using news media data, I employed topic modeling to capture how restauranteurs’ BMI actions
were discussed in various environmental conditions. In the next chapter, I use this large-scale
data collection to identify patterns in BMI changes in restaurants throughout the United States.

139

CHAPTER 5
TOPIC MODELING METHODS
In my comparative case study, I interviewed 17 restauranteurs located in a city in the
Southeastern United States. From this study, I identified several important features of their
business model innovation changes over the course of the pandemic. I recognize that the
resulting model and BMI changes are from one city and that conditions and resulting BMI for
restaurants may differ in other places U.S. regions during the pandemic.
While COVID-19 permeated the entire United States, the reactions to this pandemic by
different localities, seasonal conditions, and severity of the virus varied from place to place. The
severity of the restrictions and attitudes towards fighting the coronavirus via mask mandates,
business shutdown orders, and stay-at-home orders have differed by cities and regions (Lee et
al., 2020). In addition, relatively mild winter weather conditions in the South and West allow
restaurants to offer more outdoor dining compared to Northern states, where average
temperatures often fall below zero degrees (Fahrenheit) during the winter. Even though the
pandemic was the main external change, the particular environmental contingencies that a
restaurant faces varied across geographic and political regions. Therefore, I undertook a largescale investigation of restaurants across the United States to determine if patterns uncovered
from my qualitative analysis generalized to other regions. Specifically, I extended my
understanding of BMI across the United States by applying topic modeling to a large textual
dataset of restaurant media reports from March 2020 to September 2021. Bringing together
insights from my case study with a large-scale topic modeling analysis is a novel methodological
combination that allows me to increase the trustworthiness of my case study findings by
comparing them to national BMI patterns over the pandemic.
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In addition, a longitudinal multiple case study of companies allowed me to explore in
detail, and over time, restaurant owners’ decisions and actions during the COVID-19 pandemic
period. However, although multiple case study designs can be highly accurate due to the rich, indepth data on each case, this approach typically yields more complex findings that are harder to
generalize (Langley, 1999). Therefore, using these two process studies (multiple case and topic
modeling methods) together can uniquely address the trade-offs (i.e., accuracy, simplicity, and
generality) involved in process research (Langley, 1999). Building on the work of Thorngate
(1976) and Weick (1979), Langley (1999) identified tradeoffs in process research among (a)
accuracy—levels of explanations (abstracts or details) from the original data, (b) simplicity—the
number of theoretical factors and/or relationships, and (c) generality—theoretical ranges of
applicable situations. Langley (1999: 706) stated that “accuracy tends to conflict with both
simplicity and generality…simplicity and generality tend to be more compatible.” Many scholars
have argued for different methods and approaches to understand a phenomenon due to these
trade-offs (Langley, 1999; Lê & Schmid, 2022; Lerman, Mmbaga, & Smith, 2022). Thus, I
conducted an approach that emphasizes accuracy (case research, what Langley refers to as a
synthetic approach) and another approach that is associated with simplicity and generalization
(which Langley labels quantification of data).
Using a large textual dataset, I used topic modeling to examine broad patterns (Sonpar &
Golden-Biddle, 2008) and assess whether different business models have emerged in different
areas in the United States as a function of the differences in environmental opportunities and
constraints (Croidieu & Kim, 2018; Hannigan et al., 2019; Steyvers & Griffiths, 2007). I
compared different regional conditions (e.g., East North Central, South Atlantic, and Mountain)
and their effect on BMI decisions and actions. Thus, from both studies, I provide a rich account
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of different BMI decisions and actions over time in one industry. Next, I will introduce the media
sources selected, explain the topic modeling approach I used to assess BMI patterns found in my
qualitative analysis, and discuss my findings.
Data Sources
I compiled a large textual dataset comprised of public press articles about restaurants
from national media sources, including (1) national newspapers, such as USA Today and The
New York Times; (2) metropolitan area news media, such as The Chicago Tribune and The
Washington Post; and (3) regional and local news media, such as the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and
Tampa Bay Times. Specifically, I pulled articles using Nexis Uni data—using keywords, such as
restaurant, pandemic, COVID-19, business model, and innovation—from the beginning of the
pandemic in March 2020 to the end of my qualitative interviews in September 2021. Table 5.1
summarizes the data sources.
I collected over 110,000 news articles and captured each news article’s publication date
and location (i.e., state), but many of the articles discussed COVID-19 situations in different
countries and multiple states together in the United States rather than in just one state. Because I
needed to isolate local conditions, having data from multiple states would not allow me to
identify the local conditions. I then removed public press articles that were not linked to a
particular location, leaving 36,592 news articles discussing restauranteurs’ actions related to their
BMI during the pandemic.
To complement the media data collection, I also collected data related to each state’s
political party strength (i.e., Democrats, Republicans). As a criterion, I used 2020 presidential
election results by state. I chose 2020 presidential election results because states that voted for
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Table 5.1. Summary of Data Sources
Data Source

Public press articles about the U.S.
restaurant and food-service
industry

Political party strength

Database
Nexus Uni database
-

Search Terms: restaurant,
pandemic, COVID-19, business
model, and innovation

-

Sources in the U.S.: (1) Major
national news media such as The
New York Times, USA Today,
The Wall Street Journal, and many
others; (2) Metropolitan area news
media such as The Chicago
Tribune, Los Angeles Times, New
York Post, The Washington Post,
and many others; (3) Local news
media such as Arizona Daily Sun,
Detroit news, Tampa Bay Times,
and many others.
Presidential Elections Results
(Andre et al., 2020)

Time Period

March 2020 – September 2021

November 2020
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President Donald Trump had fewer COVID-19 restrictions compared to blue states (e.g.,
Armstrong 2020; Goodkind, 2020).
LDA Topic Modeling
Given the substantial media data collected, I used topic modeling to determine if BMI
actions found in my qualitative analysis could be identified in a broader sample. Topic modeling
is well suited for this type of analysis because it allows researchers to identify topics within large
amounts of textual data and to track topics over time (e.g., Croidieu & Kim, 2018; Wang,
Bendle, Mai, & Cotte, 2015). Thus, I identified topics related to the four BMI actions found in
the qualitative study and how those topics changed over time in different environmental
conditions (e.g., geographic locale and restriction levels) across the United States.
Among the various topic modeling approaches, I selected the Latent Dirichlet Allocation
(LDA) topic modeling approach (Blei et al., 2003), which is widely used and well accepted in
management studies (Hannigan et al., 2019; Kaplan & Vakili, 2015). LDA topic modeling is an
algorithm that inductively identifies groups of word lists as topics from documents (Blei et al.,
2003; Schmiedel et al., 2019). The basic assumption of the LDA algorithm is that words
appearing in similar contexts are prone to have similar meanings (Schmiedel et al., 2019; Turney
& Pantel, 2010). LDA topic modeling assumes that a word’s meaning is defined by cooccurrences with other words and their relationships in the text (DiMaggio, Nag, & Blei, 2013).
For instance, the co-occurrence of bank, water, and stream from a set of articles are interpreted
as a river-related topic. In contrast, the co-occurrence of bank, money, and finance, reflect a
financial institution topic.
In using LDA topic modeling, researchers make several decisions. First, researchers
decide how many topics to extract from the textual data (Croidieu & Kim, 2018; Kaplan &

144

Vakili, 2015; Schmiedel et al., 2019). Depending on the researcher’s topic specification and the
amount of textual data, the topic modeling algorithm may create abstract and partial topics (e.g.,
extract small numbers from a large set of documents) or overlapping topics (e.g., extract large
numbers from a small set of documents). Researchers also have to decide how to assess the
identified topics’ construct validity. To address these issues, multiple researchers can work
together and use quantitative and qualitative evaluation approaches to identify the appropriate
number of topics by extracting various numbers of topics and evaluating them together (e.g.,
Schmiedel et al., 2019; Wallach, Mimno, & McCallum, 2009), and determine reliability and face
validity by having in-depth discussions about the extracted topics (Antons, Joshi, & Salge, 2019;
Kaplan & Vakili, 2015). Because “topic modeling does not automatically yield new valid
constructs or extract significant relationships at the push of a button” (Schmiedel et al., 2019:
960), researchers need a deeper understanding of how to evaluate extracted topics for capturing
reliable insights. Next, I examine in detail the analysis and findings.
Data Analysis
My goal for this large-scale media study was to determine (1) whether the four BMI
patterns—i.e., replacing or adding new business concepts, expanding the business’s physical
structure, improving operational efficiency, and implementing temporary changes—from the
interview study were found across the United States and (2) if these actions’ emergence patterns
differed across regions and states. I excluded the last pattern from the case study (i.e., those using
the same old business model) because they engaged in minimal or no BMI. Applying topic
modeling to an entire article creates substantial noise—i.e., lots of text unrelated to BMI actions.
Before applying the LDA algorithm to the 36,592 articles, I took a series of data-cleaning steps.
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Data Cleaning. LDA topic modeling’s biggest challenge may be that researchers do not
know what topics they will discover and whether the topics will be relevant to the researchers'
interests. Topic modeling produces a plethora of topics, many of which are irrelevant to the
construct or patterns of interest to the researcher.
For instance, Kaplan and Vakili (2015) conducted topic modeling with nanotechnology
patent abstracts to examine the relationship between innovative knowledge (i.e., originating new
areas) and the realization of economic value (i.e., the number of citations). To capture innovative
knowledge, the authors extracted 100 topics and stated that “A series of topics focused on
production processes such as chemical functionalization of nanotubes …. Other topics covered
applications into such areas as neural networks, reinforced golf balls, optical devices .... A third
category included topics related to the equipment, primarily scanning probe microscopes, used
for visualizing and manipulating nanoscale matter” (Kaplan & Vakili, 2015: 1443). These
researchers’ topic modeling results, which cover a wide range of topics, suggest that using full
texts for topic modeling analyses may not be the best way to find particular constructs or topics
related to the researchers’ interest. Obtaining an excessive number of topics can cause
researchers to struggle to find insights from piles of word lists.
One solution to avoiding irrelevant topics is to parse the data around text segments
related to the researcher’s interests (Jung, Zhou, & Smith, working paper). Therefore, I selected
text within each media document that addressed restauranteurs’ BMI actions by identifying
keywords closely related to BMI, expanding this list of keywords with synonyms, and using
these keywords and synonyms to parse public press articles.
First, I identified the representative keywords for each BMI action from the interview
study. Using manual codes developed with my interview data, I looked for frequent words that
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were used to explain each BMI action. I reviewed word lists based on frequency counts from the
interview data and carefully selected the words associated with four BMI patterns while
removing general words, such as types of food, location, and restaurant names. For instance, I
found such words as style, concept, model, and rebrand, which I considered to be related to the
first BMI pattern (replacing or adding new business concepts). I also identified such words as
system, costs, easier, efficient, operation, quickly, and simple, which I considered indicative of
the third BMI pattern (i.e., improving operational efficiency).
Second, I expanded the keywords by adding synonyms because they can be used to
explain these BMI actions (Short et al., 2010). By extending the word lists, I expected to capture
more discussion of the four BMI actions in the news media data. To develop synonyms, I used
word2vec, which is a machine learning technique to identify words with similar meaning and to
search for word pairs with similar relationships (Mikolov, Sutskever, Chen, Corrado, & Dean,
2013; Lee et al., 2020). For instance, if the word2vec algorithm repeatedly notices such patterns
as “experiencing the financial challenges” and “experiencing the organizational challenges,” the
algorithm representing the words financial and organizational will be identified as similar.
Because these words are frequently used in comparable word contexts, researchers can consider
the words related.
In creating the synonym list with word2vec, I had to decide whether to develop my own
customized model or to use an existing (i.e., pre-trained) model. Developing a customized
word2vec model is useful when documents contain a certain language style or vocabulary (e.g.,
social media). I did not need this customization for this study because my news media data fit
well with one of Google’s pre-trained models based on a large set of news media data. Also, as
found in prior studies, the Google word2vec model is generally robust across many contexts
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(e.g., Khatua, Khatua, & Cambria, 2019; Teofili & Chhaya, 2019). Therefore, I searched for
synonyms of keywords that represented the four BMI patterns from the first step. After I
obtained the synonyms, I evaluated the word lists for their face validity with the four BMI
actions. Table 5.2 presents keywords related to four BMI patterns (i.e., word2vec input) and
these words’ synonyms (i.e., word2vec outcome).
Once all the keywords were identified, I conducted a collocation approach to capture
words only near keywords. This collocation process was used by Gephart (1997: 587), who
suggested that the context-based words provide “evidence of ‘meaningful linkages’ among
keywords in subjects’ discourse as well as to establish linkages among these keywords and the
concepts.” Gephart (1997) selected four words on either side of his study’s keywords. Following
his approach and logic with my new media documents, I created a parsed set of textual material
consisting of four words on either side of the keywords.
Finally, before I conducted topic modeling, I cleaned the parsed textual data using R.
Using the “stopwords” package, I removed non-meaningful words (e.g., determiners,
prepositions). I also transformed all parsed text into lowercase and removed all numbers and
punctuation marks to obtain reliable results (Short et al., 2010). Then I used “tokenization,”
which splits sentences into individual words (e.g., “hello world” to “hello” and “world”). These
cleaning steps are common in natural language processing and practice (Schmiedel et al., 2019).
Applying LDA Topic Modeling. After the above steps were completed, I conducted
LDA topic modeling. Although the LDA topic model is an automated algorithm for extracting
topics (Blei et al., 2003), researchers must decide the number of topics to generate. According to
Wallach et al. (2009: 7), “Selecting the number of topics... is one of the most problematic
modeling choices in finite topic modeling.” The research objectives and context drive the
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Table 5.2. All BMI Terms from Word2vec Process
Four Patterns of BMI
Keywords
(Input to word2vec)

concept, cost, costs, easier, efficiencies, efficient, expense, expenses, items,
menu, menus, model, open, operation, option, price, prices, pricing, quickly,
rebrand, reduce, service, simple, style, system,
alternative, alternatives, automating, automation, better, branding, cheaper,
choice, concepts, conceptually, continuous_improvement, convenient,
cost_avoidances, cost_effective, costing, defrays, demand, dishes, easiest,
easily, easy, economical, effective, efficiency, efficient, efficiently,
eliminate_duplication, eliminate_duplications, entrees, entrees, expenditure,
expenditures, expensed, fast, faster, fees, finesse, flair, full_adaptivity, goods,
gradually, idea, idea, immediately, incidentals, inexpensive, instantly, item,
Four Patterns of BMI
market, market, mechanism, menuing, neater, nicer, notion, opened, opening,
Synonyms
opens, operational_excellence, operations, optimize, optimizing, options,
(Output from word2vec)
overexpenditures, overhead, overheads, paradigm, practical, priced, pricetag,
pricier, productivities, productivity, promptly, quicker, rapidly, readily,
rebranded, rebranding, rebrands, reduced, reinvent, reinvigorate, relaunch,
reposition, repositioning, revamp, safer, scalability, services, simpler, simplest,
simplistic, smarter, smarter, smoother, speedily, straightforward, streamline,
streamline, streamlined, streamlining, styled, styles, stylings, swiftly, systems,
time_savings, uncomplicated
Note: Input words were from the interview study.
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decision (e.g., Giorgi et al., 2019; Schmiedel et al., 2019). Researchers may generate very
general topics if the number of topics selected is too small; conversely, if too many topics are
selected, the resulting set of topics is too numerous to be meaningful (Giorgi, Maoret, & Zajac,
2019; Marshall, 2013). There are no clear methods for choosing the right number of topics
(Giorgi et al., 2019). To select the number of topics in this study, I conducted a log-likelihood
analysis of the full dataset that I parsed. A high log-likelihood score represents a well-fitting
model (e.g., Wallach et al., 2009). My analysis indicated that extracting 53 topics yielded the
highest log-likelihood score. However, I acknowledge that “there is no statistical test for the
optimal number of topics or for the quality of solution” (DiMaggio et al., 2013: 582). Thus,
based on that score, I extracted between 40 and 60 LDA topic models to qualitatively compare
their differences. I invited management researchers to review these extracted topics and discuss
their interpretability. From this discussion, we settled on 53 topics because these topics had
better face validity and many of the topics related to all four BMI actions.
Although I extracted 53 topics, I only used 18 topics to classify the four BMI patterns
because the other topics were unrelated to the four actions. These excluded topics were
interpreted as market challenges (e.g., supply chain issues, higher costs of goods, labor market),
the government's response to COVID-19 (e.g., restrictions and financial support), and COVID19 health issues (e.g., vaccinations and health care system). Table 5.3 shows how relevant topics
were classified into each BMI pattern.
First, I found three topics (32, 34, and 42) related to the ideas of replacing or adding new
business concepts. These topics included such words as alternative, better, concept, idea, model,
new, and system, all of which I interpreted as changes in business concepts. Second, three topics
(10, 19, and 45) were related to expanding the business’s physical structure; I interpreted these
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Table 5.3. LDA Topic Modeling Results and BMI Type Categorizations
Themes
Replacing or adding
New business
concepts related
topics

Expanding the
business’s physical
Structure related
topics

Percentage of
occurrences
1.79%
2.25%
1.58%
2.01%
2.22%
1.82%
2.09%
1.75%

Improving
operational
efficiency related
topics

2.17%
2.27%
2.48%
2.40%
1.93%
1.72%

Implementing
temporary
changes related
topics

1.83%
2.21%
2.71%
1.54%

Topics words
Topic #32: choice, option, options, open, cost, idea, learning,
alternative, system, model
Topic #34: menu, dishes, items, options, menus, new, choice, restaurant,
include, dinner
Topic #42: fast, concept, new, restaurant, food, concepts, menu,
restaurants, casual, better
Topic #10: opened, open, restaurant, menu, opening, new, location,
kitchen, bar, concept
Topic #19: open, opening, opened, new, opens, first, grand, restaurant,
plans, location
Topic #45: opened, idea, open, style, said, week, quickly, years,
opening, last
Topic #6: better, much, back, make, get, easier, even, can, cost, people
Topic #13: service, reduced, workers, hours, work, cost, system,
employees, said, better
Topic #14: services, service, operations, automation, customers,
technology, help, system, digital, systems
Topic #24: idea, better, easy, simple, good, one, just, choice, think, like
Topic #30: expenses, costs, cover, payroll, businesses, cost, help,
business, rent, operating
Topic #39: better, quickly, said, get, fast, going, can, easy, idea, just
Topic #46: operations, operation, business, resume, normal, reduced,
hours, immediately, businesses, continue
Topic #12: fees, license, businesses, liquor, late, city, permit, cost,
restaurants, process
Topic #22: options, dining, option, services, campus, said, available,
food, outdoor, new
Topic #35: open, service, delivery, takeout, curbside, options, pickup,
restaurants, dinein, services
Topic #37: service, restaurants, indoor, dining, outdoor, bars, dinein,
open, bar, restaurant
Topic #47: delivery, services, service, restaurants, online, food, fees,
thirdparty, order, use
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topics as opening new locations, grand openings, and commenting on opened businesses. Third,
seven topics (6, 13, 14, 24, 30, 39, and 46) with such words as better, cost, easier, hour, simple,
operations, quickly, reduced, and systems are related to improving operational efficiency.
Finally, five topics (12, 22, 35, 37, and 47) contain words like available, curbside, delivery, dinein, dining, liquor, options, pickup, services, and takeout, which from the interview study refer to
implementing temporary changes.
With the categorized topics, I then analyzed the four BMI patterns over time (Croidieu &
Kim, 2018), specifically how those actions varied by month from March 2020 through
September 2021 and across different geographical regions. I also compared the BMI actions
based on an area’s political party to understand restaurants’ BMI actions in response to different
external environments and regulations. In sum, I determined the overall patterns of BMI actions
in various regions of the United States as well as the pattern differences based on areas’ political
party strength (i.e., Democrats, Republicans).
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CHAPTER 6
TOPIC MODELING FINDINGS
Business Model Innovations in Different Environmental Conditions
My analysis revealed that the four BMI patterns found in my interview study were also
found in the topic modeling of news media across the United States. Table 6.1 shows how much
each type of BMI action has been discussed in the media data over time. The monthly discussion
trends about each BMI action reveal patterns of restauranteurs’ BMI actions across the United
States. As shown in Table 6.1, the first two BMI patterns— (1) replacing or adding new business
concepts and (2) expanding the business’s physical structure—were discussed more frequently
over time. The patterns indicate that restauranteurs have been gradually engaging in these BMI
actions over time. However, BMI actions related to (3) improving operational efficiency
remained stable and were frequently discussed at a higher level, whereas discussions about BMI
actions associated with (4) implementing temporary changes declined over time. These patterns
suggest that restaurateurs actively modified internal processes throughout the pandemic, whereas
the addition of new services and products occurred more at certain times of the pandemic.
Overall patterns, however, may be presented differently in different regions due to environmental
differences. Thus, I examined the discussion patterns of four BMI patterns in different regions
and with political party strengths to understand how different environments relate to these BMI
actions.
Replacing or Adding New Business Concepts. An article from Crain's Chicago
Business, a weekly business newspaper, stated, “The sudden closure is also a reminder that a
well-diversified business with different concepts, market segments and locations is better suited
to handle an economic downturn” (Barker, 2020). Some restauranteurs believed that having new
concepts helped them survive during the pandemic.
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Table 6.1. Discussion Proportions of BMI in the United States
(1) Replacing or
(2) Expanding the
(3) Improving
(4) Implementing
adding new business
business’s physical
operational efficiency
temporary changes
concepts
structure
2020-03
3.78%
3.78%
14.10%
14.25%
2020-04
4.38%
4.00%
15.22%
10.35%
2020-05
4.21%
4.51%
13.82%
9.90%
2020-06
5.08%
5.62%
14.17%
10.43%
2020-07
5.21%
5.92%
15.03%
9.84%
2020-08
6.79%
6.90%
15.48%
9.63%
2020-09
6.58%
7.50%
14.81%
10.31%
2020-10
6.29%
6.77%
15.65%
11.19%
2020-11
6.23%
5.93%
13.84%
11.55%
2020-12
5.59%
5.44%
15.14%
11.84%
2021-01
5.50%
7.03%
15.70%
10.14%
2021-02
7.20%
6.74%
16.52%
8.91%
2021-03
5.71%
6.67%
15.26%
7.93%
2021-04
6.05%
7.53%
16.53%
7.80%
2021-05
6.22%
7.23%
16.26%
6.95%
2021-06
6.51%
7.60%
15.67%
7.62%
2021-07
6.64%
8.69%
16.23%
7.43%
2021-08
6.61%
7.53%
14.06%
7.03%
2021-09
7.85%
8.64%
17.45%
7.59%
Note: These numbers represent the proportions of topics discussed in documents each month.
Time
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For instance, one restaurant owner in North Dakota closed a previous restaurant and
opened a new concept BBQ restaurant in August 2020. The Grand Forks Herald, a daily
newspaper in Northeast North Dakota, detailed this restaurant owners’ story during the
pandemic:
After a short time of being open, the business [a restaurant] closed at the end of April
when the coronavirus pandemic shuttered stores in the mall and everywhere else. Not
ready to give up, the partners came up with a new concept, Bigfoot BBQ, and ran a food
truck for two weeks before finding a permanent location. (Kurtz, 2020)
BBQ restaurant owners in Florida extended their restaurant concept into a dual concept as a bar
and restaurant in March 2021. The Tampa Bay Times in Florida reported on the restaurant’s BMI
actions:
The new concept is essentially a rebranding of the second floor bar at the popular
barbecue restaurant. The idea for the new ‘sub-concept,’ bar - hatched by Dr. BBQ and
Datz Restaurant Group co-owners … was to bring some of the tiki cocktail culture they’d
discovered in other cities closer to home … Last year, shortly before the pandemic, the
couple had plans to open a stand-alone tiki bar. But as restaurateurs, they felt a little
unsure of getting into the bar business. And once Covid-19 caused the widespread shutter
of bars and nightclubs for several months, the Perrys [the restaurant owners] said that
they were happy they waited ... ‘This is actually not a new idea for us—to use one space
for more than one concept,’ Suzanne Perry said. (Freund, 2020)
Figure 6.1 shows the amount of discussion about the first set of BMI actions based on the news
media data. I discuss the patterns of the BMI action across the U.S. and different regions below.
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Figure 6.1. Patterns of Replacing or Adding New Business Concepts, U.S. Regions
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Based on the Figure 6.1, these restauranteurs’ BMI actions in different locations were
similar to some of the restauranteurs in my interview study. I analyzed how much the media
discussed the BMI action (i.e., the proportion of discussion) in nine regions and across the
United States. The discussion was relatively low—with the average discussion proportion being
5.61 percent, compared to the other three BMI actions. The proportion may result from more
restauranteurs using threat sensemaking frames rather than opportunity sensemaking frames.
Also, replacing or adding new business concepts are the most aggressive BMI actions that I
identified, which not many restauranteurs may be capable of or willing to do. In addition, the
pattern of discussion increased slightly over time but generally remained stable across regions.
Regional differences in the BMI discussion were small, but I noticed that the Southern United
States (e.g., the South Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central regions) discussed
the topics more than other regions during the pandemic. Since these states had weaker
restrictions (Goodkind, 2020), changing the concepts or expanding business with a new concept
during the pandemic may be easier and less risky for restauranteurs in the Southern United States
compared to other regions.
In addition, the overall patterns were similar to the interview study’s findings because
only a few restauranteurs substantially changed their business concepts. The restaurants in my
interview study also took actions that emerged at various times, rather than happening earlier or
later in the pandemic; two restauranteurs (Traveler and Big Shoulder) acted early in the
pandemic, while the other two (Food Network and Rebel) acted later.
Expanding the Business’s Physical Structure. According to the news media data, some
restauranteurs moved to a larger location to offer new services. For instance, in August 2020,
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The St. Louis Post-Dispatch in Missouri reported on a restauranteur who relocated to a larger
space to offer new services:
West End Bistro is moving to bigger digs in the same neighborhood…. The size of the
space at 255 Union (about 7,000 square feet) is a prime reason for the move, Green says.
… In addition to rooms for private parties, the new location also features patio seating.
Green says he also wants to put a pool table and dartboard inside the new location. The
New West End Bistro will feature the same menu as the original, … with a few additions
…. (Froeb, 2020)
Moreover, after the restrictions were lifted, an increasing number of businesses opened.
Texas A&M University’s student newspaper, the Battalion, introduced business conditions in a
Texas community and explained,
As COVID-19 restrictions lift and the economy rebounds …, business owners said they
are optimistic about reopening this year. Vacant locations are being backfilled by new
restaurants … the city’s economic development coordinator, said, … we’re getting calls
saying, ‘We’re interested; we’re ready.’ The popular Dutch Bros. Coffee is opening at
least three other locations in the city after seeing great success on Wellborn Road.
(Varnell, 2021)
Figure 6.2 shows the amount of discussion about the second set of BMI actions based on the
news media data. I discuss the patterns of the BMI action below.
Discussion about expanding was initially low but increased over time, except during the
winter season. This pattern was related to my interview study’s findings because many
restauranteurs expanded their restaurants’ physical structures later in the pandemic. For instance,
Meditation relocated to a new site early in the pandemic, but Beaver Dam and Musician opened
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Figure 6.2. Patterns of Expanding the Business’s Physical Structure, U.S. Regions
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new restaurants later. Therefore, more restauranteurs invested in growing their business later in
the pandemic, perhaps in conjunction with PPP loans. In addition, the winter is generally a slow
season in the restaurant industry; thus, discussion about this BMI action also decreased during
the winter (November and December 2020). However, when most restrictions in many regions
were lifted after May and June 2021, there was more discussion about the BMI actions across all
U.S. news media. The East South Central region, in particular discussed more of the topics
compared to any other regions after June 2020.
Improving Operational Efficiency. The operational efficiency BMI actions discussed
by the media were similar to the actions taken by the restauranteurs in the improving operational
efficiency pattern. For instance, big restaurant chains changed building designs and their
operations. The Cable News Network (CNN) introduced these practices and explained,
Taco Bell is cutting back on dining room seating and adding a second drive-thru lane
dedicated to pick-up orders made on its app. The design, unveiled in August, also
includes adding curbside pick-up for contactless pickups and ‘bellhops’—masked
employees stationed outside taking customers' orders on digital tablets…. [The] Owner
[of] Yum! Brands said that demand for its drive-thru ‘skyrocketed’ during its most recent
quarter. (Valinsky, 2020)
Also, others attempted to reduce operating costs by furloughing employees and temporarily
closing because of the restrictions and cold winter weather. An article from the Wisconsin State
Journal in Madison, Wisconsin, introduced local restaurants’ actions in reducing costs:
Johnny Delmonico’s and The Avenue Club temporarily closed as of Oct. 30 .... With a
city-county mandated limit on indoor dining at 25% capacity, and fewer customers opting
to eat inside, sales haven’t been covering expenses at those locations .... On March 17,
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Gov. Tony Evers’s administration ordered bars and restaurants to close and banned
gatherings of 10 or more…. Food Fight restaurants furloughed close to 700 …. When the
stay-at-home orders were eased somewhat, Food Fight restaurants brought back or hired
650 employees …. But, once the outdoor dining season ended …, Food Fight restaurants
now employ about 425. (Derby, 2020)
Figure 6.3 shows the amount of discussion about improving operational efficiency—across the
United States and in different regions.
Operational efficiency discussions were relatively stable across the United States.
Compared to other patterns of BMI, the discussion levels were higher—the average proportion of
discussions was 15.29 percent—because of operational changes and alignments required by any
type of BMI action (e.g., changing concepts, expanding businesses, enhancing operations,
offering new services). The topic modeling findings are consistent with the case study findings
because many restauranteurs may use threat sensemaking frames, and reduce operational costs
by furloughing employees and reducing services/business hours due to reduced dine-in
customers during the pandemic. However, with increasing customer demand for to-go, curbside,
and delivery services, restauranteurs may be focusing on improving operational efficiency with a
smaller number of employees. Thus, entrepreneurs' business operations were continually altered
to respond to challenges introduced by their environments or organizations. Although operational
efficiency discussion levels varied in some regions over time, most regions maintained similar
levels.
However, during the winter the New England and Middle Atlantic regions discussed
these topics more heavily than other regions (November 2020 to April 2021). COVID-19 was
spreading rapidly in the United States in late 2020, and states in these two regions responded to a
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Figure 6.3. Patterns of Improving Operational Efficiency, U.S. Regions
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higher level of restrictions than other states in different regions—for example, Rhode Island
restaurants closed November 30 to December 13, 2020, and indoor dining was reduced to 33
percent; Massachusetts implemented a 25 percent capacity limit; and New York, Maine, and
Massachusetts restaurants had to close from 9:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. (Blumenthal, 2020; Hauck
& Woodyard, 2020). Also, because winter weather in these areas can be colder than in other
regions, operating outdoor dining can be challenging (Miller, Hauck, & Tyko, 2020). Thus,
restauranteurs in the colder regions faced additional operational challenges.
Implementing Temporary Changes. The news media also discussed implementing
temporary changes. For instance, a restauranteur in Washington state changed menu items for togo business early in the pandemic. A news article from the Skagit Valley Herald stated,
As a farm-to-table restaurant, Seeds Bistro & Bar in La Conner usually features lots of
seasonal dishes and fresh produce on its menu. Nowadays … [the] owner… said she has
to tell them [customers] those dishes are no longer available. Instead, the restaurant is
offering macaroni and cheese, sandwiches, fish and chips, burgers, soups, a wedge salad
—a take-out friendly menu with reduced prices. (Allison, 2020)
Also, in a Bakersfield Californian news article, a California restauranteur stated, “The constant
change in how restaurants operate is frustrating … because of the pandemic, [his] restaurant has
put more emphasis on improving its takeout service, including expanding family meal options,
advertising specials on Facebook” (Shepard, 2020). Thus, many restauranteurs in different
regions also promoted new services and changed menu items in reaction to COVID-19. Figure
6.4 shows the amount of discussion about implementing temporary changes across different U.S.
regions.
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Figure 6.4. Patterns of Implementing Temporary Changes, U.S. Regions
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In contrast to expanding the business’s physical structure, where the discussion increased
over time, here there was a great deal of discussion at the beginning of the pandemic and during
the winter of 2020, but it then dwindled over time. As in my case study, many restauranteurs
actively added new services regardless of their major BMI actions. For instance, many
restauranteurs added delivery services (in-house or third party) early in the pandemic; however,
many subsequently dropped these services because concerns about food quality and their steep
costs emerged. Thus, many restauranteurs experimented with various services and products—
such as offering family-style meals—to deal with the pandemic early on, but they dropped them
later in the pandemic. COVID-19 threats decreased after vaccines were introduced (March and
April of 2021) and restrictions were lifted (May and June of 2021), giving restauranteurs fewer
reasons to add new services.
In addition, outdoor dining was considered a safer option due to better air circulation, but
offering the service was hard for restauranteurs in some regions due to the cold weather. To
make up for lost sales, restaurant owners introduced more new services during the winter
months. According to Figure 6.4, the East and West North Central regions had more discussion
about implementing temporary changes. Furthermore, due to the rapid spread of COVID-19
during the winter, these regions experienced greater restrictions (e.g., 25 percent capacity limit,
reduced business hours) than other regions during the winter (Hauck & Woodyard, 2020).
In summary, the discussions about each BMI approach in different regions are similar to
the single-city interview study’s findings. Some BMI actions fluctuated as environmental
conditions changed based on region and time of year, while other BMI actions were more stable
regardless of those conditions. In particular, I noticed that different restriction levels appeared
closely related to restauranteurs' BMI actions. Since the COVID-19 restrictions differed
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depending on each state’s political party strength (i.e., Democrats, Republicans), and the
restrictions directly affected the restaurant industry's business operations (Bartik et al., 2020;
Grossman, Kim, Rexer, & Thirumurthy, 2020; Gursoy & Chi, 2020). Next, I examine the
relationship between four BMI actions and each state's political orientation.
Different Levels of BMI Actions Based on Political Party Strength. The differences in
political parties’ strength created different restrictions in the restaurant industry during the
pandemic (Armstrong 2020; Goodkind, 2020). Generally, blue states had tougher restrictions
than red states, and various restrictions (e.g., no dine-in, capacity limitations) were among the
main challenges, and reasons for business model changes (Brizek, Frash, McLeod, & Patience,
2021; Norris et al., 2021). I conducted my comparative case study in a red state where the
COVID-19 restrictions were less severe for restauranteurs than in blue states, in general. Figure
6.5 shows the news media’s amount of discussion about four BMI patterns in both blue and red
states. Also, Table 6.2 shows the average discussion proportions of each BMI action based on the
political party strength in different states.
As shown in Figure 6.5 and Table 6.2, I found that replacing or adding new business
concepts were similarly discussed in both blue states (5.63 percent) and red states (5.57 percent)
overall. However, the frequency with which the other three BMI actions were discussed varied
between red and blue states. Red states discussed more topics related to expanding the business’s
physical structure, especially later in the pandemic. In contrast, BMI actions related to improving
operational efficiency and implementing temporary changes were discussed more in blue states.
These findings could imply that restauranteurs in red states viewed situations through more of an
opportunity lens than those in blue states. Restauranteurs in blue states, on the other hand, who
faced more restrictions, employed a threat lens more.
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Figure 6.5. BMI Discussion Patterns in Blue and Red States
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Table 6.2. Mean discussion proportions of BMI actions in Blue and Red States
BMI
Pattern

Number
of topics

Average %
of
occurrences

Replacing or
adding new
3
5.61
business
concepts
Expanding the
business’s
3
6.07
physical structure
Improving
operational
7
15.08
efficiency
Implementing
temporary
5
10.02
changes
Note: *** p < 0.001 (two-sample t-test).

Average % of occurrences
by political party strength
Blue states
Red states
(Democrats) (Republican)

t (df) = t-statistic

Effect size
(Cohen’s d)

5.63

5.57

t (36,590) = -0.48

-0.01

5.84***

6.50***

t (36,590) = 5.29

0.06

15.46***

14.35***

t (36,590) = -6.27

-0.07

10.32***

9.43***

t (36,590) = -5.81

-0.06
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However, as Table 6.2 shows, the effect sizes (Cohen’s d) of these differences were small
(Cohen’s d < 0.2). Thus, the differences may not be meaningful; even if they are statistically
significant, and I conclude that these four BMI actions appeared across the United States rather
than in a certain region or state. Therefore, the findings of my comparative case study were
generalizable in various locations.
In conclusion, my topic modeling study confirmed the four BMI patterns. Based on my
analysis, I found that different BMI actions emerged as environmental conditions evolved. Three
BMI actions (i.e., replacing or adding new business concepts; expanding the business’s physical
structure; and improving operational efficiency) were continually or gradually discussed among
restauranteurs over time, while the fourth BMI action (i.e., implementing temporary changes)
was discussed more at certain times but decreased over time during the pandemic. The results
indicate that not all BMI actions are long-term or permanent changes for their businesses. Some
BMI actions may only be used as temporary tactics.
Moreover, BMI actions may be connected to environmental changes—some
environmental condition differences (e.g., restrictions) can either strengthen or weaken
restauranteurs’ involvement in certain BMI patterns. However, from the analysis with the
political party strength, I found that BMI discussions had no differences or had only small effects
(i.e., minimal and practically insignificant differences) based on the political environment.
Therefore, I found entrepreneurs’ BMI actions cannot be explained by environmental differences
alone. In the following section, I will summarize my findings and discuss contributions.
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CHAPTER 7
DISCUSSION
From my interviews, I found that business model innovation (BMI) is a continuous
process and that multiple BMI actions can emerge and disappear over time based on
entrepreneurs’ sensemaking processes. My model (See Figure 4.1) shows that entrepreneurs'
sensemaking processes begin with noticing cues from various environmental and organizational
factors, and entrepreneurs apply either an opportunity or threat sensemaking frame to interpret
them, resulting taking different BMI actions based on these interpretations. Their BMI changes
then create new organizational cues for the next round of sensemaking, which is often stimulated
by changing environmental cues. Thus, the framework answers the following questions: (1) What
are decision-makers’ business model innovations (BMI) in response to the COVID-19 crisis and
(2) how and why have their BMIs unfolded differently over time given the same exogenous
change?
Prior BMI studies using rational, evolutionary, and cognitive lenses have provided
important insights about entrepreneurs' BMI actions, such as identifying key environmental or
organizational factors that influence entrepreneurs' BMIs, the process of creating and developing
business models, and how they find suitable business models. However, they do not explain how
and why different BMIs emerge in response to the same environmental changes. BMI
researchers have attempted to understand BMI actions as the result of specific causes, such as
environmental changes (e.g., Amit & Zott, 2001; Osiyevskyy & Dewald, 2015; Saebi et al.,
2017); market underperformance (e.g., Aspara et al., 2013; Sosna et al., 2010); or decisionmakers' cognition, such as knowledge, thinking style, and different decision making approaches
(i.e., centralized or de-centralized) (Martins et al., 2015; Snihur & Zott, 2020). However, these
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studies have presented a simple one-way process model without explaining how a firm's new
business models continue to change as a function of prior changes.
For instance, using the rational lens, Zott and Amit (2015) drew linear and static
connections between antecedents (i.e., environmental constraints) and new business model
outcomes (i.e., novel BMIs). McDonald and Eisenhardt (2020) proposed an evolutionary lens
framework called parallel play (i.e., a child plays independently near others but often mimics
them), which explains a firm’s borrowing a business model idea from others, testing it, and
pausing to adjust before applying the model to the firm. Martins and colleagues (2015) employed
the cognitive lens and explained how entrepreneurs adapt other firms' business models to change
their own. They proposed that entrepreneurs identify differences in business models, decide
which elements of the business models to apply, and integrate the elements into their existing
business models (Martins et al., 2015).
However, these studies simplified the three lenses' causes and processes; examined
processes and provided sources for potential BMI actions while still emphasizing the outcomes
of BMI actions; and provided limited explanations from a longitudinal perspective. I found that
prior process studies employing these lenses are limited to explaining varying BMI actions
during a crisis where the different firms experienced similar environmental conditions.
Specifically, these models could not explain why some entrepreneurs take radical and
incremental BMI actions, permanent and temporary BMI actions, or do not engage in BMI at all.
Theoretical Contributions: Understanding BMI Processes through a Sensemaking Frame
BMI as sensemaking. My dissertation extends BMI research by introducing different
BMI patterns and dynamic BMI processes using a sensemaking frame, which has received little
attention in the BMI literature. First, I highlight how entrepreneurs' interpretations of an overall
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situation with an opportunity frame, a threat frame, or engaging in only low-level sensemaking
result in varying BMI actions over time. Some BMI researchers noted that prior BMI research
focused on the performance implications of using BMI rather than understanding the causes or
antecedents leading to BMI’s emergence (Foss & Saebi, 2017; Snihur & Zott, 2020). These
researchers called for more studies to understand different factors causing BMI actions.
Although I agree that understanding various factors related to entrepreneurs' BMI decisions and
actions is an important area that BMI research has not actively explored, examining certain
factors (e.g., exogenous changes, organizational challenges, and business-model knowledge)
may be insufficient to comprehend the big picture of the BMI process.
External and organizational factors may generate new information that entrepreneurs
interpret; however, how they interpret the cues and what influences why they use a particular
frame may be the main drivers of BMI actions, rather than the information itself. Because
decision-makers “often rely on subtle perceptions (e.g., opportunity and threat)” (Osiyevskyy &
Dewald, 2015: 72), the perceptions can result in different interpretations of the same
environmental and organizational conditions. For instance, entrepreneurs may face a variety of
external environmental and internal organizational cues during a crisis, including regulatory
changes, supply chain problems, new customer needs, employees’ reactions, and sales channel
losses. Whether they interpret these challenges as a threat (e.g., lost access to key ingredients, or
a revenue stream they will have to replace) or an opportunity (e.g., the chance to innovate and
employ new inputs or techniques; experiment with a new sales channel) will affect the BMI
actions they take.
Further, my study also suggested that entrepreneurs do not necessarily employ the same
sensemaking frame over time; they may switch from a threat to an opportunity frame, or vice
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versa. Noticing and updating all the information creates also challenges for entrepreneurs
focusing on a specific factor (Christianson & Barton, 2020); therefore, they may make sense of
multiple cues rather than just paying attention to certain areas. Of course, certain factors can
receive more attention than others, but many (if not all) elements can be uniquely formed or
arranged into configurations (Fiss, 2007; Furnari et al., 2021) that entrepreneurs can interpret in
multiple ways. Thus, an analysis of different BMI actions based on certain factors misses
dynamic explanations; consequently, I suggest that BMI researchers should further understand
how entrepreneurs perceive and interpret cue configurations to explore BMI.
Duration of BMI actions. I found that some BMIs become a long-term piece of
organizations’ routines, while others only last for a short time. Previous studies have presented
different perspectives on business models’ persistence. For example, Doz and Kosonen (2010)
argued that business models are inherently stable and difficult to change due to embedded
organizational routines, various contracts, and collective understandings of a firm (e.g.,
governance, value creation, structure) among stakeholders. However, other BMI researchers
argue that a firm's business model is constantly changing to avoid competitors who replicate that
firm’s BMIs (Zott & Amit, 2015; Snihur, Zott, & Amit, 2021). My study suggests both
permanent and temporary BMIs are employed, and explains when and why entrepreneurs
employ various types and levels of BMI actions.
Some BMIs are closely related to core values or strategies that are difficult to change,
whereas others are used as short-term tactics. For instance, as the business environment
normalized, some restauranteurs discontinued new services and products because they were used
as short-term survival tactics, whereas others who expanded physical structures and changed
business concepts stuck with the changes because either they were aligned with core values that
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would have been costly to reverse, or the restauranteurs realized the “temporary” changes
generated profitable new revenue streams and made them permanent.
Furthermore, my findings regarding the temporal aspects of BMI actions revealed
insights that differed from the previous BMI literature because many of these short-term tactics
resulted from using existing industry “templates” (Amit & Zott, 2015). Amit and Zott (2015:
339) stated, “A business model designer can draw inspiration (i.e., borrow) by observing existing
firms, or ways of organizing activities and exchanges, and by talking to investors, mentors, or
colleagues who might be able to offer advice.” During the pandemic, restauranteurs actively used
available business model templates (e.g., to-go services, new menu items, online orders, and
third-party deliveries) (Norris et al., 2021). Although many BMI researchers argued that
entrepreneurs could develop effective business models by adapting templates (i.e., copying other
firms’ business models) (e.g., Martins et al., 2015; McDonald & Eisenhardt, 2020; Zott & Amit,
2015), I found that adapting the templates often resulted in their being easily removed from
businesses when environmental and organizational conditions changed.
The differences in results could be due to differences in contexts. Because environmental
and organizational conditions change quickly during a crisis (e.g., Smart & Vertinsky, 1984;
Wan & Yiu, 2009), modifying an existing template by “pausing”—that is, stopping to customize
it so that it is suitable for their existing business models (McDonald & Eisenhardt, 2020)—can
be difficult. Therefore, profound considerations about templates and existing business models
may be required to integrate them for long-term BMI (Amit & Zott, 2015), whereas using
templates with shallow considerations about their existing business models or concepts may
result in using templates as short-term tactics.
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BMI as an ongoing process. Third, a firm’s initial BMI action is not the end of a BMI
process; rather, it can be a new starting point for another round of BMI. Organizational changes
occur because a new business model is introduced, and environmental factors change constantly.
These changes create new information by changing the interactions among environmental and
organizational cues, creating new consequences, and forcing entrepreneurs to engage in a new
sensemaking process. As a result of these changed cues, entrepreneurs' interpretive frames, as
well as their BMI actions, can shift over time; and entrepreneurs' BMI actions can be reinnovated, reorganized, and removed at some point, regardless of how well-developed and wellthought-out new business models are.
As BMI researchers have argued, scholars have not fully explored how the BMI process
evolves over time (Amit & Zott, 2015; Berends et al., 2016). For instance, although some BMI
studies investigated the relationships between entrepreneurs' BMI actions and their interpretation
of environmental changes as opportunities or threats (e.g., Kim & Min, 2015; Osiyevskyy &
Dewald, 2015), these studies did not fully recognize the mechanism of interpretation shifts,
detailed differences in organizational conditions, and the outcomes of changes in entrepreneurs'
BMI actions. Also, many other studies discussed how entrepreneurs engage in the BMI process
over time, but their explanations either ended after BMI actions were taken (e.g., Bohnsack et al.,
2014; Frankenberger et al., 2013) or concluded broadly as a fine-tuning process after BMI (e.g.,
Demil & Lecocq, 2010; McGrath, 2010; Sjödin et al., 2020). In contrast, my dissertation offers
insights into how the BMI process evolves over time. Entrepreneurs’ BMI is an ongoing process,
rather than an outcome; this process is episodic and dynamic, rather than static and crosssectional; and it can yield both long-term and short-term innovations.
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Factors inhibiting sensemaking. My dissertation also contributes to BMI research by
identifying factors that inhibit entrepreneurs’ beginning the sensemaking process during a
crisis—that is, by explaining why entrepreneurs may not engage in sensemaking that leads to
BMI during a crisis. I found that organizational, personal, and emotional factors can inhibit
entrepreneurs’ initiating sensemaking, leading them to no BMI during a crisis. Prior sensemaking
researchers discussed how sensemaking occurs after an unexpected event (e.g., Meyer, 1982),
when environmental changes are perceived (e.g., Milliken, 1990), and when one’s identity is not
confirmed (e.g., Pratt, Rockmann, & Kaufmann, 2006). Thus, these researchers argue that
“sensemaking begins when people experience a violation of their expectations, or when they
encounter an ambiguous event or issue that is of some significance to them” (Maitlis &
Christianson, 2014: 77). However, not all individuals who experience these events necessarily
engage in sensemaking. These sensemaking studies offer limited explanations for why some
people make sense during a crisis while others do not (Christianson & Barton, 2020). Based on
my study, certain organizational, personal, and emotional factors can delay or completely inhibit
entrepreneurs’ starting the sensemaking process.
For example, organizational conditions, especially slack financial resources, can delay
the sensemaking process. Slack resources are often considered a cushion that allows a firm to
adapt to external or organizational challenges, and firms can use slack resources to better
perform in a crisis by taking risks and seeking solutions (Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert & March, 1963;
Wan & Yiu, 2009). This finding is consistent with my findings. However, having slack resources
also allows entrepreneurs to step back and wait as a crisis unfolds, rather than actively
responding to a crisis; that is, at least until they begin to run out of slack resources, and are
forced to take action. Thus, my study showed that slack resources can lead to actively engaging
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in sensemaking using an opportunity frame, or doing nothing at all until uncertainty is reduced,
or the crisis ends.
Personal interests can also inhibit initiating the sensemaking process. Personal interests
that are unrelated to taking innovative actions in response to a crisis may lead entrepreneurs to
avoid engaging in sensemaking because taking an innovative action is a choice (Ford, 1996;
Shin, Yuan, & Zhou, 2017). I found that some restauranteurs were more interested in personal
issues (e.g., retirement, relationships with customers or employees) than in adapting their
businesses during the pandemic. They felt little urgency to change and took no BMI actions.
Finally, entrepreneurs’ emotional fatigue can inhibit starting another round of
sensemaking. Prolonged innovative actions to manage and change organizations amid a crisis
can be extremely stressful. Thus, entrepreneurs may tire of constantly updating cues,
sensemaking, and taking actions. I found that some entrepreneurs who were actively and heavily
involved in BMI early on decided not to pursue any further changes over the course of my study
because they were simply exhausted and overwhelmed with implementing the changes they had
made thus far. They thus abandoned, or indefinitely delayed additional innovations to
concentrate on digesting the innovations they had already implemented.
Methodological Contribution
My dissertation also makes methodological contributions. I combined both the multiple
case study (Eisenhardt, 1989, 2021) and Langley’s (1999) process study approaches to
understand entrepreneurs’ BMI actions during the pandemic. Using these qualitative approaches
provided me a clear understanding of BMI actions and patterns that emerged in my data. I then
used LDA topic modeling, which fit well with my qualitative study because both approaches
identify historical patterns (e.g., Croidieu & Kim, 2018; Langley, 1999), to confirm my findings

177

using a nationally representative body of textual data. Qualitative approaches can identify
patterns by focusing on specific firms, industries, and locations; topic modeling can capture
patterns in a larger context and identify similarities or differences in patterns, enhancing the
trustworthiness of my initial findings. Thus, my mixed-method approach (i.e., qualitative and
topic modeling studies) can help attain generalizability by analyzing a small number of
organizations and comparing them to a larger context. Therefore, using a mixed-method of
qualitative and topic modeling approaches can increase confidence in the findings.
Avenues for Future Research
Applying a sensemaking frame to BMI provides opportunities for future research. First,
quantitative studies can test the relationship between four patterns of BMI actions—replacing or
adding new business concepts, expanding a business’s physical structure, improving operational
efficiency, and implementing temporary changes—and organizational performances during or
after a crisis. By looking at these patterns, future researchers can identify the most effective BMI
actions that create more value for firms.
Second, entrepreneurs’ BMI sensemaking process can influence other stakeholders’
sensemaking processes, which is known as sensegiving (e.g., Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Maitlis
& Lawrence, 2007). Because these two theoretical concepts (i.e., sensemaking and sensegiving)
are considered complementary and mutual processes (Rouleau, 2005), BMI researchers can
investigate how others—such as employees, customers, and business partners—interpret
entrepreneurs' BMI actions and what consequences this has for future BMI actions.
Third, my research focused on the restaurant industry in the United States, where the
government’s financial support (e.g., PPP, EIDL, and the Restaurant Revitalization Fund) to
businesses was more generous than in other countries. These funds were extremely helpful to
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most of the restauranteurs I interviewed. Without this support, entrepreneurs might have been
more likely to employ a threat sensemaking frame, and taken alternative routes to engage in
BMI—such as fewer business concept changes and business expansions but more operational
and service changes—because changing business concepts and expanding business require more
financial resources. Thus, understanding resource availability’s impact on BMI actions can be
further developed by studying different contexts.
Fourth, BMI researchers can also further investigate what factors inhibit sensemaking
that can lead to BMI. Prior studies suggested that entrepreneurs may engage in sensemaking in
response to environmental changes, uncertainty, and disruptive experiences in organizational
routines, identity, and strategic goals (e.g., Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Corley & Gioia, 2004;
Weick, 2005). However, I found that other factors (e.g., resource availability, personal interests,
and sensemaking fatigue) inhibit engaging in sensemaking that leads to BMI. Thus, engaging in
sensemaking may not always begin with one's experiences with environmental or organizational
disruptions. BMI researchers can continue to explore factors that stimulate or inhibit
sensemaking that leads to BMI.
Finally, I found that some restauranteurs engaged in BMI actions that resulted in longterm organizational changes, while others engaged in short-term changes they soon abandoned.
These BMI outcomes were related to various factors such employing different sensemaking
frames to interpret cues, existing business model fit with the environment, objectives, and
resource availability. However, I encourage BMI researchers to find more explanations for
entrepreneurs' temporary or permanent organization and business model changes. For instance,
some BMI actions may create various problems in sales, costs, operations, and organizational
culture. Some entrepreneurs may revise or develop the BMI actions, while others may simply
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remove them. Exploring the factors associated with temporary BMI actions, as well as the
process of whether entrepreneurs further develop new business models, could provide new
theoretical insights into the nature and underpinnings of BMI.
Limitations
This study has several limitations. Because it focuses on the restaurant industry during
the COVID-19 crisis, an important consideration is whether the BMIs developed through the
sensemaking process are applicable in different crisis and non-crisis situations, and in different
industries. Depending on the context, different types of BMI actions and processes may evolve.
Thus, I was unable to draw generalizable conclusions about the BMI actions and processes that
apply to broader contexts.
However, entrepreneurs may follow the sensemaking process of understanding and
synthesizing information in any crisis situation, and any industry, because external changes and
organizational conditions can provide a variety of information that entrepreneurs will assess and
respond to. Thus, entrepreneurs' BMI in response to perceived opportunities and threats can be
universal, even if the particular patterns of actions are context-specific. Also, by studying BMI in
different industries, researchers found that firms continue to expand business models (e.g., Kim
& Min, 2015; Sohl et al., 2020), enter new markets (e.g., Anderson & Kupp, 2008), enhance
operational efficiency and cost reductions (e.g., Sorescu et al., 2011; Thorgren & Williams,
2020), and change services and products (e.g., Visnjic et al., 2013; Zott & Amit, 2008). As a
result, BMIs can take various forms depending on the industry or type of business, but the
underlying ideas of BMI actions may share similarities.
This study’s final limitation is that I was unable to trace restaurants that had permanently
closed. All my interviewees’ restaurants survived, and some even thrived during the pandemic,

180

which is wonderful. After my data collection, some restauranteurs shut down a few locations, but
most businesses remained open. The lack of samples from businesses that failed during the
pandemic prevents me from telling a story about which BMI actions they did or did not use;
what cues they had; how they interpreted those cues; and how and why their BMI actions could
not prevent them from failing. That story might differ from my interviewees’ experiences. Thus,
my sample may not represent the full range of restauranteurs' experiences during the pandemic.
However, I was also conducting a process rather than a variance study. Future research that
specifically adopts a variance approach to their research design can continue to explore factors
that lead to BMI success or failure.
Conclusion
King Saul felt his chest tighten as he saw Goliath walking down to the valley of Elah and
heard him shout, "Send out your warrior." Israelites looked at each other with fear in their eyes
as Saul lowered his head and stared at the ground, hiding his fear. There was silence for a few
moments as the Israelites paused until the shepherd boy David yelled, "I will kill him!" Saul
denied this possibility but was also terrified—Goliath was the champion warrior; his soldiers had
already been discouraged and terrified by the enormous champion; and the king struggled to find
a solution. Pleading with Saul, David explained how he used slingshots to kill bears and lions to
protect his flock of sheep. Possibly interpreting David's experiences as a chance to win the battle,
Saul sent the shepherd boy to battle the giant.
Just as Goliath challenged King Saul, COVID-19 challenged entrepreneurs, who, like
King Saul, noticed cues around them, interpreted the cues, and took action. Their BMI actions
were difficult to explain using only a few environmental or organizational cues and with a static
process. However, understanding how entrepreneurs’ lived experiences and the frames they used
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to make sense of various cues provides insight into processes driving or inhibiting BMI. BMI
researchers, I believe, have tremendous opportunities to pursue a more in-depth understanding of
BMI actions and processes to advance the field if they explore BMI from the entrepreneur’s
perspective, rather than imposing frameworks from without. I hope that my dissertation will
serve as a cornerstone for identifying BMI processes and actions through a sensemaking frame.
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Appendix 1. Traveler’s Organizational Conditions, Sensemaking Frames, and BMI Actions Over Time
1st Phase
(March – July 2020)
One restaurant (downtown)
Casual dining
Dine-in focused
Italian food

2nd Phase
(August – early November 2020)
•
One restaurant (downtown)
•
Casual dining
•
Dine-in and to-go
•
Italian food - different food
styles

Opportunity frame
“We had the information, we
already spent some money on it,
and we just chose to take the
time to do it, and since we
thought the concept might work
in the future, we just figured
what a good time to test it out,
because people are really patient
right now.”

Opportunity frame
“The next concept is going to be
very different and with a different
name. It’s going to be the yin to
this as yang. And while this
concept is dinner only, high-end
experience, wine list, reservations,
indoor dining, no delivery, the
other concept will really be the
opposite of all that..”

Changing concept of restaurant
by changing food style
Hiring new employees
Changing employees’ tasks
Receiving PPP/ IDEL
Changing space layout (inside
and outside of the restaurant)
Changing business hours
Adding curbside service
Adding to-go
Changing menu items
Adding an online order service
Changing POS (point-of-sale)
system
Starting reservation only service

Developing the new business
concept
Starting partnership with
breweries
Changing online reservation
system
Adding price tag on merchandise
Changing employees’ pay
Changing business hours (7 days a
week)

Time

Prior organizational
condition

Interpretation

Interpretation quotes

Major BMI actions

Minor BMI actions

•
•
•
•

3rd Phase
(Mid-November – June 2021)
•
One restaurant (downtown),
working on opening a new
concept restaurant
•
Casual dining
•
Dine-in and to-go
•
Italian food- different food
styles
Opportunity frame
“We have decided on the
concept, yes. We just haven't
gone public with it. This isn't
public information, and so these
pop-up dinners that we’re having
will tease it, will tease the
concept. People may make
assumptions based off of that,
but we won't actually release
that until we have more of a firm
timeline with construction and
design, and we have to get the
tenant out, so there are a lot of
moving pieces.”
Testing the new business
concept
Adding new menu items
Designing merchandise with
employees (e.g., t-shirts)

After the final interview
•

•
•
•

One restaurant
(downtown), working on
opening a new concept
restaurant
Casual dining
Dine-in and to-go
Italian food
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Appendix 2. Big Shoulder’s Organizational Conditions, Sensemaking Frames, and BMI Actions Over Time
1st Phase
(March – July 2020)
One restaurant (downtown)
Casual dining
Dine-in and to-go
Vegan food

2nd Phase
(August – early November 2020)
•
Two restaurants (downtown)
•
Casual dining
•
Dine-in, to-go, third-party
delivery
•
Vegan food

Opportunity frame
“I think the corona helped me to
take it [new restaurant store]
over. The feel-good thing that
happened since the corona.”

Opportunity frame
“The owner of the [A] Hotel came
to me, eat the food, and he said,
listen, I got 2,000 square feet in
one of the hotel in [City A] and I
want to open the same concept. I
want you to come and open over
there. I told him, listen, let’s wait
three months, four months. Let’s
see what’s going on. Waiting to
do it.”
Opened the new concept
restaurant (Meat)
Installing air filtration (kills virus)
Adding new menu items

Time

Prior organizational
condition
Interpretation

•
•
•
•

Interpretation quotes

Major BMI actions

Minor BMI actions

Working on a new concept
restaurant (Meat)
Hiring new employees
Receiving PPP/ IDEL
Changing business hours
Adding third party delivery

3rd Phase
(Mid-November – June 2021)
•
Two restaurants
(downtown)
•
Casual dining
•
Dine-in, to-go, third-party
delivery
•
Vegan and Meat
Threat frame
“I said, ‘No, I cannot do it…I
can control everything. I don't
think that I'm going to go there
because I can’t.’ I am not 21
years old. I'm tired…I can't. I'm
on the edge of retirement. I don't
need to work so fast and so hard,
so I don't think so.”

After the final interview
•
•
•
•

Two restaurants
(downtown)
Casual dining
Dine-in, to-go, third-party
delivery
Vegan and Meat

None
Changing business hours for the
new restaurant (open only four
days)
Receiving PPP
Adding outside patio
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Appendix 3. Food Network’s Organizational Conditions, Sensemaking Frames, and BMI Actions Over Time
1st Phase
(March – July 2020)
Fifteen restaurants
(downtown, shopping
district)
Mixed (casual and fine
dining)
Dine-in focused
American food

2nd Phase
(August – early November 2020)
•
Fifteen restaurants
(downtown, shopping
district)
•
Mixed (casual and fine
dining)
•
Dine-in and to-go (one
restaurant)
•
American food

3rd Phase
(Mid-November – June 2021)
•
Fifteen restaurants
(downtown, shopping
district), ghost kitchen
•
Mixed (casual and fine
dining)
•
Dine-in, to-go, delivery,
curbside
•
American and Mexican
foods

Threat frame
“It’s just so crazy…I keep
telling my team, as entrepreneur,
that this is the hardest thing
you'll face…where there are so
many different factors that really
go into play. The biggest thing
you can do is stand up and be a
leader and say, ‘This is what
we're going to do,’ and stay
focused. As the bullets come at
you, you just have to take them
and stay as much as you can on
the path that you choose to do, at
least for a little while.”

Threat frame
“There was about two or three
weeks there that I was definitely
thumb in my mouth in the fetal
position underneath my desk
every day, and rocking back and
forth. I mean, I'm not kidding you.
There was a point where … and
I've got to stay positive for the
team. Revenues drop off and
everybody is like, ‘What the heck
is going on?’ and it's like, ‘No,
we're going to be great. We're
going to be great,’ and then I go
back to my office and curl up and
almost cry, and then go back out,
‘Everything is going to be great,’
you know.

Opportunity frame
“We are kind of pushing all
the chips in. We want to take
advantage of the fact that we
feel like it’s going to be…as
everybody is saying, in our
industry we feel like it’s going
to be the roaring 20’s for about
the next 18 months, so we
want to take full advantage of
that”

Time
•

Prior organizational
condition

Interpretation

Interpretation quotes

Major BMI actions

Minor BMI actions

•
•
•

None

None

Receiving PPP
Furloughing employees
Offering to-go (one restaurant)
Food donations
Promoting gift card sales

Starting ghost kitchen concept (togo, delivery, and curb-side)
Adding blankets and Igloos in
outdoor space
Offering a wellness program for
employees
Promoting additional gift card
sales

After the final interview
•

•
•
•

Fifteen restaurants
(downtown, shopping
district), ghost kitchen, a
hotel, and working on
adding different concept
restaurants
Mixed (casual, fine dining)
Dine-in, to-go, delivery
American, Mexican foods

Opened a boutique hotel
Opened new restaurants with
different menu
Partner up with a corporation
Receiving PPP
Changing rent agreements
Changing ghost kitchen
business through only an
online marketplace
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Appendix 4. Rebel’s Organizational Conditions, Sensemaking Frames, and BMI Actions Over Time
1st Phase
(March – July 2020)
•
One restaurant
(neighborhood)
•
Casual dining – breakfast,
brunch, and lunch
•
Dine-in focused
•
American food
Threat frame
“Now that COVID has come
into play, you take that mindset
of okay, can we move forward
with this and still gain ground
trying to do that? For me
personally, we just got to figure
out how to get our feet back
under us. Quite frankly, the hell
with everything else. I got a
mortgage to pay, I've got kids to
put food on the table, but I'm
also a hustler. With me, if I have
to shut down the business and
file for bankruptcy, I'll do that
and figure out life.”

2nd Phase
(August – early November 2020)
•
One restaurant
(neighborhood)
•
Casual dining - brunch and
lunch
•
Dine-in, to-go, curbside
•
American food
Threat frame
I love what I do, but we have to
generate more revenue to keep
afloat. Dinner is where money is
at, and I may just flip the switch.
I haven’t decided, but I may just
end the [Rebel] completely and
rebrand...If we do dinner, I will
make some more changes to the
dining room.

Major BMI actions

None

None

Minor BMI actions

Receiving PPP/ IDEL
Furloughing employees
Reducing food costs
Closing business (two weeks)
Changing business hours (no
breakfast)
Removing bakery service
Adding curbside, family style
meal, raw meat

Changing business hours (Tues Sun to Wed - Sun)
Increasing employees’ pay
Removing new services (family
style meal, raw meat)
Adding online order service

Time

Prior organizational
condition
Interpretation

Interpretation quotes

3rd Phase
(Mid-November – June 2021)
•
One restaurant
(neighborhood)
•
Casual dining – brunch
and lunch
•
Dine-in, to-go, curbside
•
American food
Opportunity frame
After the last PPP we got, which
was just over $100,000. It was
huge. I was starting to have
another freak-out, to be honest,
to see if I could pull it off. I’ve
got some other applications in
for grants right now too, because
that covers my payroll…I just
was sitting there thinking… I
just finally made it to the point
to where if we’re going to do
this [a dinner and bar business].

After the final interview
•
•
•
•

One restaurant
(neighborhood)
Casual dining – brunch,
lunch, Dinner, and bar
Dine-in, to-go, curbside
American food

Concept changed to a dinner and
bar focused business
Changed menu
Receiving PPP/other grants
Changing business hour (92:00PM again)
Obtaining a liquor license
Increasing menu price
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Appendix 5. Meditation’s Organizational Conditions, Sensemaking Frames, and BMI Actions Over Time
1st Phase
(March – July 2020)
Two restaurants
(downtown), one small and
one medium in size
Casual dining
Dine-in, to-go
Mexican and Asian food

2nd Phase
(August – early November 2020)
•
Two restaurants (downtown),
working on relocating to a
larger space (small
restaurant)
•
Casual dining
•
Dine-in, to-go
•
Mexican and Asian food

3rd Phase
(Mid-November – June 2021)
•
Two restaurants
(downtown), one large and
one medium in size
•
Casual dining
•
Dine-in, to-go
•
Mexican and Asian food

Opportunity frame
“We made plans back in
December to move…We should
be opening the new location in a
couple of weeks. And then we
plan to pivot the current location
into a different concept,
something more like a fast to-go
concept...That's a plan we want
to try and make it on volume…
At least our new spot has a
really large outdoor space which
is something that’s really
valuable right now that
[Meditation’s Asian restaurant]
currently doesn't really have.”
In the process of relocate to a
larger restaurant
Furloughing employees
Receiving PPP
Changing menu price
Adding reservation system
Adding new menu items
Adding a new online order
service
Adding New POS (point-ofsale) system

Threat frame
“The lesson right now is we are
just getting started and so it’s my
attitude of I’m all in to whatever I
have to do to figure out business.
It’s like I still need to do that and
there’s an immense pressure, but
also everyone has had hard few
months. It’s not necessarily going
to get any better right away, so
we’ve got to help everyone find
some balance in that.”

Threat frame
“We finally got overwhelmed
enough, and there was enough
going on; and we saw that the
next year would still be
challenging enough…so we just
had to focus on the things that
we did have.”

Opened the larger restaurant

None

Adding new menu items
Considering a new concept
business for the small restaurant
(to-go only concept)

Improving outside seating
Adding storage in the kitchen
Changing employees' pay and
benefits
Opening bar area
Adding more tables (indoor)
Installing heaters (outdoor)
Adding third party delivery
Working with other businesses
Renting out more kitchen space
Changing menu price
Receiving PPP/ State grant

Time
•

Prior organizational
condition

•
•
•

After the final interview
•

•
•
•

Interpretation

Interpretation quotes

Major BMI actions

Minor BMI actions

Two restaurants
(downtown), one large
and one medium in size,
added more space to a
large restaurant
Casual dining
Dine-in, to-go, thirdparty delivery
Mexican and Asian food
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Appendix 6. Musician’s Organizational Conditions, Sensemaking Frames, and BMI Actions Over Time
Time
•

Prior organizational
condition

•
•
•

1st Phase
(March – July 2020)
Two restaurants (downtown,
neighborhood) and a catering
store
Fast service and casual dining
Dine-in, to-go
American food

2nd Phase
(August – early November 2020)
•
Two restaurants (downtown,
neighborhood), working on
opening a new restaurant
•
Fast service and casual dining
•
Dine-in, to-go, third-party
delivery
•
American food

•
•
•
•

3rd Phase
(Mid-November – June 2021)
Two restaurants (downtown,
neighborhood), working on
opening a new restaurant
Fast service and casual dining
Dine-in, to-go, third-party
delivery
American food

After the final interview
•

•
•
•

Interpretation

Interpretation quotes

Major BMI actions

Minor BMI actions

Opportunity frame
“My mind was okay, maybe we
just need another location with a
really big kitchen. There’s
ordering and all that stuff…Now I
think the best model is to have a
restaurant with a kitchen large
enough to handle it. So my hope is
we do get [a new] restaurant open.
The kitchen is big enough and the
catering comes back, I got the
space.”

In the process of opening a larger
restaurant
Receiving PPP
Selling catering building
Furloughing employees
Changing restaurants’ layout
Offering third party delivery
services, curbside, and to-go
Changing menu price
New online order service
New POS (point-of-sale) system
Using vacuum sealer to offer precooked meals
Partnership with bars

Opportunity frame
“In [a city] specifically, they’ve
got a tun of restaurants. Ninety
percent of them are fast food and
quick service restaurants. [The
city] has got [A restaurant]. It has
got [B restaurant]. We wanted to
make a good sit-down restaurant,
full bar. We’ve never had that
before. That’s another thing [the
city] doesn’t really have is bars, a
place to go watch the game or
something. We just thought that’s
what [the city] needed. Yeah,
change it up.”
In the process of opening a larger
restaurant
Offering boxed meals
Recruiting employees
Considering new services for the
new restaurant (e.g., drive-thru
window, separate menu for a bar
business, outside patio)

One restaurant (downtown)
and one larger restaurant
(shopping district),
integrating restaurant and
catering business together
Fast and full services,
casual dining
Dine-in, to-go, third-party
delivery
American food

Threat frame
“I used to hate the word “no,” and
now I like the word “no” a lot.
(laughter)…our brand is good; we
will have plenty of money coming
in once we are up and running.
Let’s just focus on doing what we
do well, and not stress ourselves
out.”

Opened a new larger restaurant
Purchasing new equipment
Relocating management team
Redesigning employees' pay
Increasing menu price
Working on the patio
Receiving PPP
Closing a restaurant permanently
(suburb)
Changing menu items
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Appendix 7. Beaver Dam’s Organizational Conditions, Sensemaking Frames, and BMI Actions Over Time
1st Phase
(March – July 2020)
Three restaurants
(downtown, shopping
district)
Casual coffee shop
Dine-in, to-go
Coffee and baked goods

2nd Phase
(August – early November 2020)
•
Three restaurants
(downtown, shopping
district)
•
Casual coffee shop
•
Dine-in, to-go, third-party
delivery
•
Coffee and baked goods

Threat frame
“My brother [partner] said,
‘Hey, I’ve been following this
virus. This might be the real
deal.’ We almost immediately
began to just shore every
expenditure up that we needed
to, and then we were just kind of
operating for about a month. We
weren’t making any moves,
weren’t making any big
purchases.”

Opportunity frame
“And then just the whole thing has
caused me to think bigger and to
just kind of say yes to opportunity.
There’s a thing -- there’s
something about it that’s made me
less fearless or more fearless.
That’s a good way of saying it.
Just more fearless.”

Time
•

Prior organizational
condition

Interpretation

Interpretation quotes

•
•
•

Major BMI actions

None

Minor BMI actions

Furloughing employees
Receiving PPP/EIDL
Changing business hours
Adding third party delivery

Started roasting own coffee –
wholesale
Changing business hours
Adding happy hours
Adding a new online order service
Changing POS (point-of-sale)
system
Receiving state grants
Reducing food costs

3rd Phase
(Mid-November – June 2021)
•
Three restaurants
(downtown, shopping
district), and coffee
roasting wholesale
business
•
Casual coffee shop
•
Dine-in, to-go
•
Coffee and baked goods
Opportunity frame
“It didn't really have anything to
do with the pandemic, it was just
the right guys approaching us at
the right time and making the
right offer (laughter), a great
offer.”

After the final interview
•

•
•
•

Four restaurants
(downtown, shopping
district) and coffee
roasting wholesale
business
Casual coffee shop
Dine-in, to-go, drive-thru
Coffee and baked goods

Open a new restaurant – with a
drive-thru
Receiving PPP
Hiring HR consultant
Adding subscription model to
online order service
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Appendix 8. Special’s Organizational Conditions, Sensemaking Frames, and BMI Actions Over Time
2nd Phase
(August – early November 2020)
•
Two restaurants (shopping
district)
•
Casual dining
•
To-go, curbside, third-party
delivery, drive-thru
•
Fast-food

3rd Phase
(Mid-November – June 2021)
•
Two restaurants (shopping
district) with an additional
drive-thru lane
•
Casual dining
•
To-go, curbside, thirdparty delivery, drive-thru
•
Fast-food

Threat frame
“Oh gosh… Due to our volume,
we get deliveries every single
day. It went down to two and 3
days. That became a
nightmare…It was horrible. It
almost got to a point where it
would say, “Well, you’re just
lucky to have what you got.” So,
it was very, very stressful. We
stressed the supply chain, as I
referenced earlier, we have
really stressed that whole
process due to our demand.”

Threat frame
“We’ve just got some fatigue,
COVID fatigue, which leads to
possibly dropping guards and not
being quite as efficient or as good
as we were.”

Threat frame
“The employees are so
demanding that we are unable to
promote our business right now.
And I feel that is horrible.”

Working on rebuilding a
restaurant (changing blueprint)
Changing structure of process
(orders, prepare foods, deliver to
customers)
Removing dine-in service
Adding third party delivery
service, curbside, to-go
Changing parking lot for new
services (delivery, curbside)

Rebuilding a restaurant suspended
(changing blueprint)
Adding a drive-thru lane
Changing set up indoor dining
room for mobile order
Receiving ERC (Employment
Retention Credit)

Rebuilding a restaurant started

Time
•

Prior organizational
condition

•
•
•

1st Phase
(March – July 2020)
Two restaurants (shopping
district)
Casual dining
Dine-in, to-go, drive-thru
Fast-food

After the final interview
•

•
•
•

Interpretation

Interpretation quotes

Major BMI actions

Minor BMI actions

Two restaurants
(shopping district): one
has additional drive-thru
lanes, and the other is
being renovated
Casual dining
Dine-in, to-go, thirdparty delivery, drive-thru
Fast-food

Adding dine-in
Relocating employees (from
renovating store to a different
location)
Increasing price of food
Reducing costs (provide
condiments and napkins only
requested)
Adding a new door for curbside
operation
Re-organizing parking lot for
curbside
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Appendix 9. Family’s Organizational Conditions, Sensemaking Frames, and BMI Actions Over Time
Time

Prior organizational
condition
Interpretation

Interpretation quotes

Major BMI actions

Minor BMI actions

1st Phase
(March – July 2020)
•
One restaurant (shopping
district)
•
Casual dining
•
Dine-in and shipping
(bakery)
•
American food
Threat frame
“My God, the company that we
were getting cracker crumbs
from, they closed up. We’ve had
to now start trying to get out of
four to five companies out there
a cracker meal that will bread
and stay on there to the
consistency and the taste that we
had before. There are a lot of
challenges now. It’s not like
you’re completely out of
product, but the product when it
changes, it changes the taste
profile.”

2nd Phase
(August – early November 2020)
•
One restaurant (shopping
district)
•
Casual dining
•
Dine-in, shipping (bakery),
to-go, curbside
•
American food
Threat frame
“It [managing operation] was very
challenging, because I was having
to change gears multiple times
every, single day. It was like a
football coach on the sideline, and
it was like practice for 10 hours all
the way through that.”

None
Changing operation - focusing
on curbside and to-go
Receiving PPP
Adding promotion (20% off)
Removing menu items (sourcing
issue)
Changing business hours
Increasing menu price

None
Removing shipping business on
bakery items
Increasing menu price

3rd Phase
(Mid-November – June 2021)
•
One restaurant (shopping
district)
•
Casual dining
•
Dine-in, to-go, curbside
•
American food

After the final interview
•
•
•
•

One restaurant (shopping
district)
Casual dining
Dine-in, to-go, curbside
American food

Threat frame
“COVID pushed us into doing
that [operational efficiency].
COVID pushed us into
activating things that we already
knew to do. Over the years, we
had gotten complacent in doing
a lot of things like that because
we didn't have to do that. We
were able to get plenty of people
to serve the food. We allowed
that just to kind of be a process,
you know? COVID changed
that. It put a different
perspective out there. It made us
do what we should have been
doing before anyway as
survival.”
None
Closing banquet business
Increasing employees’ pay
Doing tip-pool
Changing operation (ticket times
- learned from a franchise
restaurant)
Changing ingredients (inexpensive) for some food items
Increasing menu price
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Appendix 10. Polymath’s Organizational Conditions, Sensemaking Frames, and BMI Actions Over Time
Time

Prior organizational
condition

Interpretation

Interpretation quotes

Major BMI actions

Minor BMI actions

1st Phase
(March – July 2020)
•
Three restaurants
(downtown, shopping
district)
•
Casual coffee shop
•
Dine-in, to-go, third-party
delivery
•
Coffee and baked goods
focused
Threat frame
“Obviously because of COVID,
it hasn't really, I mean, we're
keeping our heads above water
and we’re keeping the business
going, but as far as doing
anything else right now, we’re
only focused on just keeping the
doors open.”

2nd Phase
(August – early November 2020)
•
Three restaurants
(downtown, shopping
district)
•
Casual coffee shop
•
To-go, curbside, third-party
delivery
•
Coffee and baked goods
focused
Threat frame
“I think that speaks more than just
showing a high...a lot of
organizations...unfortunately are
not going to make it. But that’s
the reality of the situation. With
that being said, we just want to
stay alive. We just want to stay in
it.”

3rd Phase
(Mid-November – June 2021)
•
Three restaurants
(downtown, shopping
district)
•
Casual coffee shop
•
To-go, third-party delivery
•
Coffee and baked goods
focused

None
Reducing operating costs
(managing waste, owner
working long hours)
Receiving PPP/EIDL
Adding a new inventory system
Adding multiple third-party
delivery services
Adding curbside
Removing menu items (sourcing
issue)
Changing business hours
(downtown- 3 days a week)
Removing dine-in service

None
Removing menu items (cost
concern)
Receiving SBA 7A Loan/ A state
grants
Reducing food waste - making
product about 20% less
Starting wholesale

None
Changing business hours (open
more hours)
Kosher certified
Receiving PPP
Hiring accounting firm
Adding dine-in service

After the final interview
•
•
•
•

Three restaurants
(downtown, shopping
district)
Casual coffee shop
Dine-in, To-go, thirdparty delivery
Coffee and baked goods
focused

Threat frame
“At one point, we thought we
might have to either close the
[one of store] for a little bit of
time, or maybe look at relocating
it, but I'm starting to see signs of
life in our neighborhood, and I
think if we can just hold on until
the end of the summer, we’re
going to be fine.”
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Appendix 11. Mathematician’s Organizational Conditions, Sensemaking Frames, and BMI Actions Over Time
1st Phase
(March – July 2020)
20+ restaurants (downtown,
shopping district)
Fine and casual dining
Dine-in focused
American and Italian food

2nd Phase
(August – early November 2020)
•
20+ restaurants (downtown
and shopping district)
•
Fine and casual dining
•
Dine-in, to-go, curbside, inhouse delivery
•
American and Italian food

3rd Phase
(Mid-November – June 2021)
•
20+ restaurants (downtown
and shopping district),
catering business
•
Fine and casual dining
•
Dine-in, to-go, in-house
delivery
•
American and Italian food

Threat frame
“Our cash situation was so good
sitting at March 1st. On the 15th
of March, sales went away so
fast, nobody expected your cash
is disappearing quickly.”

Threat frame
“Restaurants are being blamed,
and we’re having to be at 50%,
but my people are not sick.
Restaurants are not spreading the
virus. Restaurants are not the
hotbed for the virus…
Restaurants are not the reason for
this so therefore I would ask why
we are still at 50% for our
restaurants.”

Threat frame
“We don’t have any extra labor
around, everybody is doing their
job and want to go home…we
are truly experiencing the fact
that we are, at this time, very
beat up; our people are very
tired. We lost a kitchen manager
this morning because of stress
and working too much. All of
our people are very stressed
right now.”

None
Receiving PPP
Furloughing employees
Closing half of restaurants
Only to-go business
Adding to-go tent (using outside
parking lot)
Removing menu items
Adding in-house delivery
Adding alcohol to-go
Renovating old restaurants (a
new roof and beer system)

None
Increasing employees' pay
Starting catering business
Changing to-go box

None
Receiving PPP
Changing business hours
Increasing menu price
Removing curbside and in-house
delivery

Time
•

Prior organizational
condition

Interpretation

•
•
•

Interpretation quotes

Major BMI actions

Minor BMI actions

After the final interview
•

•
•
•

20+ restaurants
(downtown and shopping
district), catering
business
Fine and casual dining
Dine-in, to-go
American and Italian
food
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Appendix 12. Gladiator’s Organizational Conditions, Sensemaking Frames, and BMI Actions Over Time
Time
•

Prior organizational
condition

Interpretation

Interpretation quotes

Major BMI actions

Minor BMI actions

•
•
•

1st Phase
(March – July 2020)
20+ restaurants (shopping
district)
Fine and casual dining
Dine-in focused
American food

Threat frame
“One of our guys in [a location],
when it first started... he was
kind of depressed when they
were just closing down, having
to do to-go; and he started
thinking about it, and he said
that then he got mad. And he
said, ‘I’m not going to let this
happen. I'm going to fight like
hell’ We coined the term …
#FLH… Everyone has those on
and the plan is we all fight like
hell and we’ve had that all
along. That's been the sentiment
for everybody.”
None
Receiving PPP
Furloughing employees
Changing payroll system
Adding a curbside booth
Adding family packs (new
menu)
Adding promotion (20% off)
Adding in-house delivery (some
places not all)
Adding third party delivery
Adding market fresh (row meat
and seafood)

2nd Phase
(August – early November 2020)
•
20+ restaurants (downtown
and shopping district)
•
Fine and casual dining
•
Dine-in, to-go, curbside, inhouse and third party
deliveries
•
American food
Threat frame
“We are feeling like we're able to
start seating more tables, but do
we have the staff to handle that?
You know, what do you put first,
the horse or the cart, right? We've
been trying to keep a staff of
people happy, and giving them
full sections and staffing a certain
number of people. Now that the
restrictions are loosened, we don't
have people who are just sitting
out there not getting shifts.”

3rd Phase
(Mid-November – June 2021)
•
20+ restaurants (downtown
and shopping district)
•
Fine and casual dining
•
Dine-in, to-go, curbside,
in-house and third party
deliveries
•
American food
Threat frame
“Yeah, the whole challenge of
not having a staff is somewhat
critical in some areas. I’m going
to talk to [a partner] today about
potentially even closing a day in
one location and we hate to do
that but it’s one of those things
where if you can’t get enough
people to work on the days
you’re open, it’s better to be
better staffed to on the days that
you are open, so, and we will
maybe even do more sales that
way too.”

None
Adding online order though own
website
Managing food waste - changing
inventory level

None
Receiving PPP
Increasing employees’ pay
Removing marketplace,
curbside, family pack, 20 % off,
and in-house delivery

After the final interview
•
•
•
•

20+ restaurants
(downtown and shopping
district)
Fine and casual dining
Dine-in, to-go, third
party delivery
American food
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Appendix 13. Hospitality’s Organizational Conditions, Sensemaking Frames, and BMI Actions Over Time
Time

Prior organizational
condition

Interpretation

Interpretation quotes

Major BMI actions

Minor BMI actions

•
•
•
•

1st Phase
(March – July 2020)
One restaurant (downtown)
Fine dining – dinner only
Dine-in focused
American food

Threat frame
“I was buying a blender at
Kmart and just stuff like that. I
was sitting there thinking, we’ve
totally had to switch to that.
We’re just making it happen.
But I think that's what the
entrepreneurial side of a
restaurant owner does that…I
don't have another choice. This
is everything I’ve worked my
entire life to get to and it’s like
closing is not an option for me…
the last thing I want to do is
close my business.”

None
Adding new air filtration system
Adding new POS system
Doing tip-pool
Furloughing employees
Adding online order system
Changing business hours (5days
to 7 days, open for lunch: to-go)
Adding promotion
Changing menu items
Adding alcohol to-go
Adding in-house delivery
service
Adding lunch business

2nd Phase
(August – early November 2020)
•
One restaurant (downtown)
•
Fine dining– lunch and
dinner, new menu items for
to-go
•
Dine-in, to-go, in-house
delivery
•
American food
Threat frame
“I think the biggest challenge for
us is not being able to have our
bar open, and I think that's our
biggest decline is our liquor sales.
I was looking at our September
numbers this morning, and the
wine is off, and the food is off,
just a smaller percentage, but
liquor is off by the most, and I
think that's directly affected by the
bar being closed…We’re missing
out on revenue by that, but I think
it’s not worth the fight of telling
people you can’t sit there because
people don’t want to be told "no"
in a restaurant.”
None
Changing menu items (prix-fixe
menu, to-go menu)
Managing food costs
Removing in-house delivery
service

3rd Phase
(Mid-November – June 2021)
•
One restaurant (downtown)
•
Fine dining– lunch and
dinner, new menu items
for to-go
•
Dine-in, to-go
•
American food

After the final interview
•
•
•
•

One restaurant
(downtown)
Fine dining
Dine-in focused
American food

Threat frame
“Our biggest issue is finding
people that have just any kind of
skill level at the level we need
has been a challenge. I think the
disruption of all this during
COVID, I think I read some
statistic that over a million
people aren’t returning to the
food service industry or
hospitality industry as a whole.”

None
Changing from prix-fixe menu
to full menu
Changing employees' pay
system (401K for part-time
employees)
Removing lunch service
Receiving PPP
Planning to change or drop to-go
service
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Appendix 14. Golfer’s Organizational Conditions, Sensemaking Frames, and BMI Actions Over Time
1st Phase
(March – July 2020)
Two restaurants
(downtown)
Fine and casual dining –
dinner only
Dine-in focused
American and Italian food

2nd Phase
(August – early November 2020)
•
Two restaurants (downtown)
•
Fine and casual dining–
lunch and dinner
•
Dine-in focused
•
American and Italian food

3rd Phase
(Mid-November – June 2021)
•
Two restaurants
(downtown)
•
Fine and casual dining–
lunch and dinner
•
Dine-in, to-go
•
American and Italian food

Threat frame
“It was scary. I mean the
prospect of just seeing our bank
account just dwindle and
dwindle and dwindle and
dwindle. It was like no end in
sight.”

Threat frame
“We are trying to be creative.
We’ve never run specials before,
so we’re trying to make it work
…it’s very unlikely [his business]
is profitable at the moment.”

None
Receiving PPP
Closing two restaurants several
months
Furloughing employees
Removing menu items (travel
concern - to-go service)
Adding to-go
Changing business hours
Adding lunch business

None
Adding online order service
Adding promotions
Changing menu items
Increasing menu price
Doing tip-pool

Threat frame
“We’re tight [on staff] but we’re
like, you know, last week one of
my cooks called out sick for two
days and it was hard, you know,
it was hard…You know, it’s like
running a marathon, at the end
of the weekend everyone just
like, you know, collapses, you
know?”
None
Changing business hours (6 days
to 4 days a week)
Adding outside patio
Receiving PPP/Restaurant
Revitalization Fund (RRF)
Removing promotions
Considering removing to-go

Time
•

Prior organizational
condition

Interpretation

Interpretation quotes

Major BMI actions

Minor BMI actions

•
•
•

After the final interview
•
•
•
•

Two restaurants
(downtown)
Fine and casual dining–
dinner only
Dine-in focused
American and Italian
food
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Appendix 15. Happy’s Organizational Conditions, Sensemaking Frames, and BMI Actions Over Time
Time
•

Prior organizational
condition
Interpretation

Interpretation quotes

Major BMI actions

Minor BMI actions

•
•
•

1st Phase
(March – July 2020)
One restaurant
(neighborhood)
Casual dining
Dine-in, to-go
Asian food

Low-level sensemaking
“Normally my kids at the store,
they work, and I stay home
because I’m too old to go back
to work…They are working
really well…The customers,
they are still happy to come.
That’s why nothing changed.”
None
Receiving EIDL
Furloughing employees
Adding to-go countertop
Adding in-house delivery
service
Adding an online order system

2nd Phase
(August – early November 2020)
•
One restaurant
(neighborhood)
•
Casual dining
•
Dine-in, to-go, in-house
delivery
•
Asian food
Low-level sensemaking
“I want to live simple. Yeah, I
don’t want to [change services and
menu]”

3rd Phase
(Mid-November – June 2021)
•
One restaurant
(neighborhood)
•
Casual dining
•
Dine-in, to-go
•
Asian food

None
Removing in-house delivery
service

None
Partnership with employees share profits

After the final interview
•
•
•
•

One restaurant
(neighborhood)
Casual dining
Dine-in, to-go
Asian food

Low-level sensemaking
“I’m retired. I don’t have to
work and then don’t have to put
any penny in the business. ”
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Appendix 16. Steady’s Organizational Conditions, Sensemaking Frames, and BMI Actions Over Time
1st Phase
(March – July 2020)

Time
•

Prior organizational
condition
Interpretation

One restaurant (shopping
district)
•
Casual dining
•
Dine-in, to-go, and inhouse delivery
•
Asian food
Low-level sensemaking
“I'm getting ready to retire pretty
soon, so I'm not that ambitious.”

Interpretation quotes

Major BMI actions
Minor BMI actions

None
Furloughing employees
Only To-go service (no dine-in,
no delivery)
Increasing menu prices

•
•
•
•

2nd Phase
(August – early November
2020)
One restaurant (shopping
district)
Casual dining
To-go
Asian food

Low-level sensemaking
“I’m happy with steady business
so I can plan instead going back
and working overtime and try to
make sure I have enough food to
sell. This is not what I want to
do. I just like to make it easier.”
None
None

3rd Phase
(Mid-November – June 2021)
•
•
•
•

One restaurant (shopping
district)
Casual dining
To-go
Asian food

After the final interview
•
•
•
•

One restaurant (shopping
district)
Casual dining
Dine-in, to-go, third-party
delivery
Asian food

Low-level sensemaking
“I have no more plan…I’m
looking forward to retirement
(laughter). It’s just I’ve been
working so many years and had
so much stress, just quite a lot of
stress.”
None
Adding third party delivery
Increasing menu price
Opened Dine-in service
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Appendix 17. Unconventional’s Organizational Conditions, Sensemaking Frames, and BMI Actions Over Time
1st Phase
(March – July 2020)
One restaurant
(Neighborhood)
Pop-up food stand, online
marketplace
To-go, third-party shipping
Desserts

2nd Phase
(August – early November 2020)
•
One restaurant
(Neighborhood)
•
Pop-up food stand, online
marketplace
•
To-go, third-party shipping
•
Desserts

3rd Phase
(Mid-November – June 2021)
•
One restaurant
(Neighborhood)
•
Pop-up food stand, online
marketplace
•
To-go, third-party shipping,
in-house delivery
•
Desserts

Low-level sensemaking
“I have been thinking for a long
time that may it's time to stop
the [desserts] business. This
[other business] is taking up so
much of my time and for the
hours that I put in, it’s a higher
return for sure.”
None
Receiving local government
grants
Adding own website’s online
order system
Removing pop-up service

Low-level sensemaking
“I think like I said, it [not
promoting the business] is
because it [desserts business] had
come as such a side thing for us
for a long time.”

Low-level sensemaking
“[Dessert business] now has also
been slowly decreasing, which
for me, has worked out great,
because I need time now that
we're doing all [the other
business] again.”

None
Adding in-house delivery service
Finding a new supplier

None
Receiving PPP

Time
•
•

Prior organizational
condition

Interpretation

Interpretation quotes

Major BMI actions

Minor BMI actions

•
•

After the final interview
•
•
•
•

One restaurant
(Neighborhood)
Pop-up food stand, online
marketplace
To-go, third-party
shipping, in-house
delivery
Desserts
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